JOSE CRISTOBAL, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Accused as accessory to the crime of theft, together with one
Jose Martinez as principal, as to whom the case was subsequently dismissed upon
petition of the fiscal for lack of sufficient evidence, Jose Cristobal was
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced to suffer three
years, six months, and twenty-one days of destierro, to indemnify Carmen
M. de Caro in the sum of P3,000, with the corresponding subsidiary
destierro in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The Court of
Appeals affirmed that sentence with the only modification that the indemnity was
reduced to P2,000. The case is now before us on certiorari to review that
sentence of the Court of Appeals.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

“The evidence shows that sometime in the early part of April,
1945 Mrs. Carmen M. de Caro discovered that her diamond ring which she had kept
in a handbag under her mattress had been stolen. Suspicion fell upon her 20-year
old son, Rolando Caro, who had disappeared from the house and, according to some
friends, had tried to sell a diamond ring to a certain family. Questioned about
the matter, Rolando confessed to the theft and further revealed that he had sold
the ring to the appellant Jose Cristobal, a silversmith in the City of Manila,
for P800, a part of which he spent and the rest he lost. Seen at his shop by
Mrs. Caro and her lawyer, appellant admitted having bought the ring from Rolando
for the sum above named and, upon Mrs. Caro’s supplication, agreed to let her
redeem it for the same amount without any profit. But Mrs. Caro was for some
time unable to raise the necessary sum, and when at last she found someone who
was willing to advance the money, appellant could not let her have the ring
because, according to him, the same had already been sold by his agent for
P1,200. But neither he nor the agent could name the person to whom the ring was
said to have been sold. And it is significant that when Mrs. Caro asked for the
agent’s address, appellant did not give her the right one.

“As the ring was never recovered, its owner complained to the
authorities with the result that appellant was prosecuted for the crime of theft
as an accessory after the fact.

“* * * * * * *

“Appellant would have the court believe that he disposed of the
ring without knowledge that the same had been stolen, alleging that the owner
did not inform him of that fact. But the evidence is against him on this point,
for the lawyer who accompanied Mrs. Caro to appellant’s shop testified that
after she had identified the ring which was shown her as her own she immediately
told appellant ‘that the ring was of much value to her because it was a souvenir
from her mother and that it was stolen from her by her son.’ That this
information was really imparted to appellant thus making him aware of the
illegal source of the ring which he had bought, is confirmed by the fact that he
immediately expressed his willingness to let Mrs. Caro get back the property for
the same amount that he had paid for it without any profit.

“Appellant also testified in effect that while he had agreed to
allow Mrs. Caro to redeem the ring, it was with the understanding that she would
have only one week in which to do it, after which the ring would be sold. But
not only is this testimony denied by Mrs. Caro and her lawyer, but it is also
unlikely that those two would enter into such an understanding, for appellant
would have no right to sell the ring once he was informed that it had been
stolen. This part of appellant’s testimony is therefore not to be believed.

“* * * * * * *

“There is something, however, to appellant’s contention that
the trial court has not correctly valued the stolen ring, whose appraisal at
P3,000 has nothing to support it except the owner’s testimony to the effect that
she had turned down an offer for that amount before the war. According to
appellant’s uncontradicted declaration, the diamond ring had only 1 1/2 carats
and before the war a carat cost only about 120.00. The value of diamonds,
however, must have gone up after the war because appellant actually paid P800
for the ring and he himself said that it was resold for P1,200. Obviously the
value of the stolen ring should not be set at less than the last named sum for
the purposes of this case. And reducing the valuation to that sum would not
result in the reduction of the duration of the destierro imposed upon the
appellant in view of article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code. On the
other hand, in fixing the indemnity to be paid, the sentimental value of the
ring to the injured party should be taken into account in addition to its price
(article 106, Revised Penal Code). Everything considered, we think P2,000 would
be a fair valuation for the ring in question. This would not necessitate any
change in the duration of the penalty; but the indemnity must be reduced to that
amount.”

1. Appellant vehemently assails as erroneous the finding of the Court of
   Appeals that he disposed of the ring knowing that it had been stolen. That
   finding of fact, however, is final and conclusive upon this court. We are not
   empowered to review and reverse it. (Hodges vs. People, 40 Off. Gaz. (1st
   Supp.), 227; section, Commonwealth Act No. 3; and Republic Act No. 52.)

2. Appellant’s contention that he has been erroneously found guilty as
   accessory is predicated upon the assumption that he did not know the ring had
   been stolen when he disposed of it. Thus he cites in his favor a case cited by
   Viada (Volume 1, pages 386-387) wherein a son stole various pieces of jewelry
   from his mother and sold part of them to a silversmith who was later prosecuted
   and convicted by the trial court as accessory to the theft but who on appeal was
   acquitted by the Supreme Court of Spain on the ground that at the time he bought
   and paid for the jewels he did not know that the son had stolen them from his
   mother. It should be noted that in that case the accused did not dispose of the
   jewels after he had learned that they had been stolen. In the present case the
   appellant disposed or claimed to have disposed of the ring after he had been
   informed by the offended party that her son had stolen it from her. United
   States vs. Montaño, 3 Phil., 110, 111, cited by the Court of Appeals is the case
   in point. There it was held:

   “In order to convict the defendant of the crime of being
   accessory to the crime of robbery committed as shown by the evidence in this
   case, it was not necessary to show that he had participated therein. It was
   sufficient to show that he had knowledge of it, and the proof shows that he
   acquired such knowledge when he was told by the oxmers that these carabaos had
   been taken away from the owners by robbery. After having obtained this knowledge
   he disposed of the property or concealed the same so that the owners were
   deprived of their property—the body and effects of the crime. (See
   Article 15, Penal Code.)”

   Article 15 of the old Penal Code, cited in that case, has been
   reproduced as article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. Said article defines
   accessories as those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and
   without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take
   part subsequent to its commission by profiting themselves or assisting the
   offenders to profit by the effects of the crime. There can be no question that
   the appellant profited by disposing of the stolen property at P1,200, after he
   had agreed to return it to the owner upon the latter’s reimbursing to him the
   P800 he had paid for it.

3. Appellant insists on his plea of double jeopardy. It appears that he had
   previously been prosecuted for the same offense in the municipal court of
   Manila, which after trial dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction inasmuch
   as the amount involved in the theft was in excess of P200. (Section 2468,
   Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 361.) Since the
   dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, it did not constitute a bar to the
   prosecution of the offense in the proper court. (U.S. vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil.
   265.)

4. The dismissal of the case against Jose Martinez and the noninclusion in the
   information of one Francisco Cueva are complained of by the appellant as
   prejudicial to him. Suffice it to say that these are matters for the fiscal to
   determine, with which the court should not interfere in the absence of a showing
   of clear and grave abuse.

5. The only error we notice in the appealed judgment is with regard to the
   penalty and the amount of the indemnity. The penalty provided by article 309,
   paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code where the value of the property stolen is
   more than P200 but does not exceed P6,000, is prision correccional in its
   minimum and medium periods. The penalty lower by two degrees than this should be
   imposed upon the accused as accessory to the commission of a consummated felony.
   (Article 53.) Two degrees lower than prision correccional in its minimum
   and medium periods is destierro in its maximum period to arresto
   mayor in its minimum period. (See article 61, paragraph in relation
   to article 71) Revised Penal Code, as amended by Com. Act No. 217.) The medium
   degree of this penalty should be imposed, there being neither aggravating nor
   mitigating circumstances. Destierro in its maximum period is from four
   years, two months, and one day to six years of banishment; while arresto
   mayor in its minimum period is one month and one day to two months of
   imprisonment. There is no medium or middle ground between these two penalties.
   So we must impose either one or the other. We think one month and one day of
   arresto mayor is preferable or more favorable to the accused.

The value of the stolen ring is another question raised by the
appellant, who contends that it was worth only P200. To the price of P1,200 at
which the appellant claimed to have sold the ring, the Court of Appeals added
P800 to cover its sentimental value to the owner, considering that it was a
souvenir from her mother, thus raising the value to P2,000. Article 106 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that “the court shall determine the amount of
damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and
its special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made
accordingly.” Appellant’s contention that the ring should be appraised at only
P200 is manifestly untenable, he himself having paid P800 for it and having sold
it later for P1,200. In any event, the question raised is one of fact as to
which the finding of the Court of Appeals is final. However, we think the Court
of Appeals erred in not deducting from the sum of P2,000 as the value of the
ring the sum of P800 which the appellant had paid to Rolando Caro, the son of
the offended party; otherwise, the latter and his mother would enrich themselves
by that amount at the expense of the appellant.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed judgment
is modified and the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer one month and one
day of arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P1,200, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency which shall not
exceed one third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs of both
instances.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, and
Montemayor, JJ., concur.