CHONA ESTACIO AND LEOPOLDO MANLICLIC, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PAMPANGA I, ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC. AND LOLIANO E. ALLAS, RESPONDENTS.
BALTAZAR-PADILLA, J.:
FACTS
Chona Estacio and Leopoldo Manlilic (petitioners) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and wages, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, and damages against Pampanga I, Electric Cooperative Inc., and Loliano E. Elias, the cooperative’s manager, (private respondents) before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-03-5517-03. On April 30, 2004, a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter, the fallo of which states:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
However, respondents are held liable and ordered to pay complainants the following:
|
Service Incentive
|
13th Month
|
|
|
Leave Pay
|
Pay
|
|
| 1. Chona Estacio | P5,765.19 | P5,074.03 |
| 2. Leopoldo Manlilic | P8,294.19 | P6,596.25 |
All other claims are hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and ordered the reinstatement of petitioners with payment of backwages in a Decision[3] dated June 30, 2005, the dispositive part of which states:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED.
The findings (sic) a quo dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding complainants to have been illegally dismissed by respondents. Accordingly, respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate complainants and pay them backwages pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code. The rest of the assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
Let the Arbitration Branch of origin render the appropriate computations of complainants’ backwages.
SO ORDERED.”
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the same denied was in a Resolution dated January 24, 2006.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari before this Court assailing the NLRC Decision and Resolution and the same was docketed as CA-GR. SP. No. 93971 raffled off to the Fourteenth Division. On May 29, 2008, the Fourteenth Division of this Court rendered its Decision annulling the NLRC’s Decision and Resolution and reinstating the April 30, 2004 Decision of the Labor Arbiter.[4]
Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari where it was docketed as GR. No. 183196. On August 19, 2009, the Supreme Court rendered its Decision affirming this Court’s May 29, 2008 ruling.[5] The decision became final and executory and an Entry of Judgment was issued by the High Court on February 25, 2010.
On June 25, 2010, petitioners filed before the NLRC-RAB a pleading entitled “Motion for Recomputation and Issuance of a Writ of Execution”.[6] The motion was praying for the computation of petitioners’ salaries from June 25, 2005[*] which is the date of the NLRC decision finding them to have been illegally dismissed until May 28, 2008, the rendition of this Court’s decision reinstating the April 30, 2004 decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners cited the case of Roquero vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., (G.R. No. 1523298, April 22, 2003) in support of their prayer. In said case, the Labor Arbiter found Roquero’s dismissal to have been valid but on appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and ordered Roquero’s reinstatement. When the case reached this Court, WE set aside the NLRC decision and upheld the validity of Roquero’s dismissal. The Supreme Court also upheld the dismissal of Roquero but it ordered PAL, Roquero’s employer, “to pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court [Supreme Court].”
On December 2, 2011, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[7] granting petitioners’ motion and ordering the computation of their salaries during the period of reinstatement.
Pending the recomputation of petitioners’ salaries, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution on December 8, 2011[8] but only insofar as the payment of unpaid service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay are concerned.
On January 11, 2012, Labor Arbitration Associate Diosdada D. de Vega submitted a computation of petitioners’ reinstatement salaries.[9]
On January 13, 2012, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order directing petitioners and private respondents to file their respective comments regarding the computation submitted by Labor Arbitration Associate de Vega.
On January 27, 2012, private respondents filed a petition[10] before the NLRC docketed as LER Case No. 01-013-12 praying for the annulment of December 2, 2011 and January 13, 2012 Orders of the Labor Arbiter. Private respondents contend that the Roquero case is not applicable to the present case as no motion for execution was filed by the petitioners unlike in the Roquero case where a writ of execution pending appeal was applied for and subsequently issued by the Labor Arbiter.
In a Decision dated May 28, 2012, the NLRC granted private respondents’ petition and annulled the Orders of the Labor Arbiter dated December 2, 2011 and January 13, 2012.[11] The NLRC based its decision on the Supreme Court’s pronouncements made in the cases of Mt. Carmel College vs. Resuena and Panuncillo vs. CAP Philippines Inc. wherein it was ruled that a writ of execution is needed for an order of reinstatement when it is the NLRC which issued the order. The order of reinstatement is self-executory only when the same is issued by the Labor Arbiter. The pertinent portions of the NLRC Decision read, viz —
“Unlike in Article 223 where the execution of an order of reinstatement issues as a matter of course – without need of any positive action to effect the same – the execution of a similar order emanating from the Commission, on appeal, lies not in favor of a dismissed employee as a matter of right. Article 224 of the Labor Code could not be any more categorical when it prescribes the issuance of a Writ of Execution as a condition sine qua non for the execution of an order of reinstatement issued by the Commission on appeal. As such, the option to reinstate a dismissed employee is granted exclusively to the employer. The event that gives rise for its exercise is not the reinstatement decree of [the Commission], but the writ for its execution commanding the employer to reinstate the employee, while the final act which compels the employer to exercise the option is the service upon it of the writ of execution when, instead of admitting the employee back to his work, the employer chooses to reinstate the employee in the payroll only.”[12]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 28, 2012 Decision but the same was denied on December 28, 2012.[13]
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
Petitioners raise the following grounds for the allowance of their petition, to wit:
I. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION, BY DISREGARDING OR IGNORING THAT THE TWO CASES RELIED UPON NAMELY MT. CARMEL COLLEGE V. RESUENA GR. NO. 173076 OCTOBER 6, 2007 AND PANUNCILLO V. CAP PHILIPPINES INC., GR. NO. 16[1]305 FEBRUARY 9, 2007 CAN NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY AS THE DECISION OF THE NLRC SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED WAS ISSUED ON JUNE 30, 2005.
II. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR (SIC) IN DISREGARDING OR IGNORING THE SETTLED RULE THAT ALL DOUBTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF LABOR CODE INCLUDING ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS SHALL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF LABOR.
RULING
Stated differently, the pivotal issue presented before US is whether or not a writ of execution should have been issued first by the Labor Arbiter for the enforcement of the reinstatement order of the NLRC Decision.
The petition is without merit.
There is no question that the order for reinstatement was issued by the NLRC and not by the Labor Arbiter. In this sense, the execution of said order of reinstatement is governed by Article 224 of the Labor Code and not Article 223.
This was discussed by the High Court in the case of Pioneer Texturizing Corporation vs. NLRC,[14] to wit:
“We note that prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 6715, Article 223 of the Labor Code contains no provision dealing with the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee. The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6715 is an innovation and a far departure from the old law indicating thereby the legislature’s unequivocal intent to insert a new rule that will govern the reinstatement aspect of a decision or resolution in any given labor dispute. In fact, the law as now worded employs the phrase “shall immediately be executory” without qualification emphasizing the need for prompt compliance. As a rule, “shall” in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory. An appeal or posting of bond, by plain mandate of the law, could not even forestall nor stay the executory nature of an order of reinstatement. The law, moreover, is unambiguous and clear. Thus, it must be applied according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its express terms. xxx
xxx
And in conformity with the executory nature of the reinstatement order, Rule V, Section 16 (3) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC strictly requires the Labor Arbiter to direct the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee. Thus:
“In case the decision includes an order of reinstatement, the Labor Arbiter shall direct the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed or separated employee even pending appeal. The order of reinstatement shall indicate that the employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.”
In declaring that reinstatement order is not self-executory and needs a writ of execution, the Court, in Maranaw, adverted to the rule provided under Article 224. We said:
“It must be stressed, however, that although the reinstatement aspect of the decision is immediately executory, it does not follow that it is self-executory. There must be a writ of execution which may be issued motu proprio or on motion of an interested party. Article 224 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 224. Execution of decision, orders or awards. — (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory . . .
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule VIII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC also provides:
The Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator, or the Regional Director, or his duly authorized hearing officer of origin shall, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment only within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory . . . . No motion for execution shall be entertained nor a writ be issued unless the Labor Arbiter is in possession of the records of the case which shall include an entry of judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
In the absence then of an order for the issuance of a writ of execution on the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the petitioner was under no legal obligation to admit back to work the private respondent under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to her dismissal or, at the petitioner’s option, to merely reinstate her in the payroll. An option is a right of election to exercise a privilege, and the option in Article 223 of the Labor Code is exclusively granted to the employer. The event that gives rise for its exercise is not the reinstatement decree of a Labor Arbiter, but the writ for its execution commanding the employer to reinstate the employee, while the final act which compels the employer to exercise the option is the service upon it of the writ of execution when, instead of admitting the employee back to his work, the employer chooses to reinstate the employee in the payroll only. If the employer does not exercise this option, it must forthwith admit the employee back to work, otherwise it may be punished for contempt.”
A closer examination, however, shows that the necessity for a writ of execution under Article 224 applies only to final and executory decisions which are not within the coverage of Article 223. For comparison, we quote the material portions of the subject articles:
“Art. 223. Appeal. . . .
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 224. Execution of decisions, orders, or awards. — (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu propio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final decisions, orders or awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or regional director, the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter, or voluntary arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the responsible officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels of record and the parties with copies of said decisions, orders or awards. Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such responsible officer to appropriate administrative sanctions.”
Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) years from the date a decision, an order or award becomes final and executory. It can not relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Article 223 contemplates. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve its specific purpose. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the light of the purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. And where the statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. 31 In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under R.A. No. 6715, Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. On appeal, however, the appellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its sound discretion.” (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The ruling was further clarified in the case of Panuncillo vs. Car Philippines, Inc.,[15] in this wise:
“In the present case, since the NLRC found petitioner’s dismissal illegal and ordered her reinstatement, following the provision of the sixth paragraph of Article 223, viz:
The [National Labor Relations] Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the answer of the appellee. The decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
the NLRC decision became “final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt of the decision by the parties” for reinstatement.
In view, however, of Article 224 of the Labor Code which provides:
ART. 224. Execution of decisions, orders or awards. – (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final decisions, orders or awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or regional director, the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter, or voluntary arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the responsible officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels of record and the parties with copies of said decisions, orders or awards. Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such responsible officer to appropriate administrative sanctions. xxx
there was still a need for the issuance of a writ of execution of the NLRC decision.
Unlike then the order for reinstatement of a Labor Arbiter which is self-executory, that of the NLRC is not. There is still a need for the issuance of a writ of execution. Xxx”
And reiterated in the case of Mt. Carmel College vs. Resuena:[16]
“Art. 223 of the Labor Code provides that reinstatement is immediately executory even pending appeal only when the Labor Arbiter himself ordered the reinstatement. In this case, the original Decision of Labor Arbiter Drilon did not order reinstatement. Reinstatement in this case was actually ordered by the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The order of Labor Arbiter Pura on 31 January 2005 directing reinstatement was issued after the Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 March 2004 which affirmed the NLRC’s order of reinstatement. Thus, Art. 223 finds no application in the instant case. Considering that the order for reinstatement was first decided upon appeal to the NLRC and affirmed with finality by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 80369 on 17 March 2004, petitioner rightly invoked Art. 224 of the Labor Code. As contemplated by Article 224 of the Labor Code, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory. Consequently, under Rule III of the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment, it is provided that if the execution be for the reinstatement of any person to a position, an office or an employment, such writ shall be served by the sheriff upon the losing party or upon any other person required by law to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such decision or order for reinstatement.”
Thus, with the attendant circumstances of this case, in order for petitioners to claim payment for backwages, a writ of execution must have been issued first by the Labor Arbiter enforcing the order of reinstatement by the NLRC and duly served on private respondents who have the option to choose between actual and mere payroll reinstatement of petitioners.
The fact that the Panuncillo and Mt. Carmel cases were promulgated in 2007 or after the decision sought to be enforced by petitioners was issued is of no moment. As early as 1997, the Supreme Court in the Pioneer case already upheld the need for a writ of execution in cases where the order of reinstatement came from the NLRC and not from the Labor Arbiter. WE are in full accord with the following disquisition of the NLRC contained in its Resolution of December 28, 2012:
“Needless to state, herein private respondents raise no genuine issue as, apart from admitting – contrary to their previous submissions before the Commission – that what is sought to be enforced is a reinstatement order emanating from the Commission, the aforequoted jurisprudence only serves to emphasize the ratio of the assailed Decision – reiterating the requisite need for the issuance of a Writ of Execution in enforcing a decree of reinstatement issued by the Commission on appeal. The cited case, by no stretch of rational imagination support the position espoused by private respondents herein. As can be gathered from a cursory reading of the same, Pioneer merely clarifies the distinction between a reinstatement order under Article 223 of the Labor Code and that of a similar award emanating from the Commission as provided for under Article 224. In no manner does it dispense with the prerequisite issuance of the necessary writ of execution prior to the enforcement of the reinstatement decree issued by the Commission on appeal, as argued by herein private respondents.
The mandate of the law could not be any clearer. Unlike in Article 223 of the Labor Code where an order of reinstatement immediately becomes enforceable, the execution of a similar order emanating from the Commission, on appeal, lies not in favor of a dismissed employee as a matter of right. As perfectly understood by private respondents herein, Article 224 of the Labor Arbiter categorically prescribes the issuance of a Writ of Execution as a condition sine qua non for the execution of an order of reinstatement issued by the Commission on Appeal. This, undoubtedly, is the doctrine articulated in Pioneer Texturizing Corporation, et. al. vs. NLRC which was simply clarified and reiterated in the more recent cases of Panuncillo vs. CAP Philippines, Inc. and Mt. Carmel College vs. Resuena. Jurisprudence on the matter has, in fact, been consistent contrary to the misleading suppositions advanced by private respondents.”[17]
Considering that no writ of execution was issued for the implementation of the NLRC order for reinstatement, private respondents are not obliged to pay petitioners’ salaries from the finding of illegal dismissal of the NLRC until the said decision was reversed by this Court. As correctly held by the NLRC, thus —
“By insisting that they be paid their salaries from the time the Commission decreed reinstatement stemming from the finding of illegal dismissal, private respondents naturally deprived petitioners of that opportunity to consider the option that legally belonged to the latter had a Writ of Execution been duly issued at that particular time. Needless to state – as a necessary consequence of a Writ of Execution issued precisely for the enforcement of a reinstatement order coming from the Commission – an employer is granted the option to choose whether to effect actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement. An option is a right of election to exercise a privilege, and the option in this instance belonged exclusively to the employer. Petitioners, therefore, were pre-empted from exercising such option when private respondents herein assumed that the former opted for payroll reinstatement when the latter elevated the instant case before the Court of Appeals. Private respondents err convincingly in attempting to hold petitioners liable for the payment of their salaries – absent any finding that the latter unjustifiably refused to comply with the reinstatement order – in as much as the option to choose between actual and payroll reinstatement was never presented to petitioners as a result of private respondents’ fatal omission to move for the execution of the order of reinstatement issued by the Commission. As discussed in Median v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS) – DZW:
Petitioners construe the above paragraph to mean that the refusal of the employer to reinstate an employee as directed in an executory order of reinstatement would make it liable to pay the latter’s salaries. This interpretation is correct. xxx Firstly, he can admit the dismissed employee back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or to a substantially equivalent position if the former position is already filled up as we have ruled in Union of Supervisors (RB) NATU vs. Sec. of Labor, 128 SCRA 442 [1984]; and Pedroso vs. Castro, 141 SCRA 252 [1986]. Secondly, he can reinstate the employee merely in the payroll. Failing to exercise any of the above options, the employer can be compelled under pain of contempt, to pay instead the salary of the employee. This interpretation is more in consonance with the constitutional protection to labor (Section 3, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The right of a person to his labor is deemed to be property within the meaning of constitutional guaranty that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary and unjust deprivation of his job (Bondoc vs. People’s Bank and Trust Co., Inc., 103 SCRA 599 [1981]). The employee should not be left with any remedy in case the employer unreasonably delays reinstatement. Therefore, we hold that the unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate an illegally dismissed employee entitles the employee payment of his salaries xxx.”[18]
In the light of the foregoing, WE discern that no grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the NLRC.
There is grave abuse of discretion “when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”[19]
The issuance of the questioned Decision and Resolution was made in accord with applicable law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Tijam, N.G., Chairperson and [*]Sorongon, E.D., JJ., concur.
[*] Vice J. Agnes Reyes Carpio, per Office Order No. 200-14-ABR, dated May 9, 2014.
[1] Rollo, p. 29.
[2] Id., p. 22.
[3] Id., p. 68.
[4] Id., p. 84.
[5] Id., p. 98.
[6] Id., p. 122.
[*] Should be June 30, 2005.
[7] Id., p. 140.
[8] Id., p. 136.
[9] Id., p. 142.
[10] Id., p. 143.
[11] Id., p. 29.
[12] Decision, May 28, 2012, p. 12; Rollo p. 40.
[13] Id., p. 22.
[14] G.R. No. 118651, October 16, 1997.
[15] G.R. No. 161305, February 9, 2007.
[16] G.R. No. 173076, October 10, 2007.
[17] Resolution, December 28, 2012, pp. 5-6; Rollo pp. 26-27.
[18] Decision, May 28, 2012, pp. 12-13; Rollo pp. 40-41.
[19] See Spouses Atuan vs. Chong, G.R. No. 172796, July 13, 2009.