🎧 Case Brief Lecture

EVANGELINA F. MANUBAY, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REYNALDO A. FAJARDO,JR., RESPONDENT, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.

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Manubay versus Fajardo

The Case

This is a petition by Evangelina Manubay against her husband Reynaldo Fajardo Jr., with the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, as oppositor, seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of the husband's psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations. The wife alleged that the marriage produced no child and no common property, and that her husband senselessly refused to have sexual relations with her. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's reminder that a failed marriage, however sad, is not the same as a psychologically incapacitated spouse, and that the burden of proving incapacity rests heavily on the party who seeks to dissolve the bond.

Procedural History

Evangelina Manubay filed her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23. The respondent husband did not oppose the petition and did not attend the hearings, so the case was submitted on the petitioner's evidence alone, consisting of her own testimony and the case study of a psychiatrist. In its decision of July 30, 2001, the trial court adopted the psychiatrist's findings that both spouses were psychologically incapacitated and declared the marriage void. The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show psychological incapacity. The Supreme Court, through the Third Division, reversed the trial court and dismissed the petition.

Facts

Evangelina Manubay and Reynaldo Fajardo Jr. met in 1977 as nursing students at the Nueva Ecija Doctors College and School of Nursing in Cabanatuan City. After becoming licensed nurses, both worked abroad, but they kept in touch. They returned to the Philippines together and married in 1990, first in a civil wedding in January and then in a church wedding in March. In September of that year, the husband left for Canada as an immigrant, leaving the wife behind to pursue her masteral studies. A year later, she left for Saudi Arabia to work. In 1993, the husband sent word that he was in Brunei. The couple rarely communicated and inevitably drifted apart, each becoming uncaring of the other.

The wife testified that she was thirty three years old when she married, and that the man was some two years older. She recalled that the husband once told her he had been fooled into believing she was a rich woman, and that she was turned off by this remark. At one hearing she claimed that she and her husband never had carnal knowledge of each other. But at a later hearing she admitted that they did consummate the marriage, saying that initially there was none, but because they were married they had to have a family, as she wanted children. She also admitted that when she called him about an annulment, he asked for another chance, and she told him she did not know him anymore.

The psychiatrist, whose qualifications the State admitted, found that both spouses were equally responsible for the failed marriage. She described the wife as showing narcissistic traits and a narcissistic personality disorder, and the husband as meticulous, preoccupied with work, and at risk for a dysthymic disorder. She concluded that with their respective disorders the spouses could not sustain a smooth and deep marital relationship, and she attributed the failure of the marriage to environmental factors, including the unwillingness of either spouse to live with the other's parents. The trial court relied on this and declared the marriage void, finding that the husband had stubbornly refused to engage in coitus with his wife.

Issues

  • Whether or not the evidence was sufficient to prove that the respondent husband was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.
  • Whether or not the husband's failure to satisfy his wife's sexual desires, and the couple's failure to have children, amounted to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Applicable Provisions

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

This is the sole ground invoked by the petitioner, and the whole case turns on whether the husband's condition falls within it.

Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

The husband and wife shall live together under the same roof and shall treat each other with mutual respect and affection.

This describes the essential marital obligations that the incapacitated party must be unable to comply with.

Article 1 of the Family Code provides:

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

This is the policy foundation of the Court's ruling that all doubts are resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the evidence was insufficient. The trial court's finding of complete sexual abstinence by the husband was not grounded in the evidence, because the wife herself admitted that the marriage was consummated. The Court stressed that the question is not whether the husband indulged the wife's sexual desires to the degree she found satisfying, but whether his conduct amounted to psychological incapacity, and it did not. As the Court put it, the mental or emotional illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability to perform the essential obligations of marriage, and a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, in contrast to downright refusal, incapacity or inability, will not be enough. The Court also held that the psychiatric report failed to identify the disorder as the cause of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and did not tell whether the narcissistic personality disorder or the dysthymic disorder is characterized by the inability of the patient to know his or her obligations in marriage. The report was, at best, an ex post facto explanation of why the marriage did not last.

On the second issue, the Court held that the wife ultimately wanted out of the marriage because the husband failed to give her children, and that a number of circumstances unrelated to sexual incapacity made this impossible, including problems with in-laws and the physical and emotional distance caused by their separate work abroad. The Court noted that the husband was still willing to give the marriage another chance, and it was the wife who decided to call it quits. The Court reiterated that the party seeking nullity goes to court with a heavy burden, and that all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychological incapacity must be grave enough to bring about a disability to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Second, a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, as distinguished from downright refusal, incapacity or inability, does not prove the essential defect. Third, sexual inadequacies that do not amount to a persistent or senseless refusal to perform the sex act are not psychological incapacity. Fourth, the psychiatric report must identify the disorder as the cause of the inability to know or to assume the obligations of marriage, and not merely explain why the marriage failed. Fifth, the party seeking nullity bears a heavy burden, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage, consistent with the policy in Article 1 that marriage is an inviolable social institution.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the petition, so the marriage stands and the Republic won the appeal.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, in contrast to downright refusal, incapacity or inability, will not prove psychological incapacity. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a failed marriage and a void marriage, and to test whether a psychiatric report that merely explains the breakup satisfies Article 36.