FILOMENO O. GANA, MARIA PAZ GANA, BELEN GANA, JOSE G. GANA, FILOMENA GANA, AND TELESFORO L. GANA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS GUARDIAN OF THE MINOR BENJAMIN GANA, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORA…

Gana versus Gana

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction filed by the heirs of the late Maria A. Gana against a judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The petitioners had won a judgment by default against Maria Luisa P. Vda. de Gana in a suit for reconveyance of four parcels of land. The respondent judge later set aside both the order of default and the judgment on the merits. The petitioners came to the Supreme Court to undo that act of grace, and the case matters because it fixes the hard outer limit of the remedy of relief from a judgment or order — a limit that no showing of diligence or good faith can stretch.

Procedural History

The petitioners, as heirs of the late Maria A. Gana, sued the respondent Maria Luisa P. Vda. de Gana in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for reconveyance of four parcels of land with the buildings and improvements thereon. The trial court denied the respondent's motion to dismiss and directed her to answer. When no answer came, the court, on motion of the petitioners, declared her in default and tried the case in her absence. Judgment was rendered for the petitioners.

The respondent then filed a petition for relief from the order of default. The court, presided over by Judge Jose F. Letargo, denied it. Later, the court, presided over by Judge Gavino S. Abaya, reconsidered, set aside the order of default and the judgment, allowed the respondent to answer, and set the case for trial. The petitioners went to the Supreme Court by certiorari with preliminary injunction, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Hearing was long delayed by the parties' agreement to pursue an amicable settlement, and the petition was finally heard in April 1955.

Facts

On 2 July 1947 the petitioners, as heirs of the late Maria A. Gana, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Maria Luisa P. Vda. de Gana for reconveyance to them of four parcels of land, together with the buildings and improvements erected thereon. On 8 November 1947 the court denied the motion to dismiss and directed the respondent to file her answer. On the same date, upon motion, the court allowed the respondent's counsel to retire from the case.

On 14 February 1948, upon motion of the petitioners, the respondent was declared in default for failure to file her answer within the reglementary period, and trial proceeded in her absence. The respondent learned of the order of default for the first time on 20 July 1948. On 28 July 1948 the court rendered judgment as prayed for in favor of the petitioners.

On 31 August 1948 the respondent filed a petition, dated 29 August 1948, for relief from the order declaring her in default. That was six months and seventeen days after the order of default had been entered. The petition was denied on 26 May 1949, but on 8 July 1949 the court reconsidered, set aside the order of default and the judgment, and allowed the respondent to answer. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court, contending that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction because the petition for relief was filed beyond the six-month period fixed by the rule.

Issues

• Whether or not a petition for relief from an order of default, filed within sixty days after the petitioner learned of the order but more than six months after the order was entered, may still be entertained.
• Whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in setting aside the order of default and the judgment on the merits and in allowing the respondent to file her answer.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 38, as applied by the Court, provides:

A petition to set aside a judgment, order, or other proceedings must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of such judgment, order or proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or order had been entered, or such proceeding had been taken.

This is the twin-period rule the Court enforces: the sixty-day period runs from learning of the order, but it can never operate beyond the six-month period counted from entry.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition for relief was filed out of time. The respondent learned of the order of default on 20 July 1948 and filed her petition on 31 August 1948, well within sixty days of learning. But the order of default had been entered on 14 February 1948, and the petition came six months and seventeen days later. The Court stressed that the periods are not extendible, and that the shorter period is subject to the longer one, so that relief is lost once the six-month period from entry has run, however promptly the petitioner may have acted after learning of the order.

On the second issue, it followed that the respondent judge had no authority to grant the relief. Having found the petition barred by the rule, the Court granted the writ prayed for, set aside the orders of 8 and 16 July 1949, and made the preliminary injunction final.

Doctrine

A petition for relief from a judgment, order, or other proceeding must satisfy two periods at once: it must be filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or proceeding, and in no case more than six months after the judgment or order was entered or the proceeding was taken. Both periods are non-extendible. The sixty-day period is subordinate to the six-month period, so a petition filed within sixty days of learning but beyond six months from entry is time-barred, and a court that entertains it acts without or in excess of jurisdiction. For the Bar answer, state the rule in the language of Section 3 of Rule 38, then apply the arithmetic: count learning, count entry, and let the earlier deadline govern.

Disposition

The petitioners won: the Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, set aside the respondent court's orders of 8 and 16 July 1949, and made the preliminary injunction final.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the sixty-day period is subject to the six-month period, so relief under Rule 38 dies six months after entry no matter how soon the petitioner learns of the order. Examiners use this case to test computation of the twin periods and to see whether you will be tempted by the equities of a defaulting party who moved promptly once she learned of the default.