G.R. No. L-15594. October 31, 1960
RODOLFO CANO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND HONORATA CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.
BARRERA, J.:
Relations (in Case No. 057-ULP; Emilio Cano Employees and Workers Union [PTUC],
Cayetano Olba, Salvador Labastida, Honorata Cruz, and Albino Tanghal,
complainants vs. Emilio Cano, Ariston Cano and Rodolfo Cano, “president
and proprietor, field supervisor and manager, respectively, of Emilio Cano
Enterprises” were charged with unfair labor practice for having allegedly
dismissed the complainants after they had refused to accede to respondents’
demand to disaffiliate from or dissolve their labor union and to disengage in
union activities. It was, therefore, prayed that respondents be ordered to
desist from further committing the unfair labor acts complained of and to
reinstate complainants to their former positions with corresponding back wages.
After their motion to dismiss was denied, respondents filed answer denying the
acts imputed to them and claiming that the separation of complainants was for
reasons other than their union affiliation or activities.
On December 11, 1956, after two of the complainants had already testified,
complainants Cayetano Olba and Albino Tanghal moved to be dropped from the
complaint. This motion, however, was never acted upon by the court. In the
meantime, evidence for the complainants continued to be taken. Finally, on July
3,1957, acting upon a motion then filed by the complainant Union (through its
president), the court ordered the dismissal of the entire case.
On July 9, 1957, Atty. Carlos E. Santiago, representing complainants Honorata
Cruz and Salvador Labastida filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order of dismissal, mainly for the reason that the president of the Union was
not authorized by them to cause the withdrawal of their individual complaints.
Thus, on August 21, 1957, the court en banc issued a resolution in the
following tenor:
“This is a motion filed by counsel for petitioner on July 9, 1957, for the
reconsideration of the order of the trial court dated July 3, 1957. It appearing
that said motion alleges facts which should be substantiated, let this case be,
as it is hereby, remanded to the judge a quo for the reception of evidence
in support of said motion for reconsideration.“So ordered,” (Italics supplied.)
The matter was, accordingly, set for hearing.
On March 10, 1958, the judge a quo, after considering the evidence taken
sustaining the movants’ allegation, issued an order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“Wherefore the, order of July S, 1957 is hereby set aside in the sense
that this case is reinstated as far as it affects the rights of the individual
Honorata Cruz.“And since Salvador Labastida joined the cause of the respondents and asked
for the dismissal of this case, after the hearing of this incident, as prayed
for in his communication dated January 11, 1958 (folio 147), let this case be
dismissed with respect to him.“So ordered.” (Italics supplied.)
Thereafter, the trial judge continued receiving evidence, in-eluding that of
respondents, and after hearing the case rendered judgment thereon, dated January
7, 1959, finding that the dismissal of Honorata Cruz was without justification
and constituted an act of interference in the union affiliation and/or
activities of the employee, and of unfair labor practice. Consequently,
respondents Emilio and Ro-dolfo Cano were ordered to reinstate the complainant
with back wages from the date of separation to the date of actual reinstatement.
Respondent Ariston Cano was exonerated for lack of evidence that he committed
the acts imputed to him. The motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision having been denied by the court en banc, only Rodolfo[1] comes to this Court by way of the instant
petition to review by certiorari.
Assailing the court’s decision as well as the resolution of the court en
banc denying his motion for reconsideration, petitioner claims, in
substance, that-
1. The court en banc erred in entertaining the motion for
reconsideration (of the order of dismissal) fitted by Atty. Carlos E. Santiago
without the aid or supervision of the court’s prosecutor;’2. The trial judge, designated merely to receive evidence in connection with
the allegations in the motion for reconsideration,’ erred in setting aside the
order of dismissal and in ordering the reinstatement of the complaint; and,
thereafter, in rendering decision therein;3. The trial judge erred in rendering judgment against the deceased Emilio
Cano without ordering the proper substitution of parties;4. The trial judge erred in not striking out from the records all evidence in
support of the case insofar as the order of dismissal of July 3, 1957 was not
disturbed; and in ordering the payment of back pay to Honorata Cruz;5. The court en banc erred in denying his motion for
reconsideration.
1. There is no question that the formal charge (for unfair labor practice) in
this case was filed by the court prosecutor. The motion for reconsideration,
which precipitated the partial reinstatement of the case after it was previously
ordered dismissed, was filed by counsel for complainants Cruz and Labastida.
Petitioner now claims that it was wrong for the Court en banc to have
entertained the motion it appearing that it was filed without the aid or
supervision of the court prosecutor. The contention is unmeritorious.
While under the Industrial Peace Act, a regular complaint for unfair labor
practice, to be filed by the court-prosecutor, formally starts the proceeding,
this does not necessarily bestow on said officer absolute control and
supervision over the said proceeding, as in prosecution of offenses punishable
under the penal code. By specific provision of law,[2] the rules of procedure observed in
ordinary court litigations are not to be controlling in the hearing,
investigation and determination of complaints for unfair labor practice. It is
in consonance with the spirit and intent of the law that the court en
banc took cognizance of the motion for the partial reinstatement of the
case, filed by counsel for two of the complainants even without the intervention
of the court prosecutor. To our mind, the action taken by the said court, in
disregarding technicality in order to arrive at the proper determination of the
facts of the case, particularly as to whether petitioning complainants
authorized the dismissal of their case, is well within the authority granted by
the Industrial Peace Act.
2. For the same reason adduced above, the next question raised herein would
also fail.
Admittedly, after the reception of evidence supporting movants’ allegations
of fact contained in their motion for reconsideration, the trial judge, instead
of transmitting his finding to the court en banc in order that the
latter may itself properly dispose of the motion for reconsideration filed
before it, motu proprio ordered the reinstatement of the case as far as
complainant Cruz was concerned, and proceeded with the hearing of the case on
the merits ultimately leading to the promulgation of the disputed decision.
Although there was some kind of non-observance by the trial judge of the court’s
own rules,[3] we find it insufficient to
disturb the decision rendered therein. In the first place, aside from the rule
that the Court of Industrial Relations is not bound to observe strictly
technical rules or legal formalities, but shall act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case (Sec. 20, C. A. No. 103, as amended),
it cannot be claimed that the act complained of caused respondent (herein
petitioner) any material injury. Even if the trial judge forwarded his findings
and recommendation to the court en banc, the latter would have, in the
light of its subsequent action, issued the same order and caused the case to be
remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. The trial judge
would then certainly have arrived at the same conclusion and rendered the same
decision. This is borne out by the subsequent denial by the court en
banc of herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the main
decision, based, among others, precisely on this same alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the trial judge, which denial amounted to an affirmance of the
action taken by the trial judge[4] and
may be considered, in the interest of speedy and objective administration of
labor laws, to have cured whatever procedural defect may have been committed. In
the second place, there is nothing in the records to sustain the view that the
dismissal of complainant Honorata Cruz was justified. The finding of the trial
judge, as affirmed by the court en banc, being supported by substantial
evidence, must remain undisturbed.
3. Petitioner also claims that respondent Emilio Cano, who died during the
pendency of the case in the lower court and before the promulgation of the
decision, cannot be adjudged guilty of the acts charged and sentenced in a
decision promulgated after his death. The contention is similarly without
merit.
Respondents were named in the complaint as “Emilio Cano, Ariston Cano and
Rodolfo Cano * * * president and proprietor, field supervisor, and manager,
respectively, of Emilio Cano Enterprises”. It is evident therefrom that they
were sued not in their individual capacities, but as such officials of the
establishment. The judgment rendered against the deceased, therefore, except
those portions thereof[5] personal to
him, is enforceable against his successor in office.
4. Lastly, petitioner contends that the court should have stricken from the
records and disregarded all the evidence in support of the case, insofar as not
affected by the order reinstating the case with respect to Honorata Cruz,
because the effect of the dismissal of the complaint in respect of the other
three complainants was, to quote petitioner, “to remove, strike out, eliminate,
obliterate, and destroy not only the complaint but also the evidence in support
of such complaint.” Answering this contention, the court said, and we quote with
approval:
“It is noted, that during the hearing of this case and before the respective
motions to withdraw were filed by complainant union, and complainants Cayetano
Olba, Albino Tanghal and Salvador Labastida, the complainant union was able to
present documentary evidence and testimonies of Labastida, Ferraren and Olba,
tending to establish that on several occasions they were threatened, cowed and
intimidated by respondents, more particularly Emilio Cano, in urging them to
resign their affiliation with the complainant union. It is believed that under
the broad powers of this Court pursuant to Section 5 (6) of Republic Act 875,
the evidence adduced by the above-named complainants cannot in any way be
suppressed, and must affect the complaint of the remaining complainant Honorata
Cruz, considering; that said evidence is closely related and having a bearing to
the alleged unfair labor practice supposedly committed against said Honorata
Cruz.”
Independently of the above, the evidence treating solely the case of Honorata
Cruz, which was reinstated, is, in our mind, sufficient to support the finding
that this employee was unjustly dismissed because of her union activities.
While it is true that an offer to take her back was made at the conclusion of
the hearing, her refusal thereof was justified because of the absence of a
stipulation as to her back pay. Hence, the judgment for the payment of such back
pay is correct.
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other
points raised by petitioner.
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court of January 7, 1959 and the
resolution of the court en banc dated February 4, 1959 are hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, PadiUa, Bautista Angela, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.
Decision and resolution affirmed.
[1] Respondent Emilio Cano died before
the promulgation of the decision.
[2] “Sec. 5. Unfair Labor Practice
Cases.-* * * “(b) * * *. In any such proceeding, the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the
spirit and intention of this Act that the Court and its members and Hearing
Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure. In rendering its decisions, the Court shall not be bound solely by
the evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of all other
means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of
well-ihformed persons which results must be made a part of the record. In the
‘proceeding before tlie Court or a Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall
not be required to be represented by legal counsel and it shall be the duty and
obligation of the Court or Hearing Examiner to examine and cross-examine
witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
the evidence.” (Italics supplied.)
[3] Pars. 15, 16, and 17, Rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations.
[4] Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
vs. Coto Labor Union, 105 Phil., 915.
[5] Sec. 25, 1st par., Rep. Act No.
875.