PHILIPPINE LAND-AIR-SEA LABOR UNION (PLASLU), SEVERINO BUNGOLTO AND THIRTEEN OTHERS, PETITIONERS, VS. KIN SAN RICE AND CORN MILL COMPANY AND/OR TIBURCIO MA AND TUBOD LABOR UNION…

Appeal by certiorari taken by Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union and fourteen of its members to reverse the resolution en banc
of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 43-ULP-Cebu setting
aside its decision (thru Judge Jose S. Bautista) dated June 30, 1960,
and dismissing their complaint.

Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, with main office in
Cebu City, while its co-petitioners are among its members employed with
respondent Kim San Rice & Corn Mill Company, a duly organized
domestic partnership doing business at Tubod, Lanao del Norte, with
respondent Tiburcio Ma as its manager.

On August 15, 1955, petitioners filed with the Court of Industrial
Relations a complaint for unfair labor practices under Republic Act 875
(Case No. 43-ULP-Cebu) against respondents and the Tubod Labor Union, a
legitimate labor organization, its officers and some of its members,
alleging that on April 9, 1955, Rosario Sambrano, vice-president of the
Tubod Labor Union, together with some members thereof, threatened and
coerced members of the PLASLU, who were employees of respondent
company, into joining their union, resulting in petitioner Feliciano
Angcajas being boxed and slapped by Sambrano; that on April 20, 1955
Tiburcio Ma, discriminating against PLASLU members, refused them work.

In separate answers respondents denied the material allegations of the complaint.

On June 30, 1960, after due trial, the Court, through Judge Jose S.
Bautista, found the respondents guilty of the unfair labor practices
charged and ordered them to desist from further committing the acts
complained of, and ordered them (except the Tubod Labor Union)
furthermore to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions
under the same terms and conditions of employment, with back wages from
April 20, 1955 until their actual reinstatement.

Deciding respondents’ timely filed motion for reconsideration, the respondent Court en banc issued the appealed resolution, whose dispositive part reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision dated
June 30, 1960, is set aside and the complaint should be, as it is
hereby, DISMISSED, for failure of the complainants to substantiate the
same.

However, since counsel for respondents in the oral
argument has made the Court understand that there could be a
possibility of taking them (petitioners) back (for work) should they
present themselves (Hearing of November 10, 1960), the Court enjoins
respondents to comply with the commitment for the sake of industrial
peace, whenever possible.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Industrial Relations committed
grave abuse of discretion in ruling (a) that their evidence, consisting
mainly of the testimonies of petitioners Francisco Angcajas, Felix
Gonzaga and Emilio Lucot, is not sufficient to prove the alleged unfair
labor practices alleged in their complaint, and (b) that each of the
fourteen individual petitioners should have testified to prove their
respective claims.

In the last analysis, the issue involved in this appeal therefore is
whether or not the respondent court erred in finding that its
co-respondents did not commit the acts complained of, namely: that they
coerced some members of petitioner union to join the Tubod Labor Union,
the coercion consisting mainly in petitioner Feliciano Angcajas being
maltreated by the Vice President of the Tubod Labor Union, and that
respondent partnership, through its Manager, discriminated against
members of petitioner union to whom it refused work and employment on
April 20, 1955.

In the decision of June 30, 1960, Judge Bautista found, on the basis
of the evidence presented, that said acts were committed by
respondents, but, in deciding the motion for reconsideration timely
filed by respondents, the court en banc found otherwise; that
is, that the alleged acts of coercion, maltreatment, and discrimination
were not committed. This is the finding that petitioners now seek to
have us reverse.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that the decisions of
the Court of Industrial Relations are open for review, on appeal by
certiorari, only as to questions of law and not as to questions of fact
nor as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support its findings of
fact. On the other hand, it is likewise clear that, upon considering a
motion for reconsideration, the Court of Industrial Relations, sitting en banc,
is not bound to accept the findings of fact and law made by one of its
judges who tried the case, but has the authority, nay, the duty, to
ascertain whether said findings are or are not supported by the record,
and if they are not, to reverse them and render the corresponding
decision. In view of these considerations, we are not now in a position
to hold that, contrary to the finding made by a majority of the judges
of the respondent court, the acts complained of were really committed
and that, consequently, respondents are guilty of unfair labor practice.

Wherefore, the resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.