PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DIONISIO LIDRES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Dionisio Lidres was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(Criminal Case No. V-4137) with the crime of usurpation of official
functions as defined and penalized in Republic Act No. 10, under the
following information:

“That on or about
the 22nd day of February, 1954, in the municipality of Balamban,
province of Cebu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and without pretense of
official position did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously perform acts pertaining to the position of the second grade
class of the Biasong Elementary School of the aforementioned
municipality, a position assigned to and occupied by Miss Josita Diutay
who had been duly appointed to said position.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and was, thereafter tried.
After trial, he was found guilty of the crime charged and was sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 3 years to 5 years, and to
pay the costs. From this judgment, he appealed to us directly assigning
as sole error the trial court’s finding that under the information and
facts of the case, he was guilty of the crime of usurpation of official
functions.

The records disclose that Magdalena P. Echavez, a
public school teacher of Biasong Elementary School, at Balamban, Cebu,
applied for and was granted maternity leave beginning the first school
day of January, 1954 and ending on March of the same year. To fill up
the vacancy expected to be created by said leave of Echavez, Josita
Diotay and defendant Lidres filed their respective applications as
substitute teachers. On December 30,1953, Diotay was recommended by the
supervising teacher of the aforementioned school, Hilario Laspiñas, to
fill up the position of Echavez. Laspiñas, however, requested Diotay to
sign an agreement (Exh. 1), wherein both Diotay and defendant agreed to
take over Echavez’ position on a “50-50” basis, that is, the period
from January, 1954 to March, 1954, would be equally divided between
them. Thereafter, Diotay received her appointment (Exh. B) as
substitute teacher, vice Echavez, effective January 4, 1954. Diotay
then took over the job of Echavez and began teaching the second grade
class in said school.

On February 12, 1954, apparently on
the strength of the agreement (Exh. 1), defendant appeared at Biasong,
Elementary School, armed with a prepared letter of resignation for the
signature of Diotay. When defendant asked Diotay to sign said letter of
resignation, the latter refused. Subsequently, defendant made known to
Diotay that whether she liked it or not, he would take over her class
on Monday, February 22, 1954. True to his words, defendant, on said
date (February 22), went to the classroom where Diotay was conducting
her classes, and insisted to take over the same, but Diotay tried to
hold on. As a consequence, both held classes, Diotay on 2 rows of
pupils and defendant, on the remaining 2 rows. In order to assert his
authority, defendant also erased Diotay’s name from the attendance
chart, and placed his own. Annoyed by defendant’s actuation, Diotay
left the classroom, and reported the matter to the principal teacher,
Exequiel Tecson, at Balamban. The latter advised her to return to her
post, which she did. When she arrived at her classroom in the afternoon
of the same day (February 22), defendant was still there, holding the
class until 4:00 o’clock. In view of this, Diotay went back to inform
said principal about defendant’s insistence in taking over her class.

On the following day, February 23, 1954, both Diotay and defendant were
summoned by the supervising teacher (Laspiñas) for a conference in Cebu
City. At said conference, said supervising teacher told Diotay to
continue teaching, while defendant was advised not to go back to the
school. Without heeding said instruction, defendant, on February 24,
1954, without any authority whatsoever, again took over Diotay’s class,
against the latter’s will.

Upon this set of facts, appellant was prosecuted and sentenced as stated at the beginning of this opinion.

In regard to the offense of usurpation of official functions, the law,
as originally appearing in Article 177 of Act No. 3815 (Revised Penal
Code), provides:

“Art. 177. Usurpation of official functions.—Any person who, under pretense
of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so,
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.” (Emphasis supplied.)

“Any person who, with or without pretense
of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to the
Government, or to any person in authority or public officer, without
being lawfully entitled to do so, shall be punished with imprisonment
for not less than two years nor more than ten years.” (Sec. 1; Emphasis
supplied.)

Still later on, or on June 14,
1949, Republic Act 379 was adopted, amending Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code, to read as follows:

“ART. 177. Usurpation of Authority or official functions.—Any
person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an
officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense
of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or of any
foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully
entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.” (Emphasis supplied.)

On May 31, 1954, appellant was, as already stated, prosecuted and later
tried and convicted under Republic Act No. 10. Appellant now contends
in his appeal that Republic Act No. 10 is not applicable to his case
because this law is an emergency measure and intended to apply only to
members of subversive organizations.

Examination of the
discussion of House Bill No. 126, which became Republic Act No. 10,
discloses indisputably that said Act was really intended as an
emergency measure, to cope with the abnormal situation created by the
subversive activities of seditious organizations at the time of its
passage in September, 1946. Hence, the elimination of the element of
pretense of official position required under Article 177 above-quoted
of the Revised Penal Code, and the elevation of the penalty from prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods (under the latter provision) to not
less than 2 years nor more than 10 years (under Rep. Act No. 10).

* * *

“Mr.
Sumulong. Now, if the gentleman will allow me to add something to
that—because I do not want to have any possibility of
misunderstanding—when I say that this proposed measure is intended to
supplant the provision of the Penal Code, I want to make it clearly
understood that this is going to replace the Penal Code provision only
so long as the situation which we intend to correct with this measure
continues to exist, and we like to believe that this situation will not
be permanent but only transient and ephemeral.

“Mr. Roy. I should like that to be made clear on the records. Do I understand from the gentleman from Rizal that this is a sort of an emergency measure?

“Mr. Sumulong. Exactly.

“Mr. Roy. And, if so, will, the gentleman explain the justification for the existence of that emergency?

“Mr.
Sumulong. This is an emergency measure because the situation which we
propose to correct with this bill, we believe, has its origin during
the Japanese occupation. It is a situation which was created on account
of psychology which arose during that extraordinary period in our
history.

* * *

“Mr. Roy.
Now referring to present conditions, does the gentleman have in mind
the reported activities of some organizations in the Central Plains of
Luzon to the effect that those organizations are levying or collecting
taxes and performing marriages?

“Mr. Sumulong. I think
those are intended to be corrected by this measure, if the newspaper
reports and the information contained in official reports are true,
which I cannot definitely state one way or the other.”

* * *

(Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Vol. I, No. 16, June 18, 1946, p. 309; emphasis supplied).

The explanatory note of said bill, states:

“In
some provinces of the Philippines, the rule of law and order has been
impaired or replaced by force and terrorism. Using economic injustice
as a rallying cry, unscrupulous agitators have succeeded in
destroying public faith and confidence in the orderly processes of
government and in imposing extralegal rule over the inhabitants therein.
That faith and confidence must be restored and constituted authority
respected. The Government must resist with all the forces at its
command any attempt to subvert public authority. The accompanying bill seeks to remedy the situation and approval thereof by this body is, therefore, hereby urged.” (Id., at p. 307; emphasis supplied.)

Were Republic Act No. 10 not so intended to apply only to members of
subversive organizations, it would create an absurd situation where a
lesser offense—performing official functions without pretense—is
penalized with a higher penalty, that of imprisonment of not less than
two years nor more than 10 years, instead of prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods. And since it is neither alleged in
the information aforequoted, nor proved during the trial that defendant
is a member of said seditious organizations engaged in subversive
activities, he could not be held liable or found guilty under said
provision of Republic Act No. 10.

Granting, arguendo,
that Republic Act No. 10 is an amendment to Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code and not merely an implementation thereof (2 Padilla, Revised
Penal Code Annotated [1958 Ed.] 267), or an emergency measure as
stated, the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 379 effective June
14, 1949, would constitute an amendment thereof by restoring the
element of pretense of official position in the offense of
usurpation of official functions, originally required by Article 177
prior to its amendment by the latter Act. Under Republic Act No. 379
then, the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense by defendant, pretense of official position is an
essential element of the crime of usurpation of official functions. But
the information specifically charges that defendant committed the
offense “without pretense of official position”. Under the
circumstances, the facts alleged in the information fail to constitute
an offense. Neither can defendant be convicted of usurpation of
authority, as distinguished from usurpation of official functions,
under the first paragraph of Article 177, as amended by said Republic
Act No. 379, namely, that of representing to be an officer, agent, or
representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government
or of any foreign government, inasmuch as the information does not
charge the same.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed; the accused acquitted, with costs de oficio, and the bond given for his provisional liberty cancelled. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., did not take part.