G.R. No. L-2809. March 22, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FRISCO HOLGADO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
MORAN, C.J.:
Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information,
being a private person, he did “feloniously and without justifiable motive,
kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about
eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.”
On May 8, 1948, the day set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as
follows:
“Court:
Is this case ready for trial?
“Fiscal:
“I am ready, your Honor.
“Court:—to the accused
“Q Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?—
A. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.
“Court:
Arraign the accused.
“Note:
“Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after
which he was asked this question.“Q. What do you plead?—
A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.
“Q Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name?—
A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.
“The Provincial Fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.
“Fiscal:
“I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to
do with this case and I found no evidence against this Ocampo.“Court:
“Sentence reserved.”
Two days later, or on May 10, 1948, the trial court rendered the following
judgment:
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“[Criminal Case No. V-118]
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“THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FRISCO
HOLGADO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT |
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“SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION
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‘SENTENCE
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“INFORMATION
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It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the
judgment above quoted, the offense charged is named “SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION”
while in the body of the judgment it is said that the accused “stands charged
with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.” In the information
filed by the Provincial Fiscal it is said that he “accuses Frisco Holgado of the
crime of “Slight Illegal Detention.” The facts alleged in said information are
not clear as to whether the offense charged is merely “slight illegal detention”
as the offense is named therein or the capital offense of “kidnapping and
serious illegal detention” as found by the trial Judge in his judgment. Since
the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been
presented by either party, the trial Judge must have deduced the capital offense
from the facts pleaded in the information.
Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the
accused, who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for
the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of
a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and
one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolutely any
evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is
expressly provided in our Rules of Court, Rule 112, sec. 3, that:
“If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court
that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked
if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A
reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.”
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court
has four important duties to comply with: 1—It must inform the defendant that it
is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2—After giving him such
information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3—If he
desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de
oficio to defend him; And 4—If the accused desires to procure an attorney
of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record
discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an
attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed
to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him
reasonable time to procure one or to assign an attorney de oficio. The
question asked by the Court to the accused was “Do you have an attorney or are
you going to plead guilty?” Not only did such a question fail to inform the
accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what
is worse, the question was so framed that it could have been construed by the
accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilty if he had no
attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process
clause contained in our Constitution.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that
“no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law”, and that all accused “shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel.” In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is
deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the Court
should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by
counsel pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: “but I was
instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.” The trial court failed to inquire as to the true
import of this qualification. The record does not show whether the supposed
instruction was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the
offense or to the making of the plea of guilty. No investigation was opened by
the Court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way
of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate
the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the Court became satisfied with
the fiscal«s information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the
same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for
the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to
overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have
seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the
qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be
capital by the Court.
The Judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the court
below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his
right to have and to be assisted by counsel. It is so ordered.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.