MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB ET AL., PETITIONER VS. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

For a better understanding of the issues
involved, it should be stated that at the outbreak of the war in 1941
there were in the City of Manila 10 taxicab operators, each with an
authorized quota of taxicab units. Total number of units authorized for
all was 1,365; but of these only 1,200 were registered and actually
operated. Four years of war left these operators with their equipment
practically all gone so that when they resumed operation after
liberation in 1945 they were able to put in commission only a few
units. These were, of course, insufficient to meet the great need for
taxicab service. As was proper, the Public Service Commission gave them
a reasonable time within which to complete and register their pre-war
authorized equipment. The time was extended several times so that in
all the operators were given about three years. But despite these
various extensions, the last of which expired on September 30, 1948,
only six of the operators were able to complete their authorized
equipment. They were Jose F. Zamora, Amador O. Santos, Malate Taxicab
and Garage Company, Francisco Benitez, Jr., Mateo Boquiren, and Pedro
Reyes, the last three being holders of certificates purchased after
liberation from the pre-war operators Bachrach Motor Company.

While
the old operators were trying to acquire more vehicles to bring their
equipment to pre-war level—a process which at best could only be
gradual—the Commission, in order to meet the urgent need for more
taxicabs, resorted to the expedient of issuing, to post-war
applicants, temporary certificates, good only until December 31, 1948,
for the operation of taxicab service in the city of Manila and
neighboring cities and municipalities. This practice was, however,
discontinued in May, 1947, and thereafter aspirants to such
certificates had to content themselves with having their applications
docketed.

This was the state of affairs when the Commission
commenced to take action on the numerous applications which gave rise
to the present proceedings. First of all, there were the applications
of the pre-war operators (with the exception of Pedro Reyes) who were
able to complete their equipment for authority to increase their units,
the total number asked by all being 565 additional taxicabs. Then there
were the applications of the post-war operators who, as their temporary
certificates were about to expire, asked for the conversion of those
certificates into regular or permanent ones. Along with their
applications for conversion, they also asked for increase of equipment
by proposing an addition of l,728 units to the 676 they were already
operating. And lastly, there were the applications of the late comers
or prospective operators, who were overtaken by the ban on the further
issuance of temporary certificates. Only 8 of these late comers,
however, cared to prosecute their applications, the others having
apparently abandoned theirs by not appearing at the hearing. These
& new applicants proposed to operate a total of I65 units.

All
of the applications were opposed by the pre-war operators who were not
able to complete their pre-war authorized equipment and did not ask for
an increase of their authorized units. They were the Aero Taxicab
Company, Antipolo Taxicab and Garage Company, Bachrach Motor Company,
Nicolas F. Concepcion, Fortunato F. Halili, Manila Yellow Taxicab and
Garage Company, Inc., and the Rex Taxicab Company.

By
agreement of the parties and at their instance all of the applications
were heard together, after which the Commission rendered a decision
covering all of them. Overruling the opposition, the decision (1)
granted four prewar operators, namely, Malate Taxicab & Garage
Company, Jose F. Zamora, Amador D. Santos and Francisco Benitez, Jr., a
total of 125 additional units, (2) granted 78 of the postwar operators
regular certificates and a total of 399 additional unit8, and (3)
granted three of the new applicants— Emiliano Acuña, Alejandro
Fernandez, and Hennogenes Jacinto— regular certificates with an
authorized equipment of five units each. But the decision also
expressly states that the certificates of public convenience therein
granted “shall be valid and subsisting only for a period of fifteen
(15) years counted from January 1, 1949.” This is the decision that is
now before us for review.

The petition for review assails
the decision below on four grounds, namely, (1) insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the conversion of the post-war operators’ temporary
certificates into regular or permanent ones, (2) lack of authority to
decree such conversion, (3) insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the increase of equipment granted to both pre-war and post-war
operators, and (4) ruinous competition.

As to the first ground, it should be noted that the Commission has made the following findings of fact:

“(a) That the population of the City of Manila and the adjoining cities
and municipalities before the was has considerably increased. This is
borne out by the following official data of the Bureau of Census and
Statistics:

“(b) That the volume of business has also increased in great portion,
‘con la probabilidad de que Manila se convierta en empario comereial en
el Extremo Oriente’ (Halili vs. Ice & Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, R. G. Nos. 336-343).

“(c) That the University of the Philippines has already transferred to
its present site in Quezon City, which may be followed by other
institutions of learning now in Manila; that Quezon City will also be
the seat of the National Government in the near future, and this will
necessarily mean the expansion of the taxicab service and other means
of transportation to said City;

“(d) That the taxicabs
render a service different from that rendered by the autobuses, the
former being for individual transportation, while the latter is for
mass transportation in general.

“(e) That the lack of
taxicabs is keenly felt in the City of Manila, especially on certain
hours of the day, in spite of the fact that at present there are 1,759
taxicabs actually operating. This fact has been testified to also by
the Chief, Motor Vehicles Office, Mr. Primo Villar, and by the Chief of
the Traffic Division of the Manila Police Department, Major Frank C.
Young,”

And on the basis of these findings the Commission made the following conclusion:

“Considering
the above established facts and the investments made by the post-war
operators who furnished the taxicab service which pre-war operators
failed to render, the granting of regular or permanent certificates to
the present holders of the so-called temporary certificates and to some
of the new applicants or prospective operators is justified.” Section
35 of the Public Service Act provides that the Supreme Court may modify
or set aside any order, ruling or decision.” Following this legislative
mandate this Court in reviewing an order or decision of the Commission
has consistently declared that it will not substitute its judgment for
that of the Commission unless it clearly appears that there is no
evidence reasonably to support such order or decision. In the present
case, respondents’ evidence tends to show that there is real need for
more taxicabs if public convenience in the city of Manila and suburbs
is properly to be served. To a certain extent this is contradicted by
petitioners’ proof. But in our opinion the evidence preponderates in
respondents1 favor, and in any event we cannot say that there was no
proof before the Commission reasonably to support the appealed
decision.

Starting with the assumption
that the appealed decision grants permanent certificates to post-war
operators, the petitioners question the jurisdiction or authority of
the Commission to issue such certificates on the basis of what they
call “emergency conditions. “But the assumption is erroneous, for the
decision expressly states that those certificates “shall be valid and
subsisting only for a period of fifteen (15) years counted from January
1, 1949. ” In other words, though the operators have asked that their
temporary certificate! be converted into permanent ones, the Commission
has merely extended the life of those certificates for a period of 15
years from the date of their expiration. Being for a limited period
only, the certificates cannot be considered permanent. And as to the
expediency and justice of prolonging the life of these certificates,
there can hardly be any dispute, for aside from the fact that the
Commission has found, on the basis of evidence presented,/there is
further necessity for their continuance if public convenience is to be
adequately served, there is the equal need of doing equity to these who
have risked capital to render the service which those who were called
upon to do so were not disposed or were not in a position to supply. As
was said by this Court in the case of Malate Taxicab and Garage Company
vs. Public Service Commission, G. R. No. L-2877 (decided April 26, 1951), where this very question came up for determination:

“It
would seem a matter of simple justice, in the light-of their past
performance, of the enormous increase of population of Manila and
neighboring cities and municipalities, and of the encouragement given
them by .the Commission, thank to the failure or inability of pre-war
operators to supply normal needs, that the post-war operators should
not now be left in the lurch. They had ‘answered the call of service
for the convenience of the public,’ at a time when, in the words of the
appellant, ‘the supply (of cars and taxi meters) was very meager and
limited when ‘everything was priced at a premium, when ‘new cars could
be obtained only in the so-called Black Market.’ Whatever the reasons
for the pre-war operators’ refusal or inability to resume full
operation during the acute shortage of transportation facilities, the
investments of the post-war, small operators deserve protection, at
least as much as those who claim to have lost heavily as a result of
the war. At the most, the Commission does not appear to have acted
arbitrarily in issuing regular certificates of public convenience to
these operators.”

Anent the third ground
of attack, which refers to the increase of equipment for both pre-war
and post-war operators, the Commission has also found from the evidence
“that the number of taxicabs presently being operated in Manila is not
sufficient to meet the needs of the traveling public,” so that the
increase of equipment is in order, the only point to be determined
being the ¦umber of units that should be authorized in addition to
those actually operated. There can of course be no fixed formula for
determining with mathematical precision the number of additional
taxicabs needed so that in the determination of that point a great deal
must necessarily be left to the judgment and experience of the
Commission. Making use of that discretion the Commission has estimated
the additional units needed as follows:

“The population of
Manila and the adjoining cities and municipalities before the war was
627,036 while the number of taxicabs then in operation was
approximately 1200 out of the 1,356 units authorized the then existing
ten operators. After the war, the population has increased to 1,337,956
with approximately 1,759 taxicabs in actual operation. In view of the
great increase in population of Manila and the adjoining cities and
municipalities, the established need for additional taxicabs and so as
to provide for future expansion, the Commission is of the opinion that
the number of taxicabs now operated may be raised to two thousand two
hundred ninety-eight (2,298) or an increase of five hundred thirty-nine
(539) over the present 1,750 units.

“We believe that this
increase is a conservative estimate after having taken into
consideration the financial capacity of each and every applicant , and
the fact that the Commission is in duty bound to preserve and to
protect the taxicab business against unnecessary and wasteful
competition. If the increase in the number of units herein authorized
proves to be insufficient, then applications for further increase may
be entertained by the Commission.11

We find nothing in this estimate that would justify us in substituting our judgment for that of the Commission.

The
claim of ruinous competition is not justified by the proof. There is no
clear-cut evidence that these petitioners are losing because of the
increase of equipment granted to other operators. And the mere fear
that ruinous competition will follow such increase deserves scant
notice when it is not justified by the evidence.

There
is indeed a rule, and a sound one too, that old operators must be
protected in their investment so long as they are willing and able to
serve the public need in a proper and adequate manner. But this rule is
not absolute, for this Court has time and again held that the grant of
a certificate or preference to a new operator is in order where the old
operators were given a chance to improve or complete their service but
have failed to do so, (Jose de la Rosa vs. Pedro V. Corpus, 66 Phil. &; Interprovincial Autobus Company, Inc. vs. Lubaton, 6. R. No. L-3622, decided July 26, 1951.)

The
record shows and it is not disputed that present petitioners have all
been given ample opportunity to complete the equipment which they were
authorized to operate. The original period of six months given to them
for that purpose was extended several times, the last extension being
until September 30, 194S. In all, the total period granted was about
three years. They would make it appear that their failure to complete
their equipment was due either to the difficulty of acquiring taxicabs
or to the fact that they have not yet collected their war damage
claims. The first excuse is not convincing, considering that the other
pre-war operators as well as the post-war one have been able to acquire
plenty of taxicabs, and the second excuse is no valid ground for
depriving the public of a necessary service. Public convenience is the
paramount consideration in these matters, and public not be served if
petitioners herein were allowed to play the role of dog in the manger
and prevent others from rendering a service which they themselves
cannot give.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Jugo and Bautista Angelo JJ., concur.