ROSARIO G. LASERNA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE G. PANEDA (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 220) AND MARIETTA G. HOLMGREN, RESPONDENTS.

Laserna versus Paneda

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, brought by Rosario Laserna against Judge Jose Paneda, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 220 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and against her sister Marietta Holmgren. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to annul two orders of the probate court: the order appointing Marietta Holmgren as co-administratrix of their deceased mother's estate, and the order denying reconsideration. The case matters because it fixes two rules every reviewee must carry into the bar: an order appointing a regular administrator of an estate is a final order and therefore appealable, and the availability of appeal bars recourse to certiorari. It also teaches what does not disqualify an administrator: a pending criminal charge, and strained relations with co-heirs.

Procedural History

The case began as a special proceeding for the probate of the will and settlement of the estate of Anita Guidote Vda. De Guanzon, filed by the petitioner Rosario Laserna before Branch 220 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, with Marietta Holmgren appearing as oppositor. The probate court issued an order on January 7, 2005 withdrawing the appointment of one nominee and appointing the private respondent in her stead as co-administratrix. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, and the probate court denied the motion in its order of July 15, 2005. From these orders, the petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, instead of appealing. The Supreme Court denied due course to the petition and dismissed it, with costs against the petitioner.

Facts

On October 31, 1990, Anita Guidote Vda. De Guanzon died leaving a will, with an amendment and addendum, naming a certain Ceferino Gaddi as executor. She was survived by five compulsory heirs, her daughters: Rosalinda Antiporda, Teresita Velasco, Concepcion Garcia, Marietta Holmgren, and Rosario Laserna. When the heirs failed to implement their mother's wishes without court proceedings, Rosario filed a petition to prove the will and settle the estate before Branch 220 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

The named executor refused to assume his post, so the parties jointly moved to appoint the Land Bank of the Philippines as special administrator, which the probate court approved. The petitioner then proceeded to prove the will, and the court admitted her evidence. When the petitioner moved to appoint the Land Bank as regular administrator, the bank declined. The court then ordered the parties to nominate a regular administrator. The petitioner nominated Pilar Pena; the private respondent nominated Cecilia Guidote-Alvarez or Filomena Guidote-Boclabos. The court appointed Cecilia Guidote-Alvarez and Pilar Pena as co-administratrixes, subject to a bond.

When the appointees had not yet posted the required bond, the private respondent moved to be appointed sole administratrix. In its order of January 7, 2005, the probate court withdrew the appointment of Cecilia Guidote-Alvarez and appointed the private respondent in her stead. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which argued that the private respondent lacked integrity because of pending cases before the Securities and Exchange Commission and the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila, was denied on July 15, 2005, the court finding that the private respondent was not legally disqualified and had posted her bond.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition for certiorari may be entertained, given that an order appointing a regular administrator of an estate is a final and appealable order.
• Whether or not the probate judge committed grave abuse of discretion in appointing the private respondent as co-administratrix despite the pending criminal charge of falsification, the earlier finding of forgery against her, and her adverse interest and hostile relations with the other compulsory heirs.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as invoked by the petitioner, governs the special civil action for certiorari. The Court's ruling turns on its office as a corrective remedy for errors of jurisdiction only:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The phrase "and there is no appeal" is decisive here, because the petitioner had an appeal and did not take it.

Section 1 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, as discussed by the private respondent and adopted by the Court, states the ground for disqualification of an administrator:

No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who is a minor, or who is not a resident of the Philippines, or who in the opinion of the court is unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of want of integrity or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.

The Court relies on this provision to show that a mere pending charge, without conviction, does not fall within its terms.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition must fail on its face. An order of the trial court appointing a regular administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties and is thus appealable. Because the remedy of appeal was available, recourse to the special civil action for certiorari was improper, and on that basis alone the petition was dismissible.

On the second issue, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion. It adopted the private respondent's argument that neither law nor jurisprudence makes a pending criminal charge of falsification, an earlier finding of forgery, or adverse interest and hostile relations with co-heirs grounds for disqualification. The criminal case was merely pending; the private respondent had not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, and to disqualify her on that ground would preempt the criminal proceedings and disregard the constitutional presumption of innocence. The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and found no such showing. It closed with the rule that certiorari corrects errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in findings and conclusions; since the probate court plainly had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, its orders could not be corrected by certiorari.

Doctrine

• An order appointing a regular administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final order that determines the rights of the parties, and it is appealable.
• The availability of the right to appeal precludes recourse to the special civil action for certiorari, consistent with the requirement in Rule 65 that there be "no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
• Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; it is not shown by a mere error in the court's findings.
• Certiorari issues only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings and conclusions; where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person, its rulings, however erroneous, cannot be corrected by certiorari.
• Under Section 1 of Rule 78, want of integrity or conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude must be established; a mere pending criminal charge is not proof of guilt and does not disqualify a nominee as administrator.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied due course to and dismissed the petition for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner, leaving the appointment of Marietta Holmgren as co-administratrix standing.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an order appointing a regular administrator is final and appealable, and the availability of appeal bars certiorari. Examiners use this case to test the final-order rule in special proceedings and the "no appeal, no certiorari" rule, often pairing it with questions on the disqualification of executors and administrators under Rule 78.