MARICEL E. DESTREZA, PETITIONER, VS. DOHLE PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY INC. AND/OR DOHLE (IOM) LTD., MANOLO GACUTAN, AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), RESPON…
CORALES, J.:
The Antecedents
On September 5, 2011, DOHLE-Philman engaged the services of Allan as wiper on board MV Chaiten which is operated by DOHLE-Limited. Allan boarded the vessel after having been declared “fit for sea duty” in his Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME).[6]
In the course of Allan’s employment, he complained of severe headache, dizziness, and joint pains and was diagnosed with “elevated blood pressure with fibromyalgia and heat exhaustion” by the attending physician at Jebel Ali International Hospital in Dubai, United Arab of Emirates. The attending physician also declared Allan “unfit for duty” and recommended his repatriation.[7]
On January 6, 2012, Allan was medically repatriated.[8] Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he was referred to the company-designated physicians at Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) and subjected to several tests including chest x-ray, 12 Lead ECG, and ultrasound. He was also put under the care of a cardiologist and neurologist who gave him medications for reactive hypertension.[9] He returned to MMC on January 11, 2012 and February 3, 2012 for re-evaluation and another series of tests such as ultrasound of the whole abdomen, 2D Echo Study with color flow doppler study, treadmill stress test, and clinical CT scan.[10] During the February 3, 2012 re-evaluation, Allan no longer complained of headache, vomiting or chest discomfort, his blood pressure was already controlled, and the laboratory tests revealed normal results. The company-designated physicians diagnosed him with hypertension and tension headache which is “multifactorial” in origin and not work-related.[11]
Allan was re-evaluated on February 16, 2012 and the company-designated physicians cleared him for work. He was pronounced fit to resume sea duties as of said date.[12] He then signed a Certificate of Fitness For Work[13] releasing DOHLE-Philman from all actions, claims, and demands.
However, on March 9, 2012, Allan filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint[14] for permanent disability benefits, sickness wages, and damages against DOHLE-Philman and DOHLE-Limited. He later on consulted Dr. Antonio Pascual (Dr. Pascual), a cardiologist who issued a medical certificate[15] stating that Allan was “seen and examined on 17-May-12 with the following finding/s and/or diagnosis/diagnoses: Bradycardia, to rule out Sinus Node Dysfunction” and was “MEDICALLY UNFIT TO WORK as a seaman”. He invoked the foregoing findings when he filed his position paper. He claimed that his condition did not actually improve and he could no longer perform any sea duty contrary to the “fit to work” assessment of the company-designated physicians. He attributed his medical condition to the strenuous physical activities he performed and the limited provisions on board which are mostly frozen and high in cholesterol.
In their Position Paper,[16] private respondents argued that Allan was already declared fit to work effective February 16, 2012 and his hypertension is genetic and lifestyle related, not work-related. The nature of his job has nothing to do with his genetic predisposition, poor lifestyle, and high salt intake and there is no substantial evidence of causal connection between his work as seafarer and his alleged illness. They added that the findings of the company-designated physician is controlling instead of Allan’s bare and self-serving assertion to the contrary. They pointed out that when Allan executed the Certificate of Fitness for Work, he already acknowledged the matters stated therein and cannot now be allowed to contradict himself for the mere purpose of obtaining monetary compensation.
The Rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
In the August 10, 2012 Decision,[17] the Labor Arbiter noted the undisputed fact that Allan was declared “fit to work” in his PEME and he subsequently suffered illness while on board the vessel. It was concluded that Allan’s illness was not shown to be pre-existing and Dr. Pascual’s medical findings were more reflective of Allan’s actual condition because the company-designated physicians declared Allan fit to work despite the categorical findings that he had hypertension which requires medication. Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter upheld Allan’s entitlement to permanent total disability and attorney’s fees. However, the claims for sickness wages and damages were denied for lack of factual and legal basis. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Dohle-Philman Manning Agency Inc., and/or Dohle (IOM) Limited to pay complainant Allan A. Destreza, jointly and severally the amount of SIXTY SIX THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$66,000.00) or its equivalent in Philippine Peso at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing his total permanent disability benefits and attorney’s fees.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis appears in the original text of the Decision)
On appeal, the NLRC, through its January 7, 2013 Decision,[18] reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s findings. It gave more credence to the findings of the company-designated physicians because they conducted an exhaustive examination of Allan’s condition as compared to Dr. Pascual who was consulted by Allan only on May 17, 2012 when the complaint was already filed. It further held that the Certificate of Fitness For Work has been translated in Filipino, thus, it can be safely presumed that Allan read and fully understood its contents and terms before he affixed his signature thereon. It disposed the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated 10 August 2012 is hereby ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack of merit.
All other reliefs herein sought and prayed for are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis appears in the original text of the Decision)
Allan sought reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same through its February 25, 2013 Resolution.[19]
Hence, this petition for certiorari raising the following issues:
- Whether or not the Honorable Commissioner committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that – (1) complainant was not medically repatriated; (2) his illness is not work-related; (3) complainant is fit to work as determined by the company-designated physician; (4) the purported Affidavit of Quit-Claim and Release should be given credence and proper; Thus, the Honorable Commission erroneously concluded that complainant is not entitled to any of the relief previously awarded by the Honorable Labor Arbiter.
- Whether or not the Honorable Labor Arbiter (sic) committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the claims for damages and attorney’s fees despite the fact the (sic) appellee committed gross negligence in affording appellant medical attention while on board the vessel? (sic)
Allan argues that he was medically repatriated due to a work-related illness which he acquired while on board the vessel and after being declared fit to work prior to embarkation. He allegedly developed hypertension due to poor and unhealthy provisions and stressful and strenuous work conditions on board the vessel, and since his repatriation up to the filing of the present petition, or for more than 240 days, he failed to discharge his duties as a seafarer, thus, he is entitled to permanent total disability. He insists that the findings of the company-designated physicians are not automatically binding on him and may be disputed by seasonably consulting another doctor like Dr. Pascual. Lastly, he assails the validity of the Certificate of Fitness for Work for being procured through fraud or deceit.[20]
Private respondents maintain that all their obligations to Allan ceased after he was declared fit to work by the company-designated physicians on February 16, 2012 or after 38 days of medical treatment. They further claim that there was no substantial evidence to support Allan’s allegation that he was subjected to poor provisions and exposed to stressful work conditions.[21]
Before We could resolve the petition, Allan passed away. His wife, Maricel E. Destreza (Maricel), continued pursuing the case after proper substitution of parties.[22]
This Court’s Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
As a rule, petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court involve only jurisdictional issues or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, this Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of the NLRC except when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record; or when the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter have come up with conflicting positions.[23] In this case, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter had conflicting decisions as to the propriety of Allan’s claim for permanent total disability, thus, We are constrained to wade into the factual matters to determine which findings are more in conformity with the evidence on records.[24]
After a thorough examination of the records and the respective arguments of the parties, We are more inclined to affirm the findings of the NLRC which were well supported by substantial evidence and in accord with pertinent laws and established jurisprudence.
No Substantial Evidence of Permanent Total Disability
The entitlement of seafarers to disability benefits is governed by the medical findings, by law, and by their contract which must embody the pertinent provisions of Section 20-B(3) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC),[25] viz.:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
x x x
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
x x x
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
In relation thereto, Article 192(3)(1) of the Labor Code defines total and permanent disability as a total temporary disability lasting for more than 120 days unless the seafarer is still under treatment up to a maximum period of 240 days.
Here, the company-designated physicians declared Allan fit for sea duty on February 16, 2012 or 41 days from his repatriation on January 6, 2012, which is definitely within the 120 days required under Section 20-B(3) of POEA-SEC and Article 192(3)(1) of the Labor Code.
We also note that at the time Allan filed his complaint on March 9, 2012, he had not yet consulted Dr. Pascual as shown by the latter’s certification that Allan “was seen and examined on 17-May-12”. Clearly, Allan had no cause of action for disability claim when he filed his complaint.[26] The disquisition in Philman Marine Agency, Inc. v. Cabanban[27] is apt:
In the present petition, the petitioners’ designated physician – Dr. Alegre – declared Armando fit for sea service on May 12, 2003 or 92 days from the time he disembarked or signed off from the vessel on February 10, 2003. As defined under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, total and permanent disability means total temporary disability lasting for more than 120 days (unless the seafarer is still under treatment up to a maximum period of 240 days as the Court held in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.). While Armando was initially under temporary total disability, Dr. Alegre declared him fit to work well within the 120-day mark. Viewed in this light, we find the LA and the NLRC legally correct when they refused to recognize any disability on Armando’s part as the petitioners’ designated physician had already declared his fitness to resume work. Consequently, absent any disability after his temporary disability was dealt with, he is therefore not entitled to compensation benefits under Section 20 of the POEA-SEC.
Armando, acting well within his rights, disagreed with the assessment of the company-designated physician and sought the opinion of four private physicians who arrived at a contrary finding. We note, however, that he did so only after he had already filed his complaint with the LA. Thus, Armando, in fact, had no ground for a disability claim at the time he filed his complaint, as he did not have any sufficient evidentiary basis to support his claim. (Underscoring, emphasis, and italics appear in the original text of the Decision)
Allan’s Non-Compliance with Mandated Procedure Under POEA-SEC and CBA Procedure Militates Against His Claim; Company-Designated Physicians’ Findings Deserve More Weight and Credence
It also bears stressing that the terms and conditions under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are controlling with respect to the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim.[28] The law explicitly provides that in case of disagreement between the findings of the company-designated physicians and the seafarer’s appointed physician, the parties shall jointly agree to refer the matter to a third doctor whose findings shall be final and binding on both. The importance of this procedure has been elucidated by the Supreme Court in a line of cases such as Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,[29] to wit:
The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of Dumadag’s contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. x x x Thus, the complaint should have been dismissed, for without a binding third opinion, the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician stands x x x.
x x x
Whatever his reasons might have been, Dumadag’s disregard of the conflict-resolution procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA cannot and should not be tolerated and allowed to stand, lest it encourage a similar defiance. x x x The third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, it appears to us, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties’ level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court.
Given the circumstances under which Dumadag pursued his claim, especially the fact that he caused the non-referral to a third doctor, Dr. Dacanay’s fit-to-work certification must be upheld. In Santiago v. Pacbasin Ship Management, Inc., the Court declared: “[t]here was no agreement on a third doctor who shall examine him anew and whose finding shall be final and binding. x x x [T]his Court is left without choice but to uphold the certification made by Dr. Lim with respect to Santiago’s disability. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
In this case, nothing in the records indicates Allan’s compliance with the procedure mandated by the POEA-SEC. As We pointed out earlier, Allan immediately filed the complaint before consulting Dr. Pascual who had contrary findings with the company-designated physicians. However, the disagreement between the company-designated physicians and Dr. Pascual was never referred to a third doctor jointly agreed by Allan and private respondents. Had this been done, Allan’s medical condition could have been easily clarified and finally determined.30 Consequently, the Court is behooved to uphold the findings of the company-designated physicians following the doctrine laid down in the Philippine Hammonia case[31] which was reiterated in the recent cases of Philman Marine Agency, Inc. v. Cabanban[32] and Veritas Maritime Corporation v. Gepanaga.[33]
It cannot also be denied that the certification of the company-designated physicians when weighed and considered vis-a-vis the medical report of Dr. Pascual is more worthy of credence. Records show that the company-designated physicians exerted real efforts in providing Allan with proper treatment from the time he was repatriated until his recovery. Allan was given medication, underwent series of laboratory tests, and was referred to a cardiologist and neurologist who supervised his treatment and recovery. As held in the case of Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency Inc.,[34] the Court cannot simply throw away their certifications since they acquired a detailed knowledge of Allan’s medical condition and, thus, were in a better position to reach an accurate evaluation of his health condition and his fitness for work resumption.
On the other hand, Dr. Pascual’s findings were issued on the basis of a one (1)-day consultation. Clearly, as between the company-designated physicians and Dr. Pascual, the former are more in privy to Allan’s case. It has been held that the doctor who had a personal knowledge of the actual medical condition, having closely, meticulously, and regularly monitored and actually treated the seaman’s illness, is more qualified to assess the seaman’s disability.[35]
Moreover, Dr. Pascual’s assessment of Allan’s condition cannot be taken at its face value because it was unsupported by adequate tests and procedures.[36] It must be emphasized that the award of compensation and disability benefits cannot rest on speculations, presumptions, or conjectures. Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.[37] Unfortunately, Allan failed to discharge this burden.
In this light, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the NLRC when it reversed the Labor Arbiter’s findings and ordered the dismissal of Allan’s complaint for permanent total disability.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED. The January 7, 2013 Decision and February 25, 2013 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 10-000863-12 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Villon, J., Chairperson and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
[1] The original petitioner, Allan Destreza, died during the pendency of this petition and his wife filed a motion for substitution which We granted through Our April 2, 2014 Resolution, rollo, page 276.
[2] Ibid., pages 153-180.
[3] Penn ed by Commissioner Erlinda T. Agus and concurred by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Teresita D. Castillon-Lora, ibid., pages 29-41.
[4] Ibid., pages 43-44.
[5] Penned by Executive Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco, ibid., pages 121-132.
[6] See Contract of Employment, Pre-Employment Medical Examination, and Seaman’s Book, ibid., pages 64, 65, and 106, respectively.
[7] See Shipping Patient Form, ibid., page 68.
[8] See Seaman’s Book, supra, at note 6.
[9] See the January 10, 2012 Medical Report, rollo, pages 107-108.
[10] See the January 11, 2012 2nd Medical Report, ibid., pages 109.
[11] See the February 3, 2012 3rd Medical Report, ibid., pages 110-111.
[12] See the February 16, 2012 4th and Final Medical Report, ibid., page 112.
[13] Ibid., page 113.
[14] Ibid., pages 101-102 and 103.
[15] Ibid., pages 73-74.
[16] Ibid., pages 80-100.
[17] Supra, at note 5.
[18] Supra, at note 3.
[19] Supra, at note 4.
[20] See Petition for Certiorari, supra, at note 2.
[21] See Comment To Petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari, rollo, pages 183-210.
[22] See Memorandum (with Motion to substitute the heir of the late Allan Destreza as petitioner) in relation to this Court’s April 2, 2014 Resolution granting the motion, ibid., pages 257-273 and supra, at note 1.
[23] Lambert Pawnbrokers v. Binamira, G.R. No. 170464. July 12, 2010 citing Pascua v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123518. March 13, 1998.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Philman Marine Agency, Inc, (now DOHLE-Philman Manning Agency, Inc.) v. Cabanban, G.R. No. 186509. July 29, 2013.
[26] See Veritas Maritime Corporation v. Gepanaga, G.R. No. 206285. February 4, 2015.
[27] Supra, at note 25.
[28] See Philippine Hammonia v. Dumadag, G.R. No. 194362. June 26, 2013.
[29] Ibid.
[30] See Philman Marine Agency, Inc. (now DOHLE-Philman Manning Agency, Inc.) v. Cabanban, supra, at note 25.
[31] Supra, at note 28.
[32] Supra, at note 25.
[33] Supra, at note 26.
[34] G.R. No. 194758. October 24, 2012.
[35] Ison v. Crewserve, Inc., G.R. No. 173951. April 16, 2012.
[36] See Philman Marine Agency, Inc. (now DOHLE-Philman Manning Agency, Inc.) v. Cabanban, supra, at note 25.
[37] Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency Inc., G.R. No. 194758. October 24, 2012.