SEBASTIAN C. PALANCA, PETITIONER, VS. POTENCIANO PECSON, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

In Special Proceedings No. 12126 of the Court of First instance of
Manila, Rafael Dinglasan was the attorney of Sebastian Palanca, one of
the heirs and an oppositor to the probate of the will of his deceased
father Carlos Palanca y Tanguinlay, Due to differences of opinion,
Sebastian Palanca did away with the services of Atty. Dinglasan who in
fact withdrew as Palanca’s counsel after the appeal from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila probating the will had been
elevated to the Supreme Court. On July 7, 1952, Atty. Dinglasan filed
in the testate proceedings a notice of attorney’s lien, alleging that
he was counsel of Sebastian Palanca from September 1950 until March
1952; that the reasonable value of his services is at least P20,000;
that Palanca had paid upon account only the sum of P3,083, leaving an
unpaid balance of P16,917; and praying that the statement be entered
upon the records to be henceforth a lien on the property or money that
may be adjudged to Sebastian Palanca, or that may be ordered paid to
him by the court. On August 16, 1952, Judge Potenciano Pecson ordered
that the notice of attorney’s lien be attached to the record for all
legal intents and purposes. On July 9, 1952, Atty. Dinglasan filed in
the same testate proceedings a petition, praying the Court of First
Instance of Manila to fix and declare his attorney’s fees at not less
than P20,000 and to enforce the unpaid balance of P16,917 as a lien
upon the property or money that may be adjudged in favor of Sebastian
Palanca or upon any sum that may be ordered paid to the latter.
Sebastian Palanca moved to dismiss the foregoing petition, but the
motion was denied on August 30, 1952. Palanca’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied for lack of merit. The action of Judge
Pecson in ordering that Atty. Dinglasan’s notice of attorney’s lien be
attached to the record and in taking cognizance of the petition to
determine his fees in Special Proceedings No. 12126, is assailed by
Sebastian Palanca in a petition for certiorari filed with this Court
against Judge Potenciano Pecson and Rafael Dinglasan (G. R. No. L-6334).

On July 10, 1952, Sebastian Palanca filed in the testate proceedings
a petition for an advance inheritance in the sum of P2,000. On October
21, 1952 Judge Pecson issued an order suspending action on Palanca’s
petition until Atty. Dinglasan’s petition to determine the amount of
his attorney’s lien shall have been finally disposed of. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied on November 7, 1952, Sebastian
Palanca instituted in this Court a petition for mandamus against Judge
Pecson and Atty. Dmglasan (G. R. No. L-6346), to compel the respondent
Judge to act upon Palanca’s petition for advance inheritance.

We are not here concerned with the nature and extent of the contract
between Palanca and Atty. Dinglasan as to the latter’s professional
fees, and the principal issues arising from the pleadings are (1)
whether the notice of attorney’s lien may be allowed at the stage when
it was filed, namely, before final judgment in favor of Palanca was
secured by respondent attorney, and (2) whether the respondent Judge
acted properly in entertaining the petition to determine Atty.
Dinglasan’s fees and in holding in abeyance Palanca’s petition for
advance inheritance.

It is contended for petitioner Palanca that Atty. Dinglasan not
having yet secured any decision or judgment in favor of the former, the
notice of attorney’s lien could not be allowed under section 33, Rule
127, of the Rules of Court which does not authorize a lien upon a cause
of action.

Section 33 provides that an attorney “shall also have a lien to the
same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered
to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same
right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would
have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.” Under this provision we are of the opinion that the
attorney may cause a statement of his lien to be registered even before
the rendition of any judgment, the purpose being merely to establish
his right to the lien. The recording is distinct from the enforcement
of the lien, which may take place only after judgment is secured in
favor of the client. We believe also that the provision permits the
registration of an attorney’s lien, although the lawyer concerned does
not finish the case successfully in favor of his client, because an
attorney who quits or is dismissed before the conclusion of his
assigned task is as much entitled to the protection of the rule.
Otherwise, a client may easily frustrate its purpose. Indeed, this
construction is impliedly warranted by section 24 of Rule 127, which as
amended by Republic Act No. 636 provides as follows: “A client may at
anytime dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if
the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing
and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he
shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation
stipulated in the contract For the payment of such compensation the
attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments, for the payment of money
and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment rendered in the
cases wherein his services had been retained by the client.” The
petitioner, however, argues that this provision cannot be availed of by
respondent Dinglasan because there is neither a written contract for
attorney’s fees nor a showing that his dismissal was unjustified. This
argument is without merit, inasmuch as if there was a written contract
and the dismissal was unjustified, Atty. Dinglasan would be entitled to
the entirety of the stipulated compensation, even if the case was not
yet finished when he was dismissed. In situations like that of
respondent Dinglasan the lawyer may claim compensation only up to the
date of his dismissal. For the payment of such compensation he shall
nevertheless have a lien “upon all judgments, for the payment of money
and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments rendered in the cases wherein his services have been retained by the client.” Section 24 does not state that the judgment must be secured by the attorney claiming the lien.

The petitioner’s further contention that respondent Dinglasan’s
remedy is to file a separate action for damages or for compensation, is
untenable. In the case of Dahlke vs. Viña, 51 Phil., 707, it was
already pointed out that the filing of a lien for reasonable value of
legal services does not by itself legally ascertain and determine its
amount especially when contested; that it devolves upon the attorney to
both allege and prove that the amount claimed is unpaid and that it is
reasonable and just, the client having the legal right to be heard
thereupon; and that the application to fix the attorney’s fees is
usually made before the court which renders the judgment or may be
enforced in an independent and separate action. We see no valid reason
why a probate court cannot pass upon a proper petition to determine
attorney’s fees, if the rule against multiplicity of suits is to be
activated and if we are to concede that, as in the case before us, said
court is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and
extent of the lawyer’s services.

In view of what has been said, it is obvious that the respondent
Judge neither acted without jurisdiction nor abused his discretion in
the matters herein complained of. The petition for certiorari in G. R.
No. L-6334 and the petition for mandamus in G. R. No. L-6346 are hereby
dismissed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.