PEDRO PAESTE AND FELIX CARPIO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. RUSTICO JAURIGUE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On
June 28, 1951, Pedro Paeste and Felix Carpio brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon Province against Rustico Jaurigue for
the annulment of two documents, copied in the complaint, which, it is
alleged, Felix Carpio and his son Maximo Carpio had been compelled to
sign through force and intimidation and against their will. One of the
documents purports to be an affidavit executed by Maximo Carpio on
March 12, 1945, certifying to the fact that his father, Felix Carpio,
was indebted to defendant in the sum of P3,900 and that his father had
agreed to execute a deed conveying 4 hectares of coconut land by way of
sale with pacto de retro to the said defendant; while the other
document purports to be a deed executed by Felix Carpio on May 3, 1945,
conveying to defendant, by way of sale with pacto de retro, a
piece of land in barrio Ilayang Rizal, Unisan, Tayabas, for the sum of
P1,000. The complaint also alleges that, since the execution of the
documents above referred to, defendant with the aid of armed men has
repeatedly entered another piece of land described as “lot No. 1488,
Cad. 251” in the same barrio, which was in the possession of plaintiffs
but different from the one mentioned in the documents in question, and
against plaintiffs’ will, gathered coconuts therefrom of the total
value of P7,000. In addition to the annulment of the documents,
plaintiffs, therefore, asked that defendant be sentenced to pay them
the said sum of P7,000 plus P2,000 for damages and attorney’s fees.

On motion of the defendant, the court dismissed the case on the grounds
that plaintiffs’ action had already prescribed, since “Under Article
1301 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 as well as under Section 43,
Paragraph 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 1391 of the new
Civil Code, an action for nullity in cases of intimidation or duress
must be brought within 4 years from the date the cause of action
accrued.”

Plaintiffs asked for a reconsideration of the
order of dismissal and, to meet the defense of prescription, also filed
an amended complaint alleging that since the execution of the pacto de retro
deed of May 3, 1945 by Felix Carpio, “defendant, with aid of armed men
has continuously committed and employed threat, intimidation and duress
against plaintiffs1 and with warning to the latter not to bring this
incident and matter to the proper authorities under pain of death.”

But the court denied reconsideration and disallowed the amended
complaint whereupon plaintiffs brought the case to the Supreme Court by
way of appeal, alleging that the appeal involves a purely legal
question.

Appellants contend that the lower court erred in
not admitting their amended complaint and in holding that their action
had already prescribed. Appellants are right on both counts.

Amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice. (Torres vs.
Tomacruz, 49 Phil. 913). Moreover, under section 1 of Rule 17, Rules of
Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course, that
is, without leave of court, at any time before a responsive pleading is
served. A motion to dismiss is not a “responsive pleading.” (Moran on
the Rules of Court, vol. I, 1952 ed., p. 376). As plaintiffs amended
their complaint before it was answered, the motion to admit the
amendment should not have been denied. It is true that the amendment
was presented after the original complaint had been ordered dismissed.
But that order was not yet final for it was still under reconsideration.

As to the question of prescription, it is evident that, with the
allegations in the amended complaint that the plaintiffs had executed
the documents in question through force and intimidation, that
defendant had been threatening plaintiffs with death if they took the
matter to the authorities, and that these threats lasted until 1951,
plaintiff’s action does not appear to have prescribed, for, in these
cases prescription does not begin to run until the party affected is
perfectly free to go to court as he wishes. As Manresa says:

“El
principio fundamental es, que comience la prescripcion cuando el vicio
cesa, y, o se recobra la libertad cohibida, o se conoce la realidad
ignorada o falseada. Por eso, tratandose de la violencia o
intimidation, comienza el plazo cuando cesan estas, cuando la libertad
del contratante reaparece; de donde se deduce que si despues de cesar
la intimidacion o violencia que arranco el consentimiento, se emplean
otras para impedir el ejercicio de la action de nulidad solo cuando
estas fuerzas o amenazas posteriores desaparecen, comienza a
transcurrir el plazo, y que al ejercerse aquellas (cuya prueba siempre
incumbe al que las sufre), se interrumpe la prescription comenzada.” (8
Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, Manresa, pags. 797-798).

We
also observe that the original complaint claims damages for fruits
gathered from 1945 to 1951 from land held by defendant but different
from the one covered by the documents in question. Not all of this
claim is barred by prescription.

In view of the foregoing,
the order dismissing the case and rejecting the amended complaint is
hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court below for further
proceedings. With costs. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.