J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE FELIX V. MAKASIAR, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XI; JACINTO S. PURIFICACION, PONCIAN…

Tuason versus Makasiar

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by J.M. Tuason and Company, Incorporated against Judge Felix V. Makasiar, then presiding judge of Branch Eleven of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and against the private respondents who had sued the company in the trial court. The company asked the Supreme Court to annul a trial court order that merely held in abeyance the resolution of its affirmative defenses, among them the defense of res judicata, which sought the dismissal of the complaint. The case matters for two reasons: it shows that an order postponing a ruling is not, by itself, a grave abuse of discretion, and yet it also shows that where the Supreme Court has already settled the very title in dispute, the trial court may be ordered to dismiss the case outright.

Procedural History

The private respondents filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to annul the decision and decree in a land registration case and to annul Torrens Title Number 735, in order to recover ownership and possession of about forty four hectares originally covered by that title. The company moved to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action, prescription, and res judicata. The trial court denied the motion. The company then filed an answer, later amended, and asked for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative and special defenses, namely lack of cause of action, absence of jurisdiction, and res judicata. Judge Makasiar issued the challenged order holding the resolution of those defenses in abeyance until after trial on the merits, and setting the trial for August 11, 1966. The company came to the Supreme Court by certiorari. In the meantime, the decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias, which had declared the company's title null, was appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed and set it aside in the Benin versus Tuason decision of June 28, 1974.

Facts

In January of 1965, Judge Eulogio Mencias rendered a joint decision in three cases adjudging null the title of J.M. Tuason and Company to a vast tract of land in the Greater Manila area. A considerable portion of that land had already been disposed of to many innocent purchasers, including a few educational and business institutions. That same title was the one questioned in the complaint before Judge Makasiar.

On November 16, 1964, the private respondents had filed their complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, seeking to annul the decision and decree in the land registration case and Torrens Title Number 735, and to recover about forty four hectares. The company moved to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action, prescription, and res judicata. The motion was denied on February 2, 1965. The company answered, later amending its answer, and moved for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses.

On July 7, 1966, Judge Makasiar issued the order holding the resolution of the affirmative defenses in abeyance until after trial on the merits, and setting the trial for August 11, 1966. The company then filed this petition for certiorari on August 3, 1966. While the petition was pending, the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision penned by Justice Zaldivar, reversed and set aside the appealed decision of Judge Mencias, affirming the company's title to the two parcels embraced in the original Certificate of Title Number 735.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court's order holding in abeyance the resolution of the affirmative defenses until after trial on the merits amounted to grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
• Whether or not, in light of the Supreme Court's decision affirming the company's title, the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

Applicable Provisions

Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution, as quoted in the decision, provides:

The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.

The Court invoked this provision to explain why trial courts should exercise caution before ruling that the claims of less privileged litigants are without legal support, although it ultimately held that this consideration could not defeat the company's settled title.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the order, on its face, could not be stigmatized as a manifestation of grave abuse of discretion. It would stretch the meaning of that concept, the Court said, to treat a trial judge's determination that the need for immediate resolution of affirmative defenses is not apparent as a wayward and capricious act. The Court noted that it may even be advisable for lower courts to take time and weigh seriously the opposing legal arguments, so that the ultimate decision is not vitiated by errors of law. It added that where the litigation is between parties who may belong to the lower income groups and economically well entrenched families, there is much to be said for greater caution, in keeping with the social justice concept of the Constitution and the accepted meaning that he who has less in life should have more in law.

On the second issue, the Court held that despite the foregoing views, the writ prayed for must be granted. With the disposition in Benin versus Tuason, no other outcome could be expected. The title of the company to the disputed lots had once again been affirmed, as it had been since the 1933 decision in Bank of the Philippine Islands versus Acuña. The Court made clear that the writ was granted not because of any error that infected the challenged order, but on the basis of that supervening decision.

Doctrine

First, a trial court's order holding in abeyance the resolution of affirmative defenses until after trial on the merits is an exercise of judicial autonomy that does not, by itself, amount to grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. Second, where the Supreme Court has already affirmed the title of a party to the land in dispute, a complaint seeking to annul that title is barred by res judicata, and the trial court may be ordered to dismiss it. Third, the social justice guarantee in Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution counsels caution in favor of the less privileged, but it cannot override a title that has been definitively upheld by the Supreme Court.

Disposition

The writ of certiorari was granted, and the judge appointed to the sala of the respondent, who had in the meantime been made an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, was ordered to dismiss Civil Case Number 8470 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, without pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that postponing the resolution of affirmative defenses is not grave abuse of discretion, but a supervening Supreme Court decision upholding a Torrens title bars the complaint by res judicata. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of certiorari against interlocutory orders, and the finality of Torrens titles affirmed in the Tuason line of decisions.