THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JUANCHO CORACHEA Y RAMOS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Circuit
Criminal Court of Batangas in Criminal Case No.
CCC-VIII-40, finding the accused, Juancho Corachea y Ramos, guilty of the complex crime of robbery
with homicide attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity
and evident premeditation with only the mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilty to offset one of the said aggravating circumstances, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum
of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.^[1]

The proceedings had before the Circuit Criminal Court of Batangas were summarized by the counsel de oficio for the accused thus:

“On December 27, 1968 the accused was arraigned before the Circuit
Criminal Court of Batangas for the crime of robbery with homicide allegedly
committed, as follows:

‘That on or about the 18th day of December, 1968 at about 7:30
o’clock in the evening, in Barrio Balagtas of the
Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber .45 pistol, with
intent of gain and to kill, with violence against and intimidation of persons,
and with evident premeditation and (treachery), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one Sia Lak alias Paeng with the firearm he was then provided, and without
the consent of the owner thereof, the said Sia Lak alias Paeng, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, rob
and carry away a bag containing personal effects and money in the total amount
of no less than P73.46 to the damage and prejudice of said Sia
Lak alias Paeng in the
aforementioned amount of no less than P73.46; that as a further consequence
thereof, said Sia Lak alias
Paeng suffered gunshot wounds at the neck, thru and
thru, which directly caused his instantaneous death.

‘That in the commission of the crime the aggravating circumstance
of nocturnity deli­berately sought was also present.

‘Contrary to Law.’

Accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged in the information.

Subsequently, upon motion of counsel for the accused, the trial
court granted a ten minute recess to enable the accused and his counsel to
confer before formal trial proceedings start. 
After the conference, the accused, through counsel, requested for leave
to withdraw his original plea of not guilty and to substitute a plea of guilty
without the aggravating circumstance of treachery.  The prosecution acceded to the request and
accordingly, the word ‘treachery’ was deleted from the information (t.s.n., 3, December
27, 1968).

Upon re-arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty to the crime
charged in the amended information. 
However, in view of the gravity of the offense and the fact that the
death penalty may be imposed, and apparently because there existed some doubt
in the mind of the lower court as to the existence of the aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, particularly that of evident
premeditation, the lower court deferred the imposition of the penalty and asked
the prosecution to present evidence to prove said aggravating circumstances (t.s.n. 6, ibid.)

The evidence presented by the prosecution to prove evident
premeditation to kill the victim consisted of the extrajudicial statements of
the accused marked as Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B’ “^[2]

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision, a portion of
which reads:

“The evidence adduced in the course of the aforesaid
proceedings disclosed the existence of a deliberate, determined and
well-conceived plan to rob the victim as early as October, 1968.  The sworn extrajudicial confessions of the
accused presented and marked as Exhibits ‘A’ & ‘B’ the due execution and
truth of which was not contested by the accused thru counsel, evinces the
tenacious and resolute determination of the accused to carry out the contrived
plan as he stalked and trailed the victim, with cunning and patience, and bided
his time for the most opportune moment to strike.  The statements reveal that the moment of
decision came when the victim boarded the BLTB Co. bus at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of December 18, 1968 at the municipality
of San Jose, Batangas,
bound for Batangas, Batangas.  The evidence palpably shows that accused
conducted a close surveillance of the movements of the victim from 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that date,
followed him (victim) as the latter made his usual rounds collecting money from
customers, until the evening of that date when the accused finally made up his
mind to perpetrate the crime.  The
evidence presented to this Court clearly shows that the accused had reflected
and deliberated on the consequences of the intended crime, for the opportunity
for reflection, continuously persisted and remained present, from October,
1968 when the plan was hatched until the cold blooded execution thereof
in the evening of December 18,
1968.  Needless to state,
to the mind of this Court, the evidence of the prosecution conclusively proves
the existence of evident premeditation with respect to the commission of the
crime of Robbery.  However, as enunciated
by the Supreme Court in the two (2) cases previously alluded to, to fall
squarely within the purview of the doctrines laid down in those decision, and
to be able to consider evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance in
the crime of robbery with homicide, there must not only be premeditated
intention to steal, but also evident intent to kill the victim.

However, predicated upon the confessions of the accused with
reference to the circumstances which preceded and attended the commission of
the crime charged, the existence of the homicidal intent to kill the victim is
manifestly evidenced by the outward acts of the accused which were undeniably
calculated to ensure the desired objective. 
The character of the weapon used, an unlicensed .45 caliber pistol with
a defaced serial number, the passive attitude of the victim at the time of the
incident, and the fact that the accused shot victim at close range in the neck
near the adam’s apple, a vital organ of the body, are
factors that weighed heavily in the mind of this Court in arriving at the
finding that there was also evident premeditation to kill the victim.

These are facts that rule out or negate absence of criminal design
to kill because the same are clear and notorious manifestations indicative of
the presence of a premeditated plan to kill the intended victim.  These circumstances and factors, when taken
in conjunction with the prosecution evidence showing that the crime was
well-planned and that the evil design continuously prevailed upon the accused
for a period spanning over two (2) months, are so clear and convincing that this
Court can not escape the conclusion that the killing like the robbery was also premeditated
and intended, and not merely incidental to the commission of the crime
of robbery.

Of moment also in the resolution of the issue of evident
premeditation in instant case, is the complete absence of any effort on the
part of the defense to present any evidence tending to refute, disprove or
rebut the proof presented by the prosecution to show evident premeditation as
regards the killing of the victim.

Premises considered, this Court finds the accused Juancho Corachea y Ramos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity
and evident premeditation with only the mitigating circumstance of plea
of guilty to offset one of the said aggravating circumstances and hereby
sentences him to Death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Sia Lak alias Paeng
the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) and to pay the costs.”^[3]

On January 25, 1969,
the Deputy Clerk of Court of Circuit Criminal Court of Batangas
transmitted the records of the case to this Court for automatic review.^[4]

Counsel de oficio does
not seek the reversal of the judgment in this case and the consequent acquittal
of the accused, Juancho Corachea
y Ramos, since said accused had voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to the
charge.  He, however, contends that the
imposition of the death penalty is incorrect and, therefore, prays for a
reduction of the penalty to reclusion perpetua.  Thus, the accused assigns the following
errors:

” I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
EXTRA-JUDICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION

” II

EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE SAID EXTRAJUDICIAL
STATEMENTS ARE ADMISSIBLE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION ATTENDED THE KILLING OF THE
VICTIM

” III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF NOCTURNITY”^[5]

Under the first assignment of error, the accused claims that the
trial court erred in considering his extrajudicial statements (Exhibits
“A” and “B”) as evidence to prove the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. 
The accused further argues that said extrajudicial statements are
inadmissible in evidence because they were illegally procured, in complete
disregard of the constitutional rights of the right to counsel (Sec. 1 (17),
Article III, 1935 Constitution) and the right against self-incrimination (Sec.
1 (18), Article III, 1935 Constitution); and that he was not assisted by counsel
during the custodial interrogation.  He
strongly relied upon the cases of Miranda v. Arizona
(16 L. ed. 2d. 694) and Escobedo v. Illinois
(12 L. ed. 2d. 977, 982) to support his stand.

This contention of the accused is without merit.  In the case of People v. Jose,6 where
the same issue had been raised, this Court held:

“The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point
is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: ‘In all
criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel x x x.’ While the said provision is
identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction
the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in
U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in
the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to
mean proceeding before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of
judgment.  Implementing the said
constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules
of Court that ‘In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled x x x (b) to be present and defend
in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from
the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.’ The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests,
are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section
11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18).  The rule in the United States need not be
unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no
binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the
Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof
should be considered.  And even there the
said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of
unanimity in the voting by the members of the United States Supreme Court in all
the three above cited cases.”

In the light of the above-quoted ruling, the accused cannot claim
that his extrajudicial statements were illegally procured because his
constitutional right to counsel was disregarded.  At the time he executed the extrajudicial
statements, no such right was afforded to an accused before arraignment.  As stated in the above case, the phrase
“criminal prosecution” mentioned in Article III, Section 1, Par. 17
of the Philippine Constitution which provides that “In all criminal
prosecution the accused x x x
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel” has always been
interpreted to mean proceedings before the trial court, from arraignment up to
the rendition of decision.

In a more recent case,7 this Court held that:

“x x x In Magtoto vs. Manguerra (63 SCRA
4), We ruled that the prescription against the admissibility of confession
obtained from accused during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation
of the aforementioned procedural safeguards, applies to confessions obtained
after the effectivity of the new charter on January
17, 1973.”

In view of the aforequoted ruling of
this Court, the extrajudicial statements (Exhibits “A” and
“B”) are admissible in evidence because they were obtained before the
effectivity of the new constitution.  The extrajudicial statements of accused were
not illegally procured.  No
constitutional right of the accused was violated.

Anent the second and the third errors assigned, the appellee argues that the contention of the accused that the
trial court erred in finding that the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and nocturnity attended the killing of
the victim, has no basis; that the trial court in its decision, stated the
facts from which could be clearly inferred the presence of the said aggravating
circumstances which were voluntarily admitted by appellant when he entered a
plea of guilty; that the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that a plea
of guilty admits all the material facts alleged in the information, including
the aggravating circumstances mentioned therein x x x ; that it is of no moment that the crime charged is
capital because a plea of guilty covers not only the crime but also the
attending circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the same x x x ; that the amended
information not only adequately described the complex crime of robbery with
homicide, but also specifically mentioned the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and nocturnity, hence, the
maximum penalty of death was properly and validly imposed.8

It is true that in several cases,9 this Court has consistently
enunciated the rule that a plea of guilty admits all the material facts alleged
in the information including the aggravating circumstances mentioned
therein.  However, in the recent case of
People v. Galapia,10
this Court made an exception by holding that:

“The rule is that a judicial confession of guilt admits all
the material facts alleged in the information including the aggravating
circumstances listed therein.  But, where
such circumstances are disproven by the evidence, it
should be disallowed in the judgment. 
Thus, in People v. Gungab (64 Phil 779), the
Court ruled ‘that when an accused, who lacks instruction, pleads guilty to the
crime of parricide described in the information as having been committed with
the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and his
testimony given under oath before the trial court, upon his petition, fails to
show the existence of such aggrava­ting circumstances, his plea of guilty shall
be understood as being limited to the admission of having committed the crime
of parricide, not of having done so with treachery and evident premedi­tation.’
“

Hence the question that arises is whether or not the extrajudicial
statements (Exhibits “A” and “B”) have adequately proven
that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nocturnity attended the killing of the victim.

The pertinent portion of the extrajudicial statements relied upon
by the trial court in concluding that the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and nocturnity are present reads:

“5.   T:  Maari bang ipaliwanag mo sa aking ang
buong panyayari sa pag ka baril
mo ng tao at iyong kinoha ang
bag na may laman ng pira?

S:  Na ang tao na aking
na baril at kinoha ang bag na may pira na
kikilala ko sa pangalan ng
Paing na siya ay Insik.  Na siya aking na kikilala
dito sa Bayan
ng Batangas, Batangas bilang negociante at alam ko na siya
ang nangongolikta ng pira sa
mga tindahan ng mga Insik
o Filipino man sa mga bayan.  Na magmula buan na
Octobre, 1968, aking sinosobaybayan si Paing na Insik.  Sa aking pong pag subaybay aking
plinano na siya ay aking holdapin
at ako naghihintay ng magandang pagkakataon
upang isagawa ko ang aking
plano.  Mula sa alas 2:00 p.m.
ng hapon ika-18 ng Deciembre 1968, akin na pong sinosobaybayan si Paing na
Insik sa bayan ng San Jose Batangas.  Habang sinosobaybayan ko siya ay iniisip
ko naman kong papanong ko
siya matitempohan.  Na noong ang oras humigit
komolang sa alas 7:00 p.m. ng gabi ika-18 ng Deciembre 1968, nakita ko siyang (Paing)
na sumakay sa Bus ng BLTB Co. patungo sa Batangas,
Batangas.  Sumakay na rin
po ako at ako umopo sa
kanyang kasikbay.  Pagdating sa Crossing ng daan patungo sa
Ibaan sa Barrio Balagtas, Batangas, Batangas pinara ko ang Bus na
aming sinasakyan at ako ay bumaba.  Pagka baba ko ay binonot
ko ang aking
baril na Calibre .45 pistola at sinabi sa mga
pasajeros na ‘huag kayong kikilos
na masama kayo mamatay‘ na ang
baril ko naman ay nakaturo kay Paing.  At ang sabi ko kay
Paing na ibigay niya sa
aking ang kanyang bag at ang ginawa ni Paing
ay hinogot laman ng bag kaya ang
sabi ko huag
hogotin at ibigay mo sa akin yaan at pagkatapos hindi pa ibinigay sa akin ang bag at laging may hinohogot doon sa bag kung kaya siya aking binaril
sa bandang pa olo at natamaan at aking kinoha ang
bag at ako tomakbo patungo sa Barrio Tinga, Batangas, Batangas x x x“.  (Exhibit “A”, underscoring ours)11

The foregoing does not reveal any premeditated plan to kill the
victim.  The extrajudicial statement of
the accused only shows that it was the robbery and not the killing which was
planned.  And in robbery, evident
premeditation is not considered as an aggravating circumstance because the same
is inherent in the crime.  In the crime
of robbery with homicide, there should be evident premeditation to kill,
besides stealing, in order that it can be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.12

The statement of the accused did not prove the following requisites
of evident premeditation:  (a) the time
when the accused determined to kill and rob the victim; (b) the act showing
that he had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution that would have afforded him full
opportunity for meditation and reflection and allowed his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will had he wanted to hearken to its warnings.13

The statement of the accused – “huag
kayong kikilos na masama kayo mamatay“, meant nothing more than a mere warning and
was intended to prevent or forestall any resistance or the possibility of any
resistance on the part of the intended robbery victim and the other
passengers.  As aptly put by the counsel de
oficio, the threat to kill standing alone is
utterly insufficient to warrant a finding of evident premeditation.  “A threat to kill unsupported by any
evidence which would disclose the true criminal state of mind of the accused
may be construed only as a casual re­mark and not a resolution of the character
involved in evident premeditation.”14

The following portion of the extrajudicial statement of the
accused:

“At ang sabi
ko kay Paing
na ibigay niya sa akin ang
kanyang bag at ang ginawa ni Paing
ay hinogot  laman ng bag kaya
ang sabi ko huag hogotin
at bigay mo sa akin yaan at pagkatapos hindi pa ibinigay sa akin ang bag at laging may hinohogot doon sa bag kung kaya siya aking
binaril x x x” (Exhibit “A”; underscoring supplied)15

disproves the allegation that the
killing, like the robbery, was also premeditated.  The above-quoted portion clearly reveals that
the killing, far from being planned and premeditated, was an unpremeditated
act, done at the spur of the moment.  As
correctly stated by the counsel de oficio
“the refusal of the victim to hand over his bag and his persistent effort
to pull out something therefrom might have engendered
in the mind of the accused the belief that the victim was armed and that he
might in the defense of his property, be ready to kill and be killed.  That mistaken belief in turn must have
engendered in him fear and that fear had impelled him to make the first but,
unfortunately, fatal move.”16

This Court has held in People vs. Pagal17
that:

“x x x
evident premeditation will only be aggravating in a complex crime of robbery
with homicide if it is proved that the plan is not only to rob but also to
kill.  In the case at bar, a perusal of
the written statements of the appellants before the police investigation show
that their original plan was only to rob, and that, they killed the deceased
only when the latter refused to open the ‘kaha de yero‘, and fought with them.  The trial court, therefore erred in taking
into consideration the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.”

With regard to the circumstance of nocturnity,
the Court finds that the records do not furnish sufficient particulars whereby
its presence in the commission of the crime may be properly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance.  The lower
court has found the crime to have been committed in the manner described in the
extrajudicial statement.  (But nothing in
said statement shows that the accused had purposely sought nighttime to commit
the offense.  Not having been purposely
sought in the commission of the crime, this aggravating circumstance should not
have been taken into account.  It has
been consistently ruled by this Court that nighttime per se is
not an aggravating circumstance.  To be
an aggravating circumstance, the accused must have planned and sought darkness
to prevent him from being recognized. 
Nighttime can only be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance when it
facilitated the commission of the crime and was specially sought for or taken
advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity.18

As rightly argued by the counsel de oficio,
“although the criminal act was perpetrated by the accused at night, at
about 7:00-7:30 in the evening, this
fact standing alone, does not indubitably show that said time was purposely
chosen by the accused to commit the crime. 
It should be noted that the victim had finished collecting from his
customers quite late in the afternoon. 
This was something that accused could not have helped.  That the victim should have chosen to take
the 7:00 BLTB Co. bus was something
that could not be helped.  These
circumstances were clearly beyond his control and discretion.”19
Furthermore, although the crime took place during nighttime, this Court does
not lose sight of the fact that the same was perpetrated in the presence of
other passengers.  In fact, the accused
threatened them by shouting that they should not make any move, otherwise, they
would die.  So the passengers were able
to recognize the accused.  Thus, nocturnity did not facilitate the commission of the crime.  It was merely an accidental circumstance
which was not purposely sought by the accused.

The trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation and nocturnity as aggravating circumstance.

The penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death.20 There being an absence of
aggravating circumstances and the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
plea of guilty, the penalty properly imposable is reclusion perpetua which is the lesser of the two indivisible
penalties.21

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court under automatic
review is modified in that the accused, Juancho Corachea y Ramos, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Barredo,
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., in the result.

Antonio, J., no part.

^[1] Rollo, p. 10.

^[2]
Brief for the Accused, Rollo, pp. 50-52.

^[3] Rollo, pp. 71-73.

^[4] Rollo, p. 1.

^[5]
Brief of Accused, pp. 3-4, Rollo, pp. 52-53.

7
People v. Jimenez, L-40677, May
31, 1976, 71 SCRA 186, 195-196.

8
Appellee’s Brief, pp. 4-5, Rollo,
p. 108.

9
People v. Boyles, L-15308, May
29, 1964, 11 SCRA 88; People v. Tilos,
L-27151, Nov. 29, 1969, 30
SCRA 734.

10
L-39303-05, August 1, 1978,
84 SCRA 526.

11 Brief of Accused, pp. 12-13, Rollo,
pp. 61-62.

12 People v. Garillo,
L-30281, August 2, 1978, 84
SCRA 537.

13 People v. Lim, L-34397-9, June 10, 1976, 71 SCRA 249.

14 People v. Fuentesuela,
73 Phil. 553; People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572;
People v. Villamora, 86 Phil. 287.

15 Rollo, p. 64.

16 Rollo, pp. 64-65.

17 L-32040, October
25, 1977, 79 SCRA 570, 576.

18 People v. Undong,
L-32641, August 29, 1975, 66
SCRA 386; People v. Galapia, L-39303-05, August 1, 1978, 84 SCRA 526; People v.
Roncal, L-26857, October 21, 1977, 79 SCRA 509.

19 Rollo, p. 66.

20 Article 294, Revised Penal Code.

21 Article 63, Par. 3, Revised Penal Code.