G.R. No. L-6308. March 30, 1954
FEDERICO T. JUGADOR, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ZACARIAS DE VERA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
PARAS, C.J.:
complaint against the defendant Zacarias de Vera in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, alleging that in October, 1948, the plaintiff
agreed to construct a residential house at No. 33 Bulosan St., Sta.
Mesa Heights, Quezon City, for the defendant who undertook to pay to
the plaintiff the total sum of P18,500; that in December, 1948, the
defendant received the house to his complete satisfaction but failed to
pay in full the construction price ; that on April 22, 1949, the
defendant executed in favor of the plaintiff a certificate of
indebtedness) (quoted in paragraph 4 of the complaint) whereby the
defendant acknowledge having accepted the finished house free from
liens and encumbrances, and promised to pay to Jugador Construction the
sum of P3,500 as liquidated unpaid balance of the contract price, P500
on or before May 15, 1949, and to make all sincere and serious effort
to pay P2,000 so as to leave in June, 1949, only a balance of P1,000
payable monthly at P100 beginning August 1, 1949; that prior to the
filing of the complaint, the defendant had made partial payments
amounting to P900, thereby leaving P2,600 still due from the defendant
to the plaintiff; that the defendant, notwithstanding repeated demands,
has failed and refused to pay the said amount which the plaintiff seeks
to recover from the defendant, with legal interest from April 22, 1949.
Acting upon plaintiff’s prayer in the complaint, the court issued on
December 12, 1949, a writ of attachment by virtue of which the
defendant’s property covered by transfer certificate of title No. 6764
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, was levied upon. On December
27, 1949, the defendant filed an answer, alleging that his building
contract was with Jugador Construction which has not completed the
house in accordance with the prescribed plans and specifications; that
the defendant has been paying regularly and the unpaid balance is only
P2,400 not yet due and payable for failure of Jugador Construction to
comply with construction laws and regulations; that the defendant has
complied with the terms of the certificate of indebtedness quoted in
paragraph 4 of the complaint, and has paid P100 monthly from August 1,
1949; that the attachment issued by the court was secured improperly
and illegally, and had caused him damages in the sum of P500 which he
seeks to recover from the plaintiff by way of counterclaim, in addition
to the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. On January 5, 1950, the
plaintiff filed an answer of specific denial to defendant’s
counterclaim.
On July 22, 1950, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment,
on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
supported by an affidavit of the plaintiff alleging that,
notwithstanding defendant’s allegation that the building agreement was
with Jugador Construction, the defendant had always recognized the
plaintiff as the actual contractor to whom, as a matter of fact, he
made the first payment of P100 on July 20, 1949 upon account of the
liquidated balance mentioned in the certificate of indebtedness; that
notwithstanding defendant’s allegation that his house was not built in
accordance with plans and specifications, he had accepted the work
under his certificate of indebtedness; that, notwithstanding
defendant’s allegation that he has been complying with the term of his
certificate of indebtedness, he had failed to pay the sum of P2,000
before June 30, 1949, and had paid only P100 on July 20, 1949, after
receiving the letter of demand dated July 14, 1949, written to him by
plaintiff’s attorney. On August 10, 1950, the defendant filed an
amended answer, which was admitted by the court on August 14, 1950, the
amendment consisting in the allegation that the unpaid balance of
P2,400 was not due and payable because the plaintiff had failed to
execute the necessary bond and affidavit showing that he has already
paid the wages of the laborers he employed in connection with the
construction of the defendant’s house as provided for by Act No. 3959.
The court postponed action on the motion for summary judgment until
after all the issues had been joined; but on November 8, 1950, after a
previous motion for reconsideration had been denied, the plaintiff
filed another motion for summary judgment, reiterating that of July 22,
1950. Whereupon, on August 18, 1951, the Court of First Instance of
Manila rendered a decision sentencing the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P2,600, with legal interest from April 22, 1949,
plus the costs, and dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim for damages
for lack of merit. From this decision the defendant has appealed.
The appellant contends that there is no legal basis for the
rendition of the appealed summary judgment, because there are three
genuine issues in the case established by the allegations of the
complaint and the amended answer, namely, (1) How much has already been
paid on the amount? (2) Has the plaintiff complied with the provisions
of Act No. 3959? (3) Has the defendant suffered damages in the sum of
P500 by reason of plaintiff’s illegal and improper pronouncement of the
attachment?
In our opinion the lower court acted properly. Under section 3 of
Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment “shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admission on file,
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as to a matter of law.” As may
be gleaned from the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendant’s amended
answer, and the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with supporting
affidavit, there is no question that the defendant is indebted to the
plaintiff for the construction of the former’s house. Indeed, although
the defendant alleged that his agreement was with Jugador Construction,
the point is not now urged it being merely claimed that there is an
issue relating to the exact amount still unpaid, the defendant
contending that it is only P2,400 instead of P2,600 as sued by the
plaintiff in his complaint. As to this detail, however, we are
confronted by the allegations both in the complaint and in the
plaintiff’s affidavit supporting the motion for summary judgment; and
the defendant did not even attempt to file opposing affidavits
authorized under section 3 of Rule 36. As pointed out by Chief Justice
Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. I, pages
729-730, “if the defendant does not oppose the motion by
counter-affidavits, and, in all probability he will not, if the debt is
not yet paid a summary judgment may be rendered.”
With reference to the alleged issue as to whether or not the
plaintiff has complied with the provisions of Act No. 3959, it is clear
that, as observed by counsel for the plaintiff, no material question of
fact arises and the point is purely one of law. Indeed, the trial court
decided the case against the defendant on the premise that the
plaintiff failed to comply with said Act, although it found that the
same is not a defense to plaintiff’s recovery of the unpaid balance,
since one year had already elapsed after the completion of the work and
the defendant had waived the benefits of the law. It is significant
that Act No. 3959 provides that “That the bond herein provided for
shall be automatically cancelled at the expiration of one year from the
completion of the work, unless a claim for the payment of laborer’s
wages has been filed within said period, in which case said bond shall
continue in force and effect until such claim has been paid or
otherwise finally settled.” The purpose of the bond is obviously to
guarantee the payment of the laborer’s wages, but since one year had
already elapsed after the defendant’s house was completed and no claim
for wages had been filed within said period, the necessity for such
bond ceased to exist.
It is contended for the defendant that the latter could not waive
the legal effect of Act No. 3959 for being against public policy. This
is erroneous, since the law is aimed at protecting the defendant
against possible claims for wages emanating from the contractor’s
laborers. At any rate, under section 2 of the Act, if the defendant had
committed a violation by untimely paying to the contractor the entire
cost of the work, he would merely be responsible jointly and severally
with the contractor for the payment of the wages of the laborers
employed in the work covered by the contract, with the result that the
laborers would have a double source from which to collect their unpaid
wages.
The defendant also argues that his counterclaim for damages
presented the substantial issue of fact as to whether he could collect
from the plaintiff the sum of P500 by reason of plaintiff’s illegal and
improper procurement of the attachment. This contention is without
merit, as the amount of damages may be distinguished from the right
thereto; and in the present case the lower court rendered its summary
judgment in relation to the legal question whether the defendant was
entitled to any damages, in view of the circumstances under which the
writ of attachment was obtained by the defendant and issued by the
court. As a matter of fact, under section 3 of Rule 36, a summary
judgment may be rendered except as to the amount of damages. In other
words, such judgment may be entered on the issue relating to the
existence of the right to damages. Chief Justice Moran pertinently
observes that “if there is any real issue as to the amount of damages,
the curt, after rendering summary judgment, may proceed to assess the
amount recoverable.” In the case at bar the court in effect held, as a
matter of law, that there was no basis for the counterclaim for
damages, considering the facts appearing in the pleadings and
plaintiff’s affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment,
unopposed by any counter-affidavit which the defendant had the right to
present.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs against the defendant-appellant.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur.