ANTONINA CUEVAS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT VS. CRISPULO CUEVAS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance
entitled “Donacion Montis Causa,” ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the
northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in barrio Sinasajan, municipality
of Peñaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A). In the same instrument
appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.

“Subsequently, on May 26,1952, the donor executed another notarial instrument
entitled “Eevocaci6n de Donacion Mortis Causa” (Exhibit B) purporting to set
aside the preceding conveyance; and on August 26, 1952, she brought action in
the Court of First Instance to recover the land conveyed, on the ground (1) that
the donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the
donor; and (2) even if it were a donation inter vivos, the same was
invalidated because (a) it was not properly accepted; (b)
because the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own maintenance,
and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitude, for having refused
to support the donor.

Issues having been joined, and trial had, the Court of First Instance denied
the recovery sought, and Antonina Cuevas thereupon appealed. The Court of
Appeals forwarded the case to this Court because, the case having been submitted
on a stipulation of facts, the appellant raised only questions of law.

The first issue tendered concerns the true nature of the deed “Exhibit A”;
whether it embodies a donation inter vivos, or a disposition of
property mortis causa revocable freely by the transferor at any time
before death.^[1]

It has been ruled that neither the designation mortis causa, nor the
provision that a donation is “to take effect at the death of the donor”, is a
controlling criterion in defining the true nature of donations (Laureta
vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 P,hil.,
823), Hence, the crux of the controversy revolves around the following
provisions of the deed of donation:

“Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas m samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ang lupa
na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin ang patuloy na mamomosecion,
makapagpapatrabaho, makikinabang at ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa
akin pa rin hanggang hindi ko binabawian ng buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay
hindi ko ñga iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa
kaniya.”

There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that the
donor reserves to herself “the right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and
other rights and attributes of ownership while I am not deprived of life by the
Almighty”; but right after, the same donor states that she “will not take away”
(the property) “because I reserve it for him (the donee) when, I die.” :

The question to be decided 13 whether the donpr intended to part with the
title to the property immediately upon the execution of the deed, or only later,
when she had died. If the first, the donation is operative inter vivos;
if the second, we would be confronted with a disposition mortis causa,
void from the beginning because the formalities of testaments were not observed
(new Civil Code, Arts. 728 and 828; heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of
Appeals,^[2] 50 Off. Gaz, (8), p. 3568;
Tuason vs. Posadas, 54 Phil., 289; Sent. Trib. Sup. of Spain, 8 July
1943).

We agree with the Court below that the .decisive proof that the present
donation is operative inter vivos lies in the final phrase to the effect that
the donor will not dispose or take away (“hindi ko ñga iya-alis” in the
priginal) the land “because I am reserving it to him upon my death.” By these
words the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property
in. favor of another (a right essential to full ownership) and manifested the
irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked, title to the property in favor of
the donee. As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals,
ante, such irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter
vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post
mortem. Witness article 828 of the New Civil Code, that provides:

“Art. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his
death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void.”

It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor
intended that she should retain-the entire beneficial ownership during her
lifetime, but that the naked title should irrevocably pass to the donee. It is
only thus that all the expressions heretofore discussed can be given full
effect; and when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the
“possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of
ownership,” she meant only the dominium utile, not the full ownership.
As the Court below correctly observed,. the words “rights and attributes of
ownership” should be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding
rights of “possession, cultivation and harvesting” expressly enumerated in the
deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership she had no need
to specify possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are
embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor would she then have excluded the
right of free disposition from the “rights and attributes of ownership” that she
reserved for herself.

Hence, the Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid
donation inter vivos, with reservation of beneficial title during the
lifetime of the donor. We may add that it is highly desirable that all those who
are called to prepare or notarize deeds of donation should call the attention of
the donors to the necessity of clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the
donation, they wish to retain the right to control and dispose at will of the
property before their death, without need of the consent or intervention of the
beneficiary, since the express reservation of such right would be conclusive
indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor’s death, and
therefore, the formalities of testaments should be observed; while, a
converso, the express waiver of the right of free disposition would
place the inter vivos character of the donation beyond dispute (Heirs
of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568).

The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the deed
“merely recites that (1) the donee has duly read all the contents of this
donation; (2) that he ‘shall fully respect all its terms’; and (3) that ‘for the
act of benevolence’ he is expressing his gratitude” but there is no show of
acceptance (Appellant’s brief, p. 7), is without basis. To respect.the terms of
the donation, and at the same time express gratitude for the donor’s
benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance. If the donee did not accept,
what had he to be grateful about? We are no longer under the formulary system of
the Roman law, when specific expressions had to be used under pain of
nullity.

Also unmeritorious is the contention that the donation is void because the
donor failed to reserve enough for her own support. As we have seen, she
expressly reserved to herself all the benefits derivable from the donated
property as long as she lived. During that time, she suffered no diminution of
income. If that was not enough to support her, the deficiency was not due to the
donation.

Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeable with ingratitude, because it
was expressly stipulated that the donee had a total income of only P30 a month,
out of which he had to support himself, his wife and his two children. Evidently
his means did not allow him to add the donor’s support to his own burdens.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs in this instance,
appellant having obtained leave to litigate as a pauper. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

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^[1] In Bonsato vs. Court of
Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568, we have called attention to the legal
inexistence of so-called “donation mortis causa,” that our Civil Code
identifies with testamentary disposition.

^[2] 95 Phil. 481.