VALERIANO C. BUENO, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO B. PATANAO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

REGALA, J.:


Valeriano C. Bueno and Pedro B.
Patanao are concessionaires of adjacent forest lands in the province of Agusan under licenses issued by the
Bureau of Forestry.

On April 29,
1958,
Pedro E. Patanao commenced Special Civil Case No. 48 with the Court of First
Instance of Agusan, against Valeriano C. Bueno and one Juanito Merin, for
injunction and damages. In his amended petition, Patanao alleged that on March
10, 1958 the respondents therein disturbed him in his possession of his timber
concession by illegally entering the same and cutting and hauling logs therein;
that when he went to the area to stop said respondents and their laborers,
truckers and loggers from cutting and hauling Jogs “he was met with riot
guns, pistols and other firearms”; and that defendants were able to cut no
less than one million board feet of exportable logs worth not less than
$64,000.00 and would be able to cut and haul even a Bigger amount in the space
of one month as they had allegedly concentrated all their logging machineries
and equipment with the apparent intention of illegally denuding the forest area
covered by his license. Patanao thus urged the court below to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction so as to enjoin the respondents, their agents, laborers and
lawyers, from entering the area and cutting and hauling logs therein pending
trial and, after trial, to make the injunction final and permanent, and to
condemn said respondents liable in an amount of not less than P175,000. 00 as
actual and moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

Finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, Judge Ortiz ordered the therein respondents
to file answer within 10 days form notice and to appear before the court on
April 30, 1958 at 9 o’clock a.m. to show cause why the preliminary injunction
prayed for should not issue. On April 30, however, an order was issued by the
same judge reading as follows:

“In view of the absence of the
presiding Judge of this Court, the Municipal Judge of Butuan City is
authorized to receive the evidence of the movant for the purpose of deciding
whether the injunction should issue or not. Let the hearing of this case in the
Municipal Court be set on May 5, 1958.”

The petition for preliminary
injunction was heard before Municipal Judge Ruiz on May 5 and 6, 1958, at which
dates Bueno filed written oppositions thereto and his answer to the complaint.

In defense, Bueno interposed the
following: (1) Patanao has no cause of action, his license over the area
adjacent to Bueno’s area having expired; (2) Patanao has not exhausted the
administrative remedies in the settlement of their conflict regarding their
common boundary, the same having been brought already to the attention of the
Bureau of Forestry for decision; (3) The area claimed by Patanao and where Bueno
is now operating is within said liueno’s duly licensed concession; (4)
Granting, without conceding, that Bueno had operated in the area of Patanao,
said operation was pursuant to a contractual relation between them; and (5) It
is Patanao who has actually encroached upon the forest area of Bueno.

On May 9, 1958, after hearing, Judge Ruiz granted
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and on the next day said writ
was issued by the Clerk of Court.

Armed with the writ and a sketch
map of the Bureau of Forestry delimiting Patanao’s area, a deputy of the
respondent Provincial Sheriff repaired to the concessions of the parties and
then and there restrained, prohibited and enjoined Bueno and his men from
entering and cutting or hauling logs or any other forest products from the area
of Patanao.

Later, in view of Patanao’s
representations that some logs were cut by Ms laborers within his area before
April 8, 1958, but same were left on the site and later on carted away by
Bueno’s men on or about May 10, 1958, an alias writ of preliminary injunction
was issued on May 12, 1959 by the same Municipal Judge Ruiz, ordering Bueno to
give and deliver to Patanao not less than 500 pieces of exportable lauan logs
on deposit at the logpond at Batohon, Esperanza, Agusan. In compliance thereto,
the respondent Sheriff caused the confiscation and delivery to the possession
of Patanao of 252 round logs pointed to him by Patanao’s men.

Bueno filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court orders dated May 9 and 12, 1958, and the
corresponding writs. After oral argumentation by both parties, the judge of the
Court of First Instance himself denied the motion, holding that in his absence,
under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act, Municipal Judge Ruiz had jurisdiction to
issue the preliminary injunction in question.

On June 2, 1958, Bueno instituted
before Us this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, claiming that the said orders of May 9 and 12, 1958 were issued far
in excess of the jurisdiction of Judge Ruiz and with grave abuse of discretion;
that it is Patanao who had encroached upon his forest concession; that all the
respondents have been enforcing the orders without affording him ample
opportunity to contest them; and that there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of Law.

On June 5,
1958,
counsel for herein respondents filed a “Motion to dismiss petition and
opposition to issuance of Preliminary Injunction”. In a resolution dated June
10, 1958
this Court dismissed the petition.

Bueno, however, filed a motion for
reconsideration and this Court reconsidered the said resolution, thereby giving
due course to the petition.

On motion of petitioner Bueno, a
writ of preliminary injunction was issued on June 20,
1958, upon
a bond for the fixed sum of P10,000.00. Respondents filed their answer in due
time.

It is contended in the first place
that the orders of May 9 and 12, 1958 were both improvidently issued by
Municipal Judge Ruiz of Butuan City, the authority granted to the said judge
being merely “to receive the evidence of the movant for the purpose of deciding
whether the injunction should issue or not.”

Under Section 88 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, the Justice of the Peace of a capital or the Municipal
Judge of a chartered city has like interlocutory jurisdiction as a Judge of a
Court of First Instance to hear motions for the appointment of a receiver, for
temporary injunctions, and all other orders of the Court which are not final in
their character. Even conceding, without admitting, that the Municipal Judge in
this case was given only a limited authority to receive evidence on the
granting of the injunction, yet when the writ of injunction was issued by him,
the Judge of the Court of First Instance was no longer in the province;
therefore, his act may be regarded as in pursuance of the authority vested in
him under the aforementioned Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended.

Furthermore, the Judge of the Court
of First Instance who issued the authority to the Municipal Judge under date of
April 30, 1958 to receive evidence only, in denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Bueno, sustained the power of the Municipal
Judge to issue the writ in question.

The next point raised by Bueno is
that Patanao has no cause of action as yet against him in view of the fact that
the boundary controversy between them is still pending investigation by the
Bureau of Forestry, and before one can resort to the court such administrative
remedies as may be available should first be exhaused, citing the case of
Villanueva, et al. vs. Ortiz, et al., 103 Phil., 875, decided on May 28
1958.

At first glance, petitioner’s
argument appears to be tenable. True, the common boundary of the parties was
verified by the Bureau of Forestry way back in March 1955. It seems, however,
that while petitioner Bueno had endeavored to respect the verification report,
respondent Patanao had refused to conform thereto, so much so that the conflict
was brought anew to the attention of the Dir rector of Forestry who has
formally taken a hand therein. On or about April 8, 1958, before Patanao
instituted Civil Case No. 48 with the respondent court, he was officially
requested to designate a representative to accompany Forestry officials in the
verification of the common boundary line between him and petitioner (Exhibit 8,
letter addressed to Patanao by Anastacio G. Sison, officer-in-charge, Esperanza
Forest Station, Agusan, p. 8; Opposition to Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, dated, July 23, 1958.) That said boundary dispute is’
still pending in the Bureau of Forestry at the filing of this petition is shown
by the letter of the District Forester of Agusan, now in the record as Annex
A-Opposition. The record also discloses that Patanao’s application for renewal
and consolidation of his timber licenses for 1957-58 had not yet been approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Its renewal depends upon
the consideration of the Director of Forestry. The granting of timber licenses,
their renewal or cancellation, and the determination of conflicting claims or
boundary lines involving forest zones, such as those presently occupied by the
parties hereto, are all vested by law primarily upon the Director of Forestry
and ultimately upon his Department head.

Incidentally intertwined, however,
with the issue of boundary in this case are the questions of public order and
the determination of the contractual relations of the parties which only courts
of justice have jurisdiction.

Paragraph 3 of the amended petition
of Patanao recites that when he attempted to stop petitioner Bueno and his
laborers from cutting and hauling logs, “he was met with riot guns,
pistols and other firearms.” This averment finds substantiation in the
resolution of respondent Judge Ruiz granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, as prayed for by Patanao, the pertinent part of which
reads as follows:

“That respondents committed
illegal acts against the person and rights of the petitioner and by the use of
arms, riot guns, pistols; and other firearms, forced the petitioner to desist
and stop his lawful logging operation in the area in question, thus disturbing
his peaceful and continuous possession of the above-described forest area, so
that on May 2, 1958, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with this Court
Criminal Case No. 1641, against Custodio Martinez, one of the trusted
bodyguards of the respondents, for GRAVE COERCION, against the very person of
the petitioner (Exhibit K) and this offense is only one of the illegal acts
committed by the respondents’ men on April 8, 1958, which acts are highly
artbitrary and oppressive to the rights of the petitioner. * * *.”

In the case of Bohayang vs.
Maceren, et al., 96 Phil., 390; 53 Off. Gaz. July 15, 1957, p. 4105, which
involved public land claimed by the parties thereto as within the area covered
by their respective homestead applications, this Court directed the trial court
therein to go ahead with the hearing of the possessory action instituted by one
of the applicants in spite of the pendency of a boundary dispute between the
same parties in the Bureau of Lands, thus—

“If merely a matter of the
respondent court’s control of its calendar, this Court would not interfere with
it. But the order complained of suspends the hearing of the case and makes the
resumption thereof dependent upon the action to be taken by the Director of
Lands on the conflict of claims on the land between the; petitioner and the
respondents. Such postponement may he for a long stretch of time as it is made
to depend upon the action to be taken by the Director of Lands. Such action
would settle or determine who under the Public Land Act is entitled to the land
as and for homestead. On the other hand, an action for recovery of possession
is an urgent matter which must be decided promptly to forestall breaches of
peace, bodily injury to person, mayhem, or perhaps loss of life. It is the duty
of the Court to act swiftly and expeditiously in cases of that nature.”

Considerations of public order must
transcend the mere administrative issue of conflict of “boundaries, if
courts must continue to be looked upon as the supreme arbiter of social peace.
Indeed, while the question of boundary is peculiarly within the province of the
executive branch in those cases involving the public domain, only courts are
empowered and have the weapons to compel the parties, temporarily or
perpetually, to maintain peace. One of these judicial weapons is the
provisional remedy of injunction which, considering that its sole object is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of a case can be heard, and
that the status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status
which preceded the pending controversy (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 75, Phil.
225), must be executed promptly and expeditiously to avert trouble or its
recurrence.

In an earlier case (Pitargue vs.
Sorilla, 92 Phil., 5; 48 Off. Gaz. p. 3849), this Court lengthily discussed the
propriety of a possessory action, like forcible entry, even as the rival
claimants’ respective rights to the lands applied for by them are still pending
investigation in the Bureau of Lands, and it was there concluded that the
determination of rights to public lands is different from the determination of
who has the actual physical possession or occupation with a view to protecting
the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace:

“* * * A judgment of the court
ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual
occupant, who has Been deprived thereof by another through the use of force or
in any other illegal manner, can never he ‘prejudicial interference’ with the
disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if courts were
deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of possession, the
threat of judicial action against breaches of the peace committed on public
lauds would be eliminated, and a state of lawlessness would probably be
produced between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force or might, not
right or justice, would rule.”

Also in the same case, this Court
held that the right of a bona fide occupant of public land may be
protected by the possessory action of forcible entry or by any other suitable remedy that our rules provide. Injunction, whether temporary or
perpetual, is a suitable remedy provided by our Rules of Court. Indeed, the
petition for injunction filed by Patanao in the lower court is practically a
possessory action, for it has no other purpose than to restore Patanao in the
area which he claims to be in his actual physical possession.

Another phase of the whole
controversy which favors the continuation, trial and disposition of the
petition for injunction in the court of origin concerns the contractual
relations of the parties. Paragraph 4 of the amended petition of Patanao seeks
the payment of $64,000 representing the value of one million board feet of
exportable logs allegedly cut and hauled by Bueno and his man from the area in
dispute. In his supplemental opposition to Patanao’s motion for preliminary
injunction, Bueno asserted:

“In the remote possibility that
plaintiff can maintain that defendants really operated in the area of plaintiff
(which, certainly has not during the date or dates cited in plaintiff’s
petition) the same was done by defendants pursuant to a contractual relation in
writing between plaintiff and defendant Valeriano C. Bueno, executed at Butuan
City on May 1, 1955, true copies of documents being attached hereto, * * *.

“It will be noted from the
attached documents that plaintiff had entered into a royalty arrangements with
defendant Valeriano C. Bueno for the latter to operate in plaintiff’s area at
the agreed loyalty of P3.50 per cubic meter, ‘as long as the area of the Lessee
plaintiff) shall contain commercial timber’ and that plaintiff had created ‘a
continuing first mortgage on all the total timber production of the Lessee
(plaintiff)’ in favor of defendant Valeriano C. Bueno.

“The agreed consideration of
P3.50 per cubic meter of timber taken from plaintiff’s area cannot be
interjected other than as a royalty because the same amount of P3.50 was to be
paid irrespective of ‘any grade class of timber cut.’

“Pursuant to the above-mentioned
contractual arrangement, plaintiff obtained from defendant Bueno a total of
P192,205.50 from May 1, 1955 to date, against which were charged the value of
timber cut by defendants from plaintiff’s area at P3.50 per cubic meter,
irrespective of ‘any grade, class of timber cut,’ to date, but leaving still a
balance of P8,921.02 to be offset by plaintiff with his timber and in his
alleged area.”

and in his (Bueno’s) answer to the
injunction suit, he alleged the following defenses:

“15. That granting, without
conceding, that defendants have cut logs and hauled them from the alleged
concession area of plaintiff, the same was in pursuance of a certain Agreement
and working arrangement, both executed on May 1, 1955, between plaintiff and
defendant Valeri ano C. Bueno for the exploitation and operation of the alleged
concession area of plaintiff; that plaintiff’s agreement with defendant
Valeriano C. Bueno was exclusive and in full force and effect ‘as long as the
area of the plaintiff shall contain commercial timber’ and that plaintiff had
created ‘a continuing first mortgage on all the total timber production’ out of
his area in favor of defendant Valeriano C. Bueno;

“16. That pursuant to the
Agreement and working arrangement plaintiff entered into with defendant
Valeriano C. Bueno mentioned in the preceding paragraph 15, plaintiff still has
an outstanding account with defendant Bueno in the amount of P18,921.02, to
date, the said amount to be paid off in the form of logs cut and hauled out of
the plaintiff’s alleged area by defendants pursuant to said Agreement and
working arrangement but which plaintiff maliciously and unreasonably refused to
pay, either in kind or in cash, despite repeated demands;

“17. That true copies of the
documents mentioned in the preceding paragraphs 15 and 16 are made parts and
parcels of the herein answer and attached hereto to Annexes 1 and 2;”

It appears that during the hearing
of the motion for preliminary injunction before respondent Judge Ruiz,
respondent Patanao stated that the agreement executed on May 1, 1955 were no
longer in force because of the failure of Bueno to comply with his obligations
in favor of Patanao, In his answer to the instant petition for certiorari,
Patanao averred in paragraph 3 thereof that the contracts in question pertained
to a lease of equipment by Bueno in favor of Patanao and did not give said
Bueno the right to operate in the area of Patanao.

In the case of Espinosa, et al vs.
Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134, We denied the petition to declare the lower court
therein to be without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the main
suit—a fishpond leased by the government to the plaintiff—on the
ground that the case was the offshoot of disagreements between the parties in
connection with their civil or contractual relations and not with the
determination of conflicting claims regarding the disposition of public lands
for fishpond purposes. This Court said in that case:

“The powers granted to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce by the pertinent provisions of law
invoked by petitioners are all of executive and administrative nature, such as
granting of licenses, permits, leases and contracts or approving, rejecting,
reinstating, or canceling applications, or deciding conflicting applications.
The controversies between the parties, as raised in-the pleadings in case No.
200 of the Court of First Instance of lioilo appear to have arisen upon
disagreements is civil or contractual relations between the litigants to which
the legal provisions invoked by petitioners are not and cannot be applicable.
It should be far-fetched to recognize in the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce the power of determining whether or not, as alleged by Paranpan, he
has been deprived by defendants of the possession of the fishpond in question
and of the legal effects of such alleged deprivation, or upon the nature of the
two contracts of mortgage in the form of sale with right to repurchase between
Sason and Paranpan, alleged by defendants, or whether Paranpan has charged
Sason with usurious interests. These are questions judicial in nature and only
courts of justice can decide them.”

Similarly, whether or not the
agreements, dated May 1, 1955, are still in force between the parties, and
whether they involve the cutting of timber in the forest area of Patanao by
Bueno on a royalty basis, as alleged by Bueno, or a mere lease by Patanao of
Bueno’s logging machinery, as maintained by Patanao, are essentially judicial
questions which the respondent Court of First Instance alone can and must
decide it complete and effective relief is to be obtained.

This case should be distinguished
from the case of Villanueva vs. Ortiz, supra, cited by
petitioners. While that case involved boundary disputes between two
concessionaires of adjacent forest lands (one of whom, coincidentally, is
herein respondent Patanao), there was no showing violence or riotous acts that
would necessitate the immediate interference of the courts therein. Nor was
there alleged any contractual relations between the parties.

In view of the foregoing considerations,
the instant petition is hereby dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued dissolved, with costs against petitioner.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.