HEIRS OF ASUNCION S. MELGAR, NAMELY: LAZARO DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN DE LOS SANTOS, JR., CONCHITA LABASBAS, FELICIDAD ENCARNADO, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. PIO ANTONIO M. BORREL…

Heirs of Melgar versus Borrel

The Case

This is a dispute over fifteen parcels of land that the late Asuncion Melgar donated to her step-grandson, Pio Antonio Borrel, in a deed of donation executed in October 1992. After Asuncion died in January 1993, a widow and without issue, her siblings came forward claiming to be her heirs and asking the court to declare the donation void. Their theory was narrow and technical: the lawyer who notarized the deed, Atty. Napoleon Ronquillo, Sr., was not a duly commissioned notary public in 1992, so the deed remained a mere private instrument, and a donation of immovable property not made in a public instrument is void under Article 749 of the Civil Code. The case matters because it tests the formal requirements of a solemn donation against the old notarial law, and because it shows how the burden of proof and the presumption of regularity decide a case when the attacking evidence is inconclusive.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Carigara, Leyte for declaration of nullity of donation, injunction, with prayer for a temporary restraining order, and damages. The trial court, in a decision dated 8 October 2010, dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that the deed satisfied Article 749 and that the certifications presented did not prove Atty. Ronquillo lacked a commission. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied in an order dated 28 January 2011. The petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and the appeal was denied for lack of merit, with the trial court's decision and order affirmed.

Facts

Asuncion Melgar was married to Pio Melgar. She died on 17 January 1993, a widow and without any issue, leaving personal and real properties, including the parcels of land in controversy. The petitioners are her siblings, except Conchita Labasbas, and they claim to be her heirs entitled to inherit her estate. The respondent, Pio Antonio Borrel, is her step-grandson and the donee of the fifteen parcels of land. He lived with Asuncion and took care of her until her death, and he remains in possession of the properties except for one parcel.

On 14 October 1992, Asuncion executed a deed of donation in favor of the respondent covering fifteen parcels of land. The respondent accepted the donation in the same document. The deed was prepared and notarized by Atty. Napoleon Ronquillo, Sr.

More than ten years later, on 26 November 2002, the petitioners filed their petition, alleging that the deed was fake, spurious, and a falsity, and that Asuncion never mentioned any donation during her lifetime. At pre-trial, they shifted ground: upon investigation they found that Atty. Ronquillo was not duly commissioned as a notary public in 1992, so the donation was not made in a public instrument. To support this, they presented the clerks of court of Regional Trial Court branches in Tacloban City, Ormoc City, and Carigara, Leyte, who issued certifications that Atty. Ronquillo was not commissioned as a notary public in 1992. On cross-examination, however, one clerk of court testified that her office had no available records of notarial commissions for 1991 and 1992, so she had no basis to say whether a commission had been issued. The respondent testified that he had no knowledge of the alleged lack of commission, and that it was common knowledge in Carigara, Leyte that Atty. Ronquillo was performing the duties of a notary public. The parties stipulated that Atty. Ronquillo was in fact notarizing documents in Carigara on 14 October 1992.

Issues

• Whether or not the deed of donation dated 14 October 1992 is valid under Article 749 of the Civil Code.
• Whether or not the certifications issued by the clerks of court sufficiently prove that Atty. Ronquillo was not duly commissioned as a notary public in 1992, such that the deed remained a private instrument.
• Whether or not the petitioners discharged their burden of proving their claim by preponderance of evidence.

Applicable Provisions

Article 749 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

This is the solemn requirement the petitioners invoke: a donation of real property not made in a public instrument is void.

Section 232 of the old notarial law, Act Number 2711, provides:

Section 232. Appointment of notaries public. Judges of Court of First Instance in the respective provinces may appoint as many notaries public as the public good requires, and there shall be at least one for every municipality in each province. Notaries public in the City of Manila shall be appointed by the Supreme Court or, during vacation, by the Supreme Court judge assigned to vacation duty.

This shows that the power to appoint notaries public was lodged with the judges of the Courts of First Instance in the provinces.

Section 240 of the same Act provides:

Section 240. Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.

This is decisive: a notary commissioned anywhere in the province of Leyte could lawfully notarize the deed in Carigara, Leyte.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held the deed of donation valid. A donation of real property is a solemn contract, void without the formalities of Article 749, and a deed acknowledged before a notary public is a public document. The Court listed three requisites for a valid simple donation of real property: it must be made in a public instrument; it must be accepted, either in the same deed or in a separate public instrument; and if the acceptance is in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified in an authentic form and this must be noted in both instruments. All were complied with here.

On the second issue, the Court examined the old notarial law in force in 1992, before the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Under Sections 232 and 240 of Act Number 2711, appointment lay with the judges of the Courts of First Instance in the provinces, and once appointed, the notary could act anywhere within the province, even beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court that appointed him. The certifications from the clerks of court of the Regional Trial Court branches in Leyte therefore did not categorically prove that Atty. Ronquillo lacked authority: he may have applied for a commission in any of the many Regional Trial Court branches in the province, and the petitioners did not show that all those branches issued the same certification. The testimony of the clerk of court confirmed that her office had no records for 1991 and 1992, so she could not say whether a commission had been issued. The stipulation that Atty. Ronquillo was notarizing documents in Carigara on the very date of the deed indicated, though not absolutely, that he had authority to perform notarial acts.

On the third issue, the Court applied the rule on burden of proof. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, which the Court described as the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, synonymous with the greater weight of the credible evidence, and which in the last analysis means probability of the truth. The petitioners failed to overcome this burden, so it could be safely presumed that Atty. Ronquillo was duly authorized to act as a notary public in 1992. The Court also deferred to the trial court's findings of fact, which are entitled to great weight on appeal absent strong and valid reasons.

Doctrine

A donation of immovable property is a solemn contract and is void unless made in a public document, with the acceptance made during the lifetime of the donor, either in the same deed or in a separate public document, and if in a separate instrument, with the donor notified in authentic form and the step noted in both instruments. A deed of donation acknowledged before a notary public is a public document. Under the old notarial law, a notary public's jurisdiction in a province is co-extensive with the province, so a commission issued by any Court of First Instance branch in that province authorizes notarial acts anywhere within it. Certifications from clerks of court that no commission appears in their records do not prove the absence of a commission, because the notary may have been commissioned by another branch. The party alleging the nullity of a notarized deed bears the burden of proving it by preponderance of evidence, and failing that, the presumption of regularity stands.

Disposition

The appeal was denied for lack of merit, and the trial court's decision dismissing the petition and its order denying reconsideration and new trial were affirmed; the respondent kept the donated lands.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a notary's jurisdiction under the old notarial law was co-extensive with the province, so a certification from one branch proves nothing about a commission issued by another. Examiners like to use this case to test the formal requisites of a donation of real property under Article 749 and the burden of proof when a notarized deed is attacked as a private instrument.