CARMELO & BAUERMANN, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COM­MISSION, LABOR ARBITER JULIO F. ANDRES, JR., CARMELO & BAUERMANN UNITED WORKERS UNION, AND NELPIO CABRERA…

The special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at
bar was instituted in this Court by petitioner to annul and set aside the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. RB­-IV-11539-77. That decision affirmed with modification
that of the Labor Arbiter which essentially found petitioner guilty of unfair
labor practice and ordered reinstatement of all individual private respondents
and the payment to them of their back wages.^[1]
After the case had been pending in this Court for about a year, the petitioner
and private respondents, assisted by their respective counsel, jointly filed a
“MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE” dated April 10, 1980,^[2]
praying “for the dismissal with prejudice of both this petition and the
case a quo [NLRC Case No. RB-IV-11539-77] as originally filed with and
decided by the * * Labor Arbiter Julio F. Andres, Jr. and National Labor
Relations Commission on the ground that this case and all incidents thereof
were already settled amicably by the adverse parties herein to their full and
complete satisfaction as evidenced by the Quitclaim and Release Agreement dated
April 10, 1980 * * attached and made integral part (of the motion).”

Five days or so later, some twenty-one (21) persons –­ Benjamin
Tolentino, et al., who were not parties in the proceedings a quo but
claim to be “among the thirty three (33) office personnel and employees
similarly situated of petitioner CARMELO & BAUERMANN, INC. who are
mentioned and dealt with at length in the Decision, dated December 1, 1978 of
the respondent ** Commission ** in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-11539-77” — filed
a motion for leave to intervene.^[3]
To their motion they appended a “PETITION IN INTERVENTION,”^[4]
which prayed for judgment:

“1.  Declaring null and void ab initio
the dismissal of intervenors and their conversion into casual employees;

“2.  Declaring that the separation pay received by
intervenors be treated as penalty for unfair labor practice, and that they are
not under obligation to return the same;

“3.  Restoring to intervenors their status as
permanent regular employees entitled to all fringe benefits such as accrued
vacation and sick leaves with pay, 5-hour work on Saturdays for plant workers, special
public holiday pay for monthly-paid employees, security of tenure and without
loss of seniority rights from May 28, 1976, specifically declaring that for
purposes of retirement, the computation of retirement benefit should be made to
begin from the date of their original appointments;

“4.  Ordering Carmelo & Bauermann to pay each
of the petitioners-intervenors the sum equivalent to their separation pay as
shown in Annex ‘AA’ hereof, or in the alternative, as and by way of damages,
plus the costs of suit” (and equitable relief, “such as attorneys’ fees in
the amount of P20,000.00”).

The intervenors also presented an
“URGENT MANIFESTATION AND MOTION” in which they alleged that
consideration of the joint “MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE” should
be held in abeyance until after the ** intervenors have been given their day in
court through their ** Petition in Intervention, ** because if this case is
dismissed with prejudice **, the legal rights of the ** movants­-intervenors
would be forever barred with the result that a grave miscarriage of justice
will ensue **.”^[5]

By Resolution dated August 18, 1980, the Court (Second Division)
granted the motion for leave to intervene, and required “the adverse
parties to COMMENT on the urgent manifestation and motion dated April 16, 1980
of counsel for movants-intervenors within ten (10) days from notice.”^[6]

In its Comment,^[7]
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. pointed out that:

1)   intervenors were NEVER parties either in the
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, or in NLRC
Case No. RB­-IV-11539-77; neither are they persons who may be considered as
necessary or indispensable parties in said NLRC Case or in this special civil
action, “nor are they in any way affected by the amicable settlement
entered into by the principal parties in this action **;”

2)   they attempted to intervene “only
now in the instant action and only after the public
respondents ** had already tried and decided the case a quo on the merits and only
after the petitioner and the private respondents had presented their
evidence in the case a quo;”

3)   the actions at bar being purely in
personam, any judgment therein “will definitely not affect the
intervenors nor constitute res judicata as against them for obvious
reason * * (and their) causes of action, if any and if at all, can be fully
protected in a separate action or proceeding;”

4)   the intervenors would have “this Court
receive evidence and ** adjudicate only for the first time and at this very
late stage their claimed rights against the petitioner” which simply
cannot be done in a special civil action of certiorari or by this Court,
which is not a trier of facts;

5)   the intervenors have not exhausted their
remedies before the Ministry of Labor and Employment which has original
jurisdiction of their present claims; they are thus barred from initiating or
intervening in an action of certiorari under the so-called
“doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies;” and

6)   in any event, their causes of action, if any,
have prescribed, since the Labor Code requires that unfair labor practice cases
be filed with the appropriate agency within one (1) year from accrual,^[8]
and money claims accruing prior to the effectivity of the Code, also within one
(1) year from date of such effectivity,^[9]
“otherwise they shall be forever barred.”

The Solicitor General agrees that the movants-intervenors do not
indeed have any interest in this proceeding which “is for the review of
the decision of the NLRC;” this court is not the right forum because their
complaint “would require investigation of several factual
allegations” and this Court is not a trier of facts; the intervention
would delay the proceedings at bar to the prejudice of private respondents, and
the intervenors’ “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” is before the
NLRC.^[10]

Petitioner and the Solicitor General are quite right in stating
that the intervenors must seek their remedy, if any, elsewhere, not in these
proceedings to review a decision in a case to which they were never
parties. To be sure, the petitioner
does not deny, and indeed the record does attest,^[11]
that the twenty-one (21) intervenors were among the one hundred eighteen (118)
who signed quitclaims and releases, in effect consenting to their separation
from petitioner’s employ in consideration of various amounts paid and
received. They are not, however, among
the sixty-one (61) employees — now private respondents herein — ­who later
impugned said waivers and charged petitioner with unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal in Case No. RB-IV-11539-77 subject of the present petition
for certiorari. Petitioner
correctly points out that said case is one in personam, affecting only
the parties thereto,^[12]
who alone are bound by the decision therein. That decision in nowise affected the rights of the intervenors, or
foreclosed, concluded or resolved any claims they might have in respect of
their employment with petitioner or the releases they had executed as such
employees. Nor, in that context, would
any adjudication by this Court on the present petition have any wider or
different effect.

Intervenors were neither indispensable nor proper parties in the
case now under review. Their presence
was not, and is not, essential to either the final determination of said case,^[13]
or the accordance of complete relief as between those already parties thereto.^[14]
Their motion to intervene is quite late. No good reason therefore exists to allow their intervention at this late
stage, particularly as it would threaten to derail an amicable settlement
between the present parties and a prompt termination of the controversy.

Furthermore, it is not possible at this stage to decide the
intervenors’ claims on the merits without evidence which, of course, this Court
will not receive in this proceeding.

Petitioner would have it that the intervenors’ right of action
has already prescribed, a contention not entirely without plausibility, but one
that this Court does not now pass upon. If that is correct, intervenors would have only themselves to blame for sleeping
on their rights, although to all appearances, they did not really so sleep on
their rights, but simply waited until those of their colleagues who had taken
up the cudgels against the original waiver agreements succeeded in obtaining a
further financial settlement and then, and only then, bestirred themselves to
ride, as it were, on the latter’s coattails. If, on the other hand, prescription be held not to have yet set in, then
it is clear that the rights intervenors would now assert can be fully litigated
and protected in a separate proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the petition in intervention is DISMISSED; the
joint “MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE” dated April 10, 1980 is
GRANTED, there being nothing in the “Quitclaim and Release” of the
same date on which it is based that is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy; and the main petition is also hereby DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 232, 236-237, 241

^[2]
Id., pp. 269-279

^[3]
Id., pp. 280-284

^[4]
Id., pp. 284-296

^[5]
Id., pp. 297-298

^[6]
Id., p. 298-A

^[7]
Id., pp. 329 et seq.

^[8]
ART. 291

^[9]
ART. 292

^[10]
Comment, Feb. 4, 1981, Rollo, pp. 363-370

^[11]
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 41-48

^[12]
.. and, as stated in Sec. 9 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, “their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action”

^[13]
Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court

^[14]
Sec. 8, Rule 3, Rules of Court