MARIA AÑONUEVO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ROLANDO E. PEMPEÑA, RESPONDENT.

In a sworn letter–complaint
dated January 27, 1993, Maria Añonuevo charged Rolando E. Pempeña, Sheriff IV assigned to the Municipal Trial
Court of Goa, Camarines Sur, with non-performance of official duty. Complainant was the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 822, entitled “Spouses Orencio Añonuevo and Maria Añonuevo vs.
Bernardo Rodriguez, et. al.,” for forcible entry with a prayer in her
complaint for a writ of preliminary injunction. In due course, she obtained a favorable judgment for which a writ of execution was
subsequently issued. Respondent sheriff
allegedly failed to implement
said writ.^[1]

Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated May 10, 1993,^[2]
respondent filed his comment, to which complainant later submitted her
reply. Thereafter, the case was
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

In a memorandum^[3]
submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, dated April 18,
1994, the following findings are reported:

“It appears that complainant is the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 822, entitled ‘Sps. Orencio Añonuevo and Maria Añonuevo vs. Bernardo Rodriguez,
et. al., for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction.’ On June 7,
1989, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The case was appealed to the Regional Trial
court of Tigaon and then to the Court of Appeals, both of which courts affirmed
the lower court’s decision. The
decision having become final and executory, the court a quo on February 4, 1992 issued a Writ of Execution commanding the
sheriff to require the defendants to vacate and restore the possession of the
premises to the plaintiffs; to remove and/or demolish the building being
erected on the land in question; and to order the defendants to pay jointly and
severally the amount of P15,000 as damages and litigation expenses; P3,500 as
attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of suit. The aforesaid writ was received by the respondent on February 13, 1992.

“Complainant asserts that on same date, she gave respondent
the amount of P500 (P100 with receipt and P400 without receipt) to implement
the decision. But until now, respondent
has failed to fully execute the decision in spite of the fact that the property
in question can only be found within 3 1/2 kms. from the respondent’s office.

“Respondent, in his comment, denies that he failed to perform
his duty as a sheriff. He claims that
the delay was due to the non­-cooperation of the plaintiff in the execution of
the judgment; that complainant at first was reluctant to give the reasonable
amount for the implementation of the writ under the wrong notion that the
expenses shall be shouldered first by the Executing Sheriff subject to
reimbursement; that despite the pittance allowance of P500 (P100 went to the
Clerk of court) given to respondent, the latter was able to realize the P6,000
initially which was increased to P12,000 from the defendants (Annexes 1 and 2);
that complainant always prevail(ed) over the respondent to defer the demolition
of the houses which will require expenses as (s)he is more interested in the
monetary aspect of the main case; that respondent caused to be levied (sic) the
supersedeas bond worth P20,000 which was conditioned to pay for the damages of
one of the defendants, Resureccion Rodriguez, who was considered insolvent but
complainant refuses to pay for the documentation and registration fees; and that
the alias writ of execution cannot be implemented in the absence of a
demolition order from the court which should be obtained by the plaintiff.

“In her reply, complainant denies being interested more in the
monetary aspect of the case rather than the main case, claiming that she in
fact asked respondent how much money will she have to raise for the demolition
of the defendant’s houses. She asserts
that respondent could have long ago levied (on) the supersedeas bond of the
defendants for the damages suffered by her and not implement the writ on a
piece by piece basis. She claims that
the collection of P12,000 was anomalous since it was realized well beyond the
period to execute the writ. Moreover,
respondent did not notify complainant of the additional collection of P6,000 as
early as October 5, 1992 and that P200 was deducted therefrom when in fact
respondent was already paid P400 in advance as sheriff(‘s) expenses. As for the P100 paid to Atty. Rivera, the
latter issued 2 official receipts therefor, OR No. 1367714 and OR No. 0169659.

“On February 3, 1994, respondent filed a Manifestation with
Motion to Dismiss praying that the complainant be declared non-suited for
failure to file (her) reply despite (an) order from this Court.

“Complainant, on March 22, 1994, opposed the motion to
dismiss, arguing that she had already made her reply as of November 1, 1993 and that an oversight to furnish a copy
of the reply to herein respondent is not a ground for dismissal due to lack of
interest. On said date, she furnished a
copy of said reply to the respondent.”^[4]

x x x

Prefatorily, it bears mentioning that the sheriff is a court
official primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all
court processes and writs originating from his court and the branches thereof,
as well as those that may be delegated to him by other courts.^[5]

The records of this case yield ample evidence showing that
respondent unjustifiedly failed to fully execute the writ involved in the
instant complaint. Said writ commanded
him to satisfy the monetary obligation of the defendants therein, to evict the
latter and place the plaintiff in possession of the premises, and to remove
and/or demolish the structure erected on her land. ^[6]

In an attempt to justify his half-hearted efforts in the
collection of the monetary award, respondent capitalizes on the fact that he
succeeded in collecting one-third (1/3) of the obligation from Teofilo Atole,
one of the defendants.^[7] He allegedly failed to collect any
amount from Resureccion Rodriguez, another defendant, since the latter had no
real property registered in his name as certified
to by the Deputy Provincial and Municipal Assessor of Goa, Camarines Sur.^[8]

Unfortunately for respondent, his aforesaid asseverations cannot
exculpate him from liability.

Firstly, it is significant that the decision being executed
imposed a solidary obligation upon the defendants. Respondent, therefor, was not in any way justified in collecting
only one-third (1/3) of the obligation from Atole as the latter’s share, as if
the obligation was a joint and not a solidary one.

Secondly, respondent should have levied on all the leviable
properties, real or personal, of all the other defendants,^[9]
sufficient to satisfy the amount of the judgment, costs of suit and attorney’s
fees.

Respondent further contends that the reason why he did not exert
much effort in implementing the other directives in the judgment was that
herein complainant became more interested in the enforcement of the monetary
aspect thereof.^[10]

This defense is definitely unsatisfactory, if not specious. Complainant’s alleged
“instigation” as to how the judgment must be implemented did not
invest respondent with discretion in the enforcement of the writ and, hence, is
no justification for its incomplete execution. The sheriff’s duty to implement a writ of execution is purely
ministerial and not discretionary.^[11]
Moreover, as we have held in Young vs. Momblan,^[12]
“(w)hen a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of
instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it
according to its mandate.”

We likewise find irregular respondent’s non-issuance of an
official receipt for the P400.00 he collected from complainant allegedly as
sheriff’s expenses.^[13]
While said amount may not be excessive, it is nonetheless incumbent upon him to
issue an official receipt, considering that sheriff’s fees form part of the
Judiciary Development Fund which is subject to periodic examination and
accounting by this Court.^[14]
Furthermore, it will also be observed that respondent still deducted P200.00
from the P6,000.00 he collected from one of the defendants although he already
received P500.00 from complainant as sheriff’s fees.^[15]

It is an abhorrent and anomalous practice for a sheriff to demand
fees in excess of those lawfully allowed. This Court has emphasized, time and time again, that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to
the sheriff and down to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct, at all times, must be characterized with propriety and decorum, but
above all else, must be above and beyond suspicion. For every employee of the judiciary should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty.^[16]

We find merit, however, in respondent’s contention that the
removal and/or demolition of the structures erected on the land of the
plaintiff (herein complainant) could not be executed for lack of a special
order for that purpose.^[17]
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is explicit on the matter, to wit:

“When the property subject of the execution contains
improvements constructed or planted by the judgment debtor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon
special order of the court, issued upon petition of the judgment creditor after
due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a
reasonable time fixed by the court.”

Thus, we held in Carreon,
et al. vs. Mendiola, etc., et al.,^[18] that
“(t)he demolition aspect of the decision subject of the writ of execution
pending appeal cannot be implemented without a special order for that
purpose.” We accordingly absolve respondent on that particular aspect.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, respondent
sheriff Rolando E. Pempeña is declared guilty of non-­performance of official
duty and is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine corresponding to one (1)
month salary, or P4,240.00, with a stern warning that his commission of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 2.

^[2]
Ibid., 10.

^[3]
Ibid., 41.

^[4]
Ibid., 41-43.

^[5]
De Castro vs. Santos, etc., A.M.
No. P-90-474, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 245.

^[6]
Rollo, 33.

^[7]
Ibid., 16.

^[8]
Ibid., 17.

^[9]
Section 15, Rule 39, Rules of Court.

^[10]
Rollo, 12.

^[11]
Cruz vs. Dalisay, etc., A.M. No. R-181-P, July 31, 1987,152 SCRA 482.

^[12]
A.M. No. P-89-367, January 9, 1992, 205 SCRA 33.

^[13]
Annex A, Rollo, 34.

^[14]
Adm. Circular No. 31-90, dated October 15, 1990.

^[15]
Annex 2, Rollo, 15.

^[16]
Valenton, et al. vs. Melgar, etc., A.M. No. P-92-698, March 3, 1993, 219
SCRA 372.

^[17]
Rollo, 12.

^[18]
A.M. No. P-90-512, March 22, 1993, 220 SCRA 214.