A.M. No. RTJ-86-50. June 28, 1993
ADELAIDA P. FELONGCO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE LUIS D. DICTADO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, DAET CAMARINES NORTE, RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
All the above-entitled cases were consolidated and assigned to
Associate Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona of the Court of Appeals for
investigation. These cases were decided
on the basis of the findings of the Investigating Justice as stated in his
reports.
* * * *
*
A. M. No. RTJ-86-50
Complainant Adelaida P.
Felongco charges respondent with:
I. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment adverse to plaintiff;
II. Facilitating the issuance of a writ of
execution, thus unduly favoring defendants;
III. Refusing to abide by
a restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals against the enforcement of
the unjust decision;
IV. Citing the plaintiffs for contempt on
the ground of alleged disobedience of the unjust decision.
Complainant Felongco
filed a complaint for forcible entry against Celso Tapangan, et
al., in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capalonga and Sta. Elena,
Camarines Norte, docketed as Civil Case No. 479. The lower court rendered judgment ejecting therein defendants
from the premises.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. 5340),
respondent, as the presiding judge, reversed the inferior court’s decision. In the dispositive portion of his decision
dated November 25, 1986, respondent ordered:
“Plaintiff-appellee and all her agents
and caretakers xxx to immediately vacate the premises and restore
defendants-appellants to the possession of the fishpond in question. For purposes of the last sentence of Section
18, Rule on Summary Procedure, motu propio (sic) writs of execution and possession are hereby ordered issued to implement the restoration
of the defendants-appellants on the premises.” (Record, Civil Case No.
5340, p. 314)
Upon petition by
complainant (CA-G.R. SP No. 10730), the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of respondent holding that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court’s “findings
are supported by the evidence adduced” and that “the Regional Trial
Court was in error when, motu proprio, even in the dispositive part of the decision, it directed the
immediate issuance of the writ of execution and possession” (Rollo, p.
110).
On appeal by certiorari
(G.R. No. 80865), the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated May 16, 1988
resolved as follows:
“It appearing from the petition, the
comment and the reply that the respondent court committed no error in reversing
the regional trial court and affirming
the factual finding of the municipal trial court as more conformable to the
established evidence, particularly as to the forcible take-over of the property
in question by the petitioner from the private respondent, who was declared
entitled to the possession thereof after careful evaluation of such evidence;
xxx and that appeal not being a matter of right, it will be justified only upon
a clear showing of special and important reasons for the review sought, which
reasons are not present in the case at bar to sustain reversal of the
questioned decision, the Court Resolved to sustain the said decision and DENY
the petition.” (Rollo, p. 113)
I. Knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment adverse to plaintiff; and II.
Facilitating the issuance of a Writ of
Execution, thus unduly favoring defendants.
The first and second
charges, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
Complainant charges
respondent with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment (Complaint, par. 3) and
with facilitating the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment, thus
unduly favoring and assisting the defendants in the execution of the writ and
restoring them in possession of the premises (Complaint, par. 5).
The investigating Justice
concluded that respondent had indeed facilitated the issuance of the writ of
execution “thereby violating the cold neutrality required of an impartial
judge.” This conclusion was based on the following circumstances:
1. Respondent ordered
execution in the dispositive
portion of the decision itself;
2. He ordered the issuance
of the writ of execution on the very day that the motion for its issuance was
filed [November 27, 1988];
3. He signed the writ of
execution himself;
4. He issued the writ on the same day that the
official copies of the decision were sent to the parties on the case (Report,
A.M. No. RTJ-86-50, p. 4).
When respondent ordered
the issuance of the writ of execution in the decision itself sought to be
enforced and on the basis of the ex parte motion for execution, he displayed his
inclination to favor defendants to the prejudice of the plaintiff. Respondent issued and signed the writ of
execution himself, when this chore is left to the clerk of court. He caused the issuance of the writ even
before copies of the decision were served on the plaintiff, the party adversely
affected by the enforcement of the judgment.
Respondent contends that
the order of execution was allowed under Section 18 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, which provides that the decision rendered be “immediately
executory.” This contention has no merit.
As held by this Court in Dy v. Court of
Appeals, 195 SCRA 585 [1991], the judgment or order of a regional trial
court must first be served on the losing party before the same may be
considered immediately executory under the Rules on Summary Procedure. The reason is that, if such judgment or
order may be immediately executed without prior notice to the losing party,
then such a party shall be left without any remedy even against a judgment not supported by any evidence and/or the applicable
law, as in this case.
The Rules on Summary Procedure contemplate the filing of a motion
for execution on the part of the prevailing party, which, like an ordinary
motion must be set for hearing; otherwise, it becomes a mere slip of paper which
a judge should ignore.
A very queer circumstance
that throws a cloud of suspicion on the bona fides of respondent is the fact that the
defendants filed their motion for execution on the same day the decision of
respondent was rendered, and respondent, in effect, granted the motion in the
said decision. This only means that
defendants knew that the decision yet to be signed and promulgated by
respondent would be favorable to them.
III. Refusing to abide by
a restraining order issued by the
Court of Appeals
In the third charge,
complainant accuses respondent with refusing to abide by the restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals against the enforcement of his decision
(Complaint, par. 6).
The resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated December 3, 1986, restraining respondent from enforcing
the writ of execution and taking further cognizance of Civil Case No. 5340, was received in
respondent’s sala on December 9, 1986 (Record, Civil Case No. 5340, p.
348). By that time, the resolution was already moot because the
decision of respondent sought to be restrained was executed on November 28,
1986, as shown by the Sheriff’s Return dated December 3, 1986 (Record, Civil
Case No. 5340, p. 319). Hence, this charge must fail under the
circumstances.
IV. Citing
the plaintiffs for contempt on the ground
of alleged disobedience of the unjust judgment
In the fourth charge,
complainant alleges that respondent, in his order dated December 3, 1986,
ordered complainant to show cause why she and her co-parties should not be
cited for contempt (Record, Civil Case No. 5340, pp. 333-334). Subsequently, however, respondent issued an order dated December 10, 1986,
suspending the contempt proceedings “to await the result of the decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 10730” in view of the Court of Appeals restraining
order. Likewise, this charge cannot
prosper.
A.M. No. RTJ-88-222
Complainant Atty. Lakap
charges respondent with:
I. Graft
and Corruption;
II. Questionable
Trial Scheduling;
III. Rendering Unjust
Judgment/Orders;
IV. “Vengeful”
Acts;
V. “Injudicious”
and Immoral Acts.
I. Graft and Corruption
Complainant charges
respondent with the following specific acts of graft and corruption:
1. Respondent had asked
money from practicing lawyers claiming that his salary as a judge was not
sufficient (Complaint, p. 1).
2. Sometime in the middle
of June, 1985, respondent asked the complainant to buy for him and Mrs.
Dictado tickets to Manila from Sarkies Tours, which was complied with by
complainant (Complaint, p. 1).
Every time respondent went home to Manila on weekends, he
required complainant to buy the bus tickets for him. This went on until September, 1985 when the complainant failed to get the respondent his
ticket because it was “Peñafrancia time” and all the Sarkies Tours
buses were fully booked. When
complainant failed to purchase a ticket for respondent, he sent the price of
the ticket to respondent through the latter’s emissary (Complaint, p. 2).
3. Respondent would drop at
the complainant’s residence and would ask to be fed in a restaurant with his
two alalays (Complaint, p. 2).
4. Respondent got a permanent pass from Sarkies Tours
despite the fact that the said company has pending cases before his sala
(Complaint, p. 1).
The only witness who testified on the alleged acts of graft and
corruption was the complainant. The
investigating Justice, however, doubted complainant’s credibility, considering that (i) complainant could not recall when
respondent allegedly asked money from lawyers, and could only state that these
alleged impositions occurred in respondent’s chambers (TSN, May 17, 1991, p.
15); (ii) no other evidence was presented to corroborate complainant’s
testimony that he had bought Sarkies Tours tickets for respondent or that he
had dined with respondent at restaurants; (iii) complainant filed
the administrative complaint only after he had been ordered jailed for contempt
by respondent in connection with Civil Case No. 2981, and only after the lapse
of three years, which delay he could not explain (TSN, June 10, 1991, pp. 4-7);
(iv) although complainant had attached to his reply in this complaint a photocopy of an affidavit of a certain Atty.
Fidencio H. Gerro, and had alluded to a pleading filed by a certain Atty.
Subra, both attesting to respondent’s alleged corrupt practices, complainant
did not endeavor to procure and present the originals or certified true copies
of the documents, nor to present the lawyers; and, (v) Atty. Lapak made
contradictory statements on important details, which contradictions were unexplained
(Report, A.M. No. RTJ-88-222, pp. 3-7).
Respondent admits that he
rides Sankies Tours buses free of charge, but asserts that this privilege was
granted to him by Delia Carapiet, Vice-President and General Manager of Sarkies
Tours, his cousin, who issued a certification to this effect (Rollo, p.
53). Respondent further asserts that at
the time he assumed office, there was already a pending case involving Sarkies
Tours (Civil Case No. 5271), against whom respondent issued an adverse ruling
(Answer, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 35-36).
That the privilege was
extended by and through respondent’s relative is not exculpating and does not
negate the fact that respondent, a judge, received benefits from a
litigant. Such act constitutes grave
misconduct.
II. Questionable Trial
Scheduling
Complainant alleges that from 1985 to 1987, respondent would
come to his station (in Camarines Norte) to hold trials on a Tuesday and then
leave his station on a Thursday (Complaint, p. 1).
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that complainant may be
referring to the days when he (respondent) availed of his leave privileges
granted under law, and that he has more than four hundred leave credits
(Answer, p. 1; Rollo, p. 35).
In view of complainant’s failure to substantiate his charges
beyond the general avernment, We find respondent’s explanation satisfactory.
III. Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgments/Orders
In his complaint, complainant alleges that respondent knowingly rendered
an unjust judgment or order in the following cases: a) Adelaida Felongco v. Celso Tapangan, et al. (Civil Case No.
5340); b) Robert Tabaniag v. Yu Kim Pue, Delfin Ang and Imperial Insurance,
Inc. (Civil Case No. 2981) and c) People v. Boy de Asis, et al. (Criminal Case No. 4688).
During the course of the
investigation conducted in this case, complainant further charges that respondent
rendered an unjust judgment or order in a) Digna C. Morales v. Elmer R. Morales
(Civil Case No. 5748); b) People v. Homer Bulalacao (Criminal Case No. 6134);
c) People v. Alberto Yarte (Criminal Case No. 3399); and d) Lerma Adan v. Philip George Woodward and Esperanza Pereyra (Civil Case No. 5304). Respondent did not
object to the additional charges
and even commented thereon.
Adelaida Felongco v.
Celso Tapangan, et al. and Robert Tabaniag
v. Yu Kim Pue, Delfin Ang
and Imperial Insurance, Inc.
These cases are discussed
in A.M. Nos. RTJ-86-50 and RTJ-88-224, respectively.
People v. Boy de
Asis, et al.
The accused in People
v. Boy de Asis, et al. (Criminal Case No. 4688) was charged with
homicide committed on the occasion of implementing the writ of execution issued
by respondent in Civil Case No. 5340. Plaintiff in said civil case, Adelaida Felongco, through herein complainant
Atty. Lapak, filed a motion for voluntary inhibition alleging that the
administrative complaint they had filed against respondent (A.M. No. RTJ-86-50)
“may cause an adverse effect in the present case where the accused may be
unjustly absolved and acquitted of the crime committed” (Rollo, p. 123).
Respondent issued an
order dated May 3, 1988 denying the motion and requiring Atty. Lapak to show
cause why he should not be cited for contempt.
The above order was
assailed in a petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No.
14577). This petition was dismissed,
the appellate court stating that there was “no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent judge in denying the motion for his voluntary
inhibition nor in his order for the petitioner to show cause why they should
not be punished for contempt” (Rollo, RTJ-88-224, p. 234).
Digna C. Morales
v. Elmer R. Morales
In Digna C.
Morales v. Elmer R. Morales (Civil Case No. 5748), an action for support,
plaintiff therein filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order directing
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation to hold the departure of
therein defendant. Respondent, on the
same day the motion was filed, issued an order granting the same. Defendant filed a motion to set aside the
order, manifesting that there was no need for a hold order because he had
already received the service of summons, and such, jurisdiction over his person
was already acquired. When this motion
was denied, defendant assailed the order of denial in the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. SP No. 18672). The appellate court
held that respondent had “exceeded the limits of its judicial discretion
in issuing the hold departure order,” and that the order
“constitute[s] a violation of [therein] petitioner’s right guaranteed by
the constitution of travel and abode unless he is charge of a serious offense”
(Rollo, p. 295).
People v. Homer Bulalacao
Trial in People v. Homer Bulalacao
(Criminal Case No. 6134), a criminal case for reckless imprudence, began in
June, 1989. After several
postponements, hearings were set for October 10 and 11, 1989. However, on these dates, a typhoon in Bicol
rendered roads impassable. The accused
and his counsel, who lived in Buho, Camarines Norte were unable to attend the
hearings. On October 11, they sent a
telegram to the trial court informing respondent of their predicament. This notwithstanding, respondent on October
11 ordered the arrest of the accused, and on October 12 granted the prosecution’s
motion for the accused to be tried in absentia if, in the next scheduled session, he [the
accused] still would not appear. Upon learning of the above orders, the
accused and his counsel filed an “explanation and motion to lift the order
of arrest”. Though the court
accepted the explanation, the order of arrest was not lifted, and a subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied.
The accused filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 19430). The
appellate court held that respondent “committed grave abuse of discretion
in not lifting his order of arrest, trying [the accused] in absentia represented by a counsel de officio
when [the accused] has a counsel de parte” and further
stated that “the stubborness of the respondent judge bore lamentable
consequences”. Consequently, the
proceedings from October 11, 1989 and onward were declared null and void
(Rollo, p. 303).
People v. Alberto
Yarte
The information against Alberto
Yarte charged him with qualified theft for having removed, acquired,
collected and concealed without proper authority, forest products consisting of
539 flitches. The complaint was
dismissed and the Bureau of Forest Development was ordered to return all the
flitches to the accused upon payment of the dues thereon.
In 1989, a second alias
writ of execution was issued by the trial court, and the sheriff, with Yarte,
seized several flitches and lumber from the Department of Natural Resources
compound in Daet, Camarines Norte. The
DENR and the provincial prosecutor, objected to the seizure on the ground that
these flitches and lumber were not the ones involved in Criminal Case No. 3399,
and asked for their return. Respondent
issued an order dated April 28, 1989, denying the request of the provincial
prosecutor on the ground that only the party to whom the flitches and lumber
belonged had the right to complain by filing a third party claim. This order and a subsequent order denying
the opposition of the provincial prosecutor to Yarte’s motion for the issuance
of a third alias writ of execution were assailed by the public
prosecutor in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP No. 19634).
The Court of Appeals
granted the petition and annulled the two orders.
Lerma Adan v. Philip George Woodward and Esperanza
Pereyra
Assailed in a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 11912) was
respondent’s order in Lerma Adan v. Philip
George Woodward and Esperanza Pereyra,
an action for damages and injunction, granting the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction prayed for by therein plaintiff, thus giving her possession of a
restaurant which, prior thereto, was actually occupied by Bruno Freundlich,
therein intervenor. The appellate court
granted Freundlich’s petition, directing respondent to desist from hearing
Civil Case No. 5304, except to dismiss it, when private respondent therein
failed to file his comment, which silence was deemed by the appellate court as
“eloquent proof of lack of cause of action on her part” (Rollo, p.
292).
In all the above cases,
with the exception of People v. Boy de Asis,
et al., respondent’s decisions or orders were declared null and
void by the Court of Appeals. It is
true that in none of these cases did the appellate court make a finding that
respondent, in rendering or issuing the assailed judgment or
order, acted with malice or bad faith. Only after the appellate court, in a final judgment, finds that a trial judge’s errors were committed with malice and in bad faith may a charge
of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment prosper (Villamor v. Salas, 203 SCRA
540 [1991]; Garcia v. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178 [1982]).
However, the errors of
judgment committed by respondent in these cases cannot be ignored. While a judge should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or
errors of judgment, repeated acts of grave abuse of discretion and errors of
judgment cause concern as to the competency of respondent to sit in judgment of
his fellow men (Abad v. Bleza, 145 SCRA 1 [1986]).
IV. “Vengeful” Act
This is discussed in A.M.
No. RTJ-88-224.
V. “Injudicious” and Immoral Acts
The alleged
“injudicious” and immoral acts committed by respondent are: (1) his using of the stenographers’ room on
Branch 41, his former station, as his living quarters; (2) his taking
cognizance of cases over which he had no jurisdiction under the Election Code;
and (3) his holding a party in the court room with litigants (Complaint, p.4).
Respondent does not deny that he occupied one of the six rooms in
Branch 41. He, however, contends that
this had been the practice of judges assigned to that branch.
It does not appear that
respondent acted high-handedly in the transfer of the stenographers to another
room of the court house.
However, We cannot sanction the use of the court premises as
living quarters for the judges. Firstly, government property should not be used for the personal
convenience of the judge. Secondly, the
premises should be used exclusively for the administration of justice. We deem respondent’s act of converting a
room of the court as his living quarters as misconduct, which undermines the
dignity of the court.
As to respondent’s taking cognizance of election cases over which
he had no jurisdiction, complainant presented copies of restraining orders
issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
81784 entitled “Rolando O. Esturias v. Judge Dictado” and in G.R. No.
81550 “Cesar A. Cereno v. Judge Dictado”. Inasmuch as the restraining orders do not in themselves give an
adjudication on the merits of these cases, there is no basis to rule that
respondent had acted with grave abuse of discretion or without jurisdiction,
and We decline to so rule.
Complainant alleges that
respondent held a party in his chambers with politicians, after which he
granted a petition for injunction filed by Mayor Froilan Pimentel, and that
respondent issued a restraining order in favor of the brother-in-law of
Congressman Unico, the latter allegedly being instrumental in the appointment
of respondent to the judiciary (TSN, May 17, 1991, pp. 51-56).
The investigating Justice
found that these charges were based on “rumors”, and the matters on
which the complainant Atty. Lapak testified were not of his personal knowledge,
but were from “reliable sources” whom he did not identify (TSN, May
17, 1991, Ibid). Consequently,
We cannot give credence to these charges.
A.M. No. 88-224
Complainant
Delfin Ang charges respondent with:
I. Failure
to give due notice of hearings and the decision;
II. Undue
denial of appeal;
III. Oppressive
use of contempt powers.
As a result of a
vehicular accident, an action for damages was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte (Civil Case No. 2981) against herein complainant
Delfin Ang, the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident, his employer,
Yu Kim Pue, and Imperial Insurance, Inc. A certain Atty. Victorino V. Jaiver, representing complainant and Yu,
filed a Memorandum dated August 22, 1983.
On November 28, 1983, the then presiding judge issued an order
for the retaking of the testimonies of two witnesses for the plaintiff in
connection with the claim for damages, in view of missing stenographic
notes. However, a copy of the
transcript of the stenographic notes was produced by Yu, with only a single
page missing. By this time, Yu was
being represented by another counsel.
On September 21, 1987,
Ang received the respondent’s decision dated June 22, 1987 ordering him and
Imperial Insurance, Inc. to pay
damages to plaintiff. Complainant, by
himself, filed a notice of appeal on October 6, 1987. Respondent “disapproved and denied” the notice of appeal
“considering that defendant Delfin Ang was represented by counsel Atty.
Victorino V. Javier and to whom a copy of the decision was sent and received by
him on July 15, 1987, the Notice of Appeal filed by Delfin Ang apparently is
filed out of time” (Record, Civil Case No. 2981, p. 364).
Ang filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 13185), which was granted. The appellate court set aside respondent’s decision, and all proceedings which took place after Atty.
Javier ceased to have active participation therein were annulled on the ground
that Ang was denied due process. The
appellate court further ordered the reopening of the case for trial.
I. Failure to give due notice of
hearings and the decision; and II. Undue
denial of appeal
In the record of Civil
Case No. 2981 there is no notice of withdrawal by Atty. Javier, nor any indication of when the new counsel entered
his appearance. Atty. Javier was sent
notices of hearings, copies of all orders and a copy of the decision.
In view of the above
findings, the investigating Justice concluded that respondent did not wittingly
fail to give due notice of hearings and of the decision, and did not unduly
deny complainant’s appeal. We agree.
We note that respondent
took cognizance of the case only beginning in 1986, and only from the retaking
of the testimony in the missing pages. By then, the case had been through at least four judges.
III. Oppressive use of contempt powers
After Civil Case No. 2981
was remanded to the trial court for re-hearing, complainant for himself, with
Atty. Lapak, filed a motion for voluntary inhibition alleging that “[he]
feels that he has no chance of winning the case against the plaintiff in whose
favor [respondent] rendered a favorable judgment”; that respondent
“may no longer possess the cold neutrality of a judge to be able to render
an impartial judgment;” that “the annulment of the judgment [by the
Court of Appeals] may have antagonized [respondent]” (Record, Civil Case
No. 2981, p. 393).
This motion was denied during the hearing of July 19, 1988 and in
respondent’s order dated July 19, 1988. In this order, complainant and Atty. Lapak were held in direct comtempt
and sentenced to three days imprisonment. The basis of the direct contempt charge was the “clearly vicious
antics of Atty. Jose L. Lapak in placing this court open to doubt by the public [which] will eventually erode
the confidence of the people who consider the court the last bastion of
fairness, equity and justice” (Record, Civil Case No. 2981, p. 399). After their motion for reconsideration was
denied, complainant and Atty. Lapak were committed to prison.
Atty. Lapak filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 15149) asking for the nullification of respondent’s
July 19, 1988 order. The appellate
court denied the petition stating that “[a] mere general averment that a
previous decision of the respondent judge in Civil Case No. 2981 has been reversed
by the Court of Appeals, and the case has been ordered reopened, is not a
sufficient proof of bias or prejudice
as would justify our issuance of an order disqualifying the judge from further
proceeding in the instant case” (Record, Civil Case No. 2981, p.
421). The appellate court further
stated that the issue on the validity of complainant and Atty. Lapak’s had
become moot and academic, as at the time the decision was promulgated, they had
already served their three-day sentence.
Atty. Lapak apparently also filed a petition for habeas corpus
with the Supreme Court (UDK-8770). The
writ was granted; however, the case was eventually dropped from the Court’s
agenda in a resolution dated February 9, 1989 for failure of Atty. Lapak to
file the appropriate pleading.
In a resolution dated August 10, 1989 in G.R. No. 84239 (Delfin
Ang, et al. v. Dictado), We dismissed complainant’s petition on the inhibition
of respondent “[i]n view of the fact that a decision of a trial judge
against the herein petitioner will not necessarily lead to a repetition of the
same adverse judgment when the case is remanded by the appellate court to the
trial court” (Record, Civil Case No. 2981, p. 463).
Complainant Ang and Atty. Lapak allege that respondent used his
contempt powers oppressively. On the
other hand, respondent deemed the statements in the motion for voluntary
inhibition contemptous.
Direct contempt is
conduct assailing the authority and
dignity of the court (Silva v.
Lee, Jr., 169 SCRA 513 [1989]; and cases cited therein). The mere fact that respondent did not see
any validity in the grounds given in the motion for his voluntary inhibition
does not render the movants liable for direct contempt. It may be true that the contents of the
motion were critical of respondent’s prior actuations and expressed concern
regarding his impartiality. Ang and
Atty. Lapak may have insulted respondent. This, however, cannot be considered derogatory, offensive, or malicious
as to undermine the integrity and dignity of the court and hamper the
administration of justice.
We cannot countenance
respondent’s misappreciation of the scope of his contempt powers in the present
case, which resulted in Ang and Atty. Lapak’s imprisonment.
A.M. No. RTJ-89-320
Complainant Catalino Jerez charges respondent with:
I. Unjust denial of the
motion for re-examination;
II. Requiring or
suggesting that complainant change his counsel Atty. Lapak;
III. Improper imposition of
a high penalty;
IV. Knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment.
I. Unjust denial of the motion for re-examination
In Criminal Case No. 4407, accused Catalino Jerez, complainant in
this administrative complaint, was charged with grave threats. The criminal case arose from letters allegedly
written by the accused to Elsa O. Ilagan.
On September 23, 1987, hearing was re-set to October 15 to allow
the accused to get an expert witness. On October 9, the accused filed a motion requesting the trial court to
direct the NBI to transmit to the PC Crime Laboratory several documents where
the accused’s handwriting appeared and which were used by the prosecution to establish that the handwriting on the
letters was that of the accused. The
accused manifested that he wanted to avail of the services of the PC Crime
Laboratory because he could not avail of the services of a private handwriting
expert.
The motion was denied on the ground that “the court will be
making [the NBI and the PC] quarrel” (TSN, November 24, 1987, p. 6).
The accused was eventually convicted and sentenced to the penalty
of six years and one day to eight years imprisonment.
On appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 05914), the decision was reversed. The appellate court agreed with the
manifestation of the Solicitor General that: “1) [t]he standards used by the expert witness were not sufficient
to establish that appellant wrote the threatening letters; and 2) [a]ppellant
was denied due process of law.”
On the matter of the
denial of the complainant’s motion, the Solicitor General stated that:
“It should be stressed that appellant’s conviction was based solely
on the testimony of the NBI expert. On
the other hand, only appellant could testify in his defense. Under the circumstances, appellant was
deprived of his right to present another witness when the trial court denied his
motion for it to issue an order directing the NBI to transmit the questioned
documents to the PC Crime Laboratory for another examination.
On motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to all
parties, the court may order the production or inspection of material evidence
in the possession or under the control of the prosecution, the police, or any
other law investigating agencies
(Sec. 11, Rule 116, Rules of Court). Appellant’s motion that the questioned documents be ordered transmitted
to the PC Crime Laboratory for another examination was not unreasonable. Its denial in effect deprived him of the
opportunity to be heard, since his defense
turned on the refutation of the testimony of the NBI handwriting expert”
(Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee’s Brief, p. 25).
The record does not show
any circumstance that is manifest of any ill motive on the part of respondent
in denying the request of complainant to secure the assistance of the PC Crime
Laboratory in his defense. However, We
cannot ignore that respondent’s denial of the motion violated complainant’s
right to have compulsory process to secure the production of evidence in his
behalf (Sec. 14 (2), Art. III, 1987 Constitution).
II. Requiring or suggesting
that complainant change his counsel Atty.
Lapak
Complainant alleges that after the decision in Criminal Case No.
4407 was rendered, he spoke with respondent in the latter’s sala to request the
reduction of the penalty imposed upon him so that he could avail of the
provisions of the Probation Law. Respondent allegedly told him to terminate the services of Atty. Lapak
and to hire a certain Atty. Narra. He
further alleges that when he went to see Atty. Narra, the latter told him to
prepare P500.00 for respondent (TSN, March 21, 1991, pp. 18-19).
We accept the finding of the investigating Justice that
complainant was not a credible witness and that his testimony regarding this
charge was self-serving and and uncorroborated.
III. Improper imposition of a
high penalty
In determining the
penalty to be imposed upon complainant, respondent did not apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Unawareness
or unfamiliarity with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is censurable
(In Re: Jose G. Paulin, 101 SCRA 605
[1980]).
IV. Knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment
The Court of Appeals did
not make any finding of bad faith relative to respondent’s decision in Criminal
Case No. 4407. We cannot infer bad
faith merely from the reversal by the appellate court of respondent’s
decision. Furthermore, during the
investigation conducted in this administrative case, complainant did not point
to specific circumstances which may show that respondent consciously and
deliberately intended to perpetrate an injustice.
A.M. No. RTJ-89-389
Complainant Florencia Ropeta charges respondent with:
I. Infidelity in the
custody of public documents;
II. Knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment; and
III. Failure to observe the
90-day period for deciding cases.
I. Infidelity in the custody of
public document; and III. Failure to observe the 90-day period for
deciding cases
These two charges, being
interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
Complainant alleges that
respondent removed from the record of Civil Case No. 5287 (Amada Balon v.
Santos Ropeta) the duplicate original of the decision in that case and
substituted in its place a supposed original. According to complainant, the decision initially attached to the
record contained the date when the decision was received by the clerk of court
of respondent’s sala, whereas the copy inserted in substitution gave no such
indication. The substitution was
allegedly done to conceal the fact that the decision was antedated, and to
feign compliance with the 90-day period for deciding cases.
It appears that Civil Case No. 5287 was considered submitted for
decision on November 4, 1987, pursuant to the respondent’s order of October 20,
1987, which provided that the “parties are given 15 days from [that day]
within which to submit their memorandum simultaneously, with or without which,
the case will be considered submitted for decision.” Plaintiff’s
memorandum dated October 28, 1987 appears in the record, but nowhere in the
record is defendant’s memorandum.
Defendant filed a motion for voluntary inhibition on March 7,
1988, which respondent denied in his order dated March 11, 1988. In this order, respondent stated that:
“x x x x
x x x
x x
The Court, after going over the motion for
voluntary inhibition is convinced that said motion is now moot and academic
considering that the court has already decided the case as of January 18, 1988,
the release of which was delayed due to the many works (sic) that the steno-reporters
of this court have. x x x”
The original of the decision attached to the record is dated
“January 18, 1988” or well-within the 90-day period mandated by the
Constitution. The registry receipts
attached to the decision show that copies thereof were mailed to the counsel of
the parties on March 9, 1988 and March 10, 1988.
The evidence on record, while giving rise to the suspicion that
respondent antedated his decision, is not sufficient in law to support said
charge.
However, while it may be accepted that respondent did pen the
decision within the 90-day-period, We cannot ignore the fact that he failed to
timely release the same. It is not
enough that a judge writes his decision; it is important to promulgate and
make it known to all concerned at the earliest possible time (Nidua v. Lazaro,
174 SCRA 581 [1989]; Mangulabnan v.
Tecson, 101 SCRA 810 [1980]) if only to dispel any suspicion that something
sinister is going on. One of the
laments of litigants is the withholding by judges of their decisions which
they had long prepared and signed.
We cannot understand respondent’s passing the blame for the delay
in the release of the decision, as distinguished from its preparation, to the
stenographers-reporters. The respondent
cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court
personnel (Nidua v. Lazaro, supra).
II. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
Respondent decided Civil Case No. 5287 in favor of the plaintiff
therein. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV No. 17765) reversed the decision stating that “the
evidence was not sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court and that
said judgment was contrary to the law and jurisprudence.”
On the matter of the
motion for inhibition, the appellate court stated as follows:
“In the language of the renowned Justice Holmes of the United
States Bench, “a judge must learn to suppress his personal emotion, must
show a willingness to suspend judgment until a comprehensive survey of the
ground, and an appreciation and understanding
of the different attitudes and viewpoints of those involved in the
controversy has been made and must learn to transcend his own narrow prejudices
or prejudgment.” We find these worthy traits
of a judge wanting in the author
of the decision now on appeal, and
find his honor lacking in that degree
of impartiality expected of him (Record,
Civil Case No. 5287, p. 140; Underlining supplied).
On appeal to the Supreme
Court (G.R. No. 90064), We affirmed the above resolution.
The appellate court found that the decision of the respondent was
not supported by the evidence, and furthermore, was contrary to law and
jurisprudence, thus prompting said court to question respondent’s impartiality.
We find that respondent’s
actuations in the instant case display his partiality.
* * * * *
In consideration of the reports of the investigating Justice and the records of the administrative
complaints, the Court DISMISSES for lack of merit:
(i) In A.M. No. RTJ-86-50,
the third and fourth charges (refusing to abide by a restraining order issued
by the Court of Appeals against the enforcement of an unjust decision, and,
citing the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5340 for contempt on the ground of
alleged disobedience of the unjust decision);
(ii) In A.M. No.
RTJ-88-222, all the charges of graft and corruption, except that in relation to
respondent’s acceptance of benefits from a litigant, the second charge of
questionable trial scheduling, and, the fifth
charge of injudicious and immoral acts, except the specific charge relative to
respondent’s use of a room in the court premises as his living quarters;
(iii) In A.M. No. 88-224,
the first and second charges (failure to give due notice of hearings and the
decision, and, undue denial of appeal in Civil Case No. 2981);
(iv) In A.M. No.
RTJ-89-320, the second and fourth charges (requiring or suggesting that
complainant change his counsel Atty. Lapak, and, knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment); and,
(v) In A.M. RTJ-89-389,
the first and third charges (infidelity in the custody of public documents,
and, failure to observe the 90-day period for deciding cases).
In all the remaining charges, the Court finds that respondent failed to meet
the exacting standards required of his office, as set forth in Canons 1, 2 and
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provide as follows:
“Canon 1
A judge should uphold the integrity and independence
of the judiciary.
Canon 2
A judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Canon 3
A judge should perform his official duties
honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.”
The Court finds respondent GUILTY:
(i) In A.M. No.
RTJ-86-50, of evident partiality under the first and second charges, as
manifested by his acts in connection with the issuance of the writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 5340;
(ii) In A.M. No.
RTJ-88-222, of gross misconduct in accepting material benefits from a litigant,
of gross ignorance of the law relative to the third charge, and of misconduct
under the fifth charge;
(iii) In A.M. No.
RTJ-88-224, of oppressive use of his contempt power under the third charge;
(iv) In A.M. No.
RTJ-89-320, of violating the complainant’s right to have compulsory process to
secure the production of evidence in his behalf under the first charge, and, of
gross ignorance of the law relative to the improper imposition of the penalty
in Criminal Case No. 4407 under the
third charge; and,
(v) In A.M. No.
RTJ-89-389, of evident partiality under the second charge.
The infractions of respondent, especially when viewed together
instead of as separate and isolated acts, show that he is unfit to discharge
the duties and functions of a judge so as to warrant the imposition of the
extreme penalty of DISMISSAL from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Luis D. Dictado is hereby
DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to
any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. He may, however, enjoy all vacation
and sick leave benefits that he has earned during the period of his government
service.
This judgment is immediately executory and respondent is hereby
ordered to forthwith vacate his position and desist from performing any further
official functions appertaining to said office.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., on official leave.