PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DIOSDADO PATAYAN, JR. @ “TATA”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Patayan

The Case

This is People versus Patayan, a criminal appeal in which the accused, Diosdado Patayan, Junior, admits that he wounded the private complainant, Godofredo Ladesma, but claims he did so in self-defense. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the whole architecture of self-defense: the burden of proof that shifts to the accused who admits the act, the indispensable element of unlawful aggression, the sharp line between self-defense and retaliation, and the rule that incomplete self-defense can never rest on a missing unlawful aggression. It also teaches how voluntary surrender may still be credited even after an information has been filed and a warrant issued.

Procedural History

An information for frustrated homicide was filed against the accused before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49 of Tagbilaran City. He was arraigned with the assistance of counsel and entered a plea of not guilty. After pre-trial and trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision on April 18, 2012, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and awarding actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning as errors the trial court's ruling that unlawful aggression had already ceased and its treatment of the information's caption.

Facts

On the evening of September 20, 2004, Godofredo Ladesma was in the sala of his house in Tagbilaran City watching television with his stepdaughter Norlyn Lasco and his two children. The accused suddenly barged inside and repeatedly hacked him on the forehead and chest with a samurai sword, rendering him unconscious. The children shouted for help, and a neighbor, Marietta Deguma, saw the accused emerging from the house with a bloodied samurai. Godofredo was treated by Doctor Rolando Po, who described a hacking wound on the left forehead and another on the left breast and opined that without medical attendance the open wounds could have caused death.

The accused told a different story. He claimed that on the previous day he had been warned that Ladesma was roaming the neighborhood with a bolo. On the evening in question, while walking to a store with two friends, Ladesma suddenly sprang from the dark alley and struck him with a bolo, hitting his shoulder and later his chest. He ran home, seized a samurai displayed in his sala, and parried the blows. He drove Ladesma out of the house, but Ladesma kept attacking, and near Ladesma's house he retaliated with two strikes. Doctor Po found the accused's wounds to be minor and superficial.

The trial court rejected self-defense, holding that whatever unlawful aggression began had ceased when the accused reached his own house, so that his later hacking was retaliation. The accused appealed.

Issues

• Whether or not the unlawful aggression initiated by the private complainant had already ceased at the time the accused inflicted the injuries, such that self-defense cannot be appreciated.
• Whether or not incomplete self-defense may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused.
• Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender may be credited to the accused.

Applicable Provisions

The information charges the crime under Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 249 defines homicide, and Article 6 governs the stages of execution, including the frustrated stage on which the conviction rests. The Court applies the elements of self-defense as a justifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, which requires unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. The Court states the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, namely that the offender has not been actually arrested, that he surrendered to a person in authority or the latter's agent, and that the surrender was voluntary.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal is without merit. When an accused admits inflicting the wounds but invokes self-defense, he assumes the burden of establishing his plea by credible, clear, and convincing evidence, and he must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution. The Court found that only the initial attack by Ladesma was established, and that the accused's claim of a relentless, continuous attack was uncorroborated and incredible. Against it stood the straightforward testimony of Norlyn Lasco that her stepfather was already inside the house watching television when the accused barged in and hacked him. The Court stressed that unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non of self-defense, and that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression ceases; when it ceases, the defender has no right to wound the former aggressor, and what is committed is retaliation, not self-defense.

It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.

On the second issue, the Court held that incomplete self-defense cannot be appreciated, because unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite even for the privileged mitigating circumstance. Any of the other two elements may be wanting, but never unlawful aggression.

It is any one of the two other elements of self-defense that could be wanting in an incomplete self-defense, i.e., reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; or lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself; but it can never be unlawful aggression.

On the third issue, the Court refused passion or obfuscation, since the act arose from retaliation and not from a lawful sentiment. It did, however, credit voluntary surrender. Although an information had been filed and a warrant of arrest issued before the accused surrendered, the Court held that the mere filing of an information or issuance of a warrant does not automatically make the surrender involuntary.

We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender "involuntary."

Doctrine

First, an accused who admits inflicting the injury but pleads self-defense bears the burden of proving the plea by clear and convincing evidence, and must stand on his own evidence. Second, unlawful aggression is the condition sine non qua of self-defense; when the aggressor flees, unlawful aggression ceases, and any wound inflicted thereafter is retaliation, not self-defense. Third, incomplete self-defense requires unlawful aggression; it can never be appreciated where that element is absent. Fourth, voluntary surrender may be credited even after an information is filed and a warrant issued, provided the surrender is spontaneous and the accused acknowledges his guilt or spares the authorities the trouble of search and capture.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the conviction for frustrated homicide, while crediting the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accused.

Remember This

Memorize the line: when the first aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression ceases, and what follows is retaliation, not self-defense. Examiners use this case to test the burden of proof in self-defense, the impossibility of incomplete self-defense without unlawful aggression, and the modern, flexible treatment of voluntary surrender.