INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED NATIVIDAD PAREJA, PAZ PAREJA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. JULIO PAREJA, REGINA PAREJA, AND JOSE PAREJA, OPPOSITORS AND INTESTATE ESTATE OF PAREJA V…

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon declaring Julio Pareja, Regina Pareja, Paz Pareja, and Jose
Pareja, as well as Soledad Pareja Marcial, acknowledged natural
children and heirs of the deceased Natividad Pareja. The appeal was
certified to this court by the Court of Appeals on the ground that
fundamental question involved is one of law and not of fact.

The record discloses that Natividad Pareja died on April 6, 1943. He
and Eulogia Fernandez lived together as man and wife without being
married, although both had no impediment to contract marriage, and out
of their relationship the said Julio Pareja, Regina Pareja, Paz Pareja,
and Jose Pareja were born. Soledad Pareja was recognized by the
deceased as his natural child, in compliance with a judgment rendered
by this court in which he was found guilty of the seduction of Timotea
Patria, as a result of which crime Soledad was begotten (Exhibit 1).
She was declared by the trial court an acknowledged natural child, and
she opposed the claim of the other children of the deceased, the
appellees herein, as acknowledged natural children. So trial was held
and evidence submitted, after which the court entered the order
appealed from.

It is to be noted that no action for recognition was instituted
during the lifetime of the deceased to compel him to recognize the
appellees. (Article 135, paragraph 2, Spanish Civil Code.) Claim is
made, however, that he had recognized them in the records of their
births and in public documents. The records of birth are Exhibit B,
birth certificate of Paz Pareja wherein it appears that she was born on
September 10, 1905, “legitimate,” father, “Natividad Pareja”; Exhibit
C, baptismal certificate of Julio Pareja, in which it appears that he
was baptized on May 7, 1898, as “legitimate” child of “Natividad
Pareja”; Exhibit D, baptismal certificate of Regina Pareja, wherein it
appears that she was born on September 7, 1900, and baptized on October
6, 1900, as “legitimate” child of “Natividad Pareja”; Exhibit E, birth
certificate of Jose Patricio Pareja, who is supposed to have been born
on March 15, 1902, as a “legitimate” child, but with the name of the
father as “P. N. C.” (padre no conocido—father unknown.)
Another documentary evidence presented at the trial is the “Information
for Membership Insurance” (Exhibit A) dated March 12, 1939, filed by
the deceased with the Government Service Insurance System on April 4,
1939, and containing the following designation of beneficiaries :

Name	Family Name	Relationship	Age
Julio	Pareja	son	40
Regina	Pareja	daughter	38
Jose	Pareja	son	26
Paz	Pareja	daughter	24

The trial court held that the birth certificates, Exhibits B and E, of
Paz Pareja and Jose Patricio Pareja, respectively, and the baptismal
certificates, Exhibits C and D of Julio Pareja and Regina Pareja,
respectively, are public documents, which “constitute proofs of the
facts contained therein,” i.e., Julio, Regina, Paz, and Jose, all
surnamed Pareja, are recognized natural children of the deceased; that
even if Exhibit E contains the statement that the father of the child
mentioned therein is “P. N. C.”, this deficiency is supplied by the
testimony of Eulogia Fernandez, who declared that Jose Pareja is one of
the four children she bore to Natividad Pareja; and that even if
because of the technicalities of the law the above-named children have
not proved their acknowledgment as natural children under the
provisions of article 131 of the Spanish Civil Code, or can not now
bring the action for recognition because they were all of age when
their father died, still the court, which sits as a court of equity,
should decree their recognition for the reason that the deceased had
brought them up and reared them in every possible way, “ministering to
their physical and moral needs, with tenderness and solicitude proper
of every good father.” Against these legal conclusions of the trial
court Soledad Pareja Marcial has appealed.

The law which governs the form and manner in which recognition of
natural children may be made is article 131 of the Spanish Civil Code,
thus:

ART. 131. El reconocimiento de un hijo natural
debera hacerse en el acta de nacimiento, en testamento o en otro
documento publico.

The public document that is pointed out in the above article as one
of the ways of acknowledgment is denned in article 1216 of the same
code, as follows:

ART. 1216. Son documentos publicos los autorizados
por un Notario o empleado publico competente, con las solemnidades
requeridas por la ley.

Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public
documents, those executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public
officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in
Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class. (Willard, Notas al Codigo Civil Español,
pp. 25-28.)

Sanchez Roman, on the other hand, states that recognition of natural children must be precise, express, and solemn.

54. En cuanto a los elcmentos formales del
reconocimiento de hijos naturales, o sean las formas legales de
llevarlo a cabo, las establecidas por el Codigo son de caracter
taxativo, expreso y solemne.

Lo primero, porque, segun el
art. 131 y sus complementarios, 132, 133, solo puede tener lugar dicho
reconocimiento en el acta de nacimiento, en testamento o en otro
documento publico, y en este ultimo caso, cuando el reconocimiento sea
de un menor, con la aprobacion judicial y audiencia del Ministerio
fiscal, asi como cuando es de un mayor, siempre con su consentimiento,
segun ya se ha dicho (1).

Lo segundo, porque de este mismo
criterio legal taxativo y de los mediosunicos que establece el articulo
131, se deduce una vez mas, que el Codigo, apartandose del sentido
declarado por la jurisprudencia del Derecho anterior, no acepta la
doctrina del reconocimiento tacito, ni siquiera la de la libertad para
acreditario por ualquiera de los medios de prueba establecidos en
Derecho, cuando del reconocimiento voluntario propiamente tal se trate,
siendo, a la sumo, aquellos medios, elementos para jundar la demanda
del llamado reconocimiento forzoso, a que se refieren los articulos 135
y 136 (2), siempre que concurran las circunstancias especificas, en
cuanto a la prueba de la filiation natural, que los mismos enuzneran.

Lo
tercero, porque todas las formas de llevar a cabo el reconocimiento,
taxativamente expresadas en el Srticulo 131 y complementadas para algun
caso en el segundo parrafo del 133, son de caracter soiemne, segun lo
revelan sus distintas especies, y hasta la mas generica que expresa de
documento publico, cuyo valor legal se establece por el articulo 1.216
(3) del Codigo; y para este efecto, como tal, debe considerarse el acta
de conciliation, calificada de documento publico y solemne por la ley
de Enjuiciamiento civil (4). Tampoco cabe negar tal caracter a la forma
especial del testamento olografo, no, obstante la condition privada de
su otorgamiento, puesto que la cualidad de documento publico la
adquiere desde el momento en que es protocolado (5). (Tomo 5, Vol. 2,
Sanchez Roman, p. 1043.)

None of the documents presented, Exhibits B, C, D, and E, F, satisfies
the requirements of precision and solemnity retired by article 131 of
the Spanish Civil Code. Evidently, the trial court failed to
distinguish the public document mentioned in said article 131 from
“public instruments” in general. “Public instruments” and “public
documents” have been used interchangeably. “Public instruments,” under
the Spanish notarial law, are a class of public documents and are
denned in article 596 of the Ley Enjuiciamiento Civil. They are similar
to the public instruments mentioned in sections 38 and 39 of Rule 123
of the Rules of Court. Certificate of birth, which are copies of
official records (Section 35), or copies of public writings (Section
38, Rules 123), although issued by public officers, are in no sense
public documents as defined in articles 131 and 1216 of the Spanish
Civil Code. Neither are the baptismal certificates (Exhibits C and D)
public documents or public writings, because the parochial records of
baptisms are not public or official records, as they are not kept by
public officers, and are no proof of relationship or filiation of the
child baptized. (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil., 350; Madridejo vs.
Leon, 55 Phil., 1.), Exhibits B, C, D, and E are not, therefore, public
documents as required in article 131 of the Spanish Civil Code by which
parents may acknowledge their natural children. However, it remains to
be seen if Exhibit A may not be so considered.

Exhibit A is not acknowledged before a notary public; a sheriff
signed the document but he only signed as a witness. But in the
document the deceased made an express statement that the appellees are
his children. It is admitted that it is an official document, because
it was made by the deceased in his capacity as an employee falling
under the Government Service Insurance System, which is a Government
institution. As to its authenticity, there is also no dispute. But as
it was not executed with the formalities required by article 131, in
the sense that it should be made before a notary public solemnly, we
are constrained to hold that it does not possess the requisites of a
public document of recognition. The trial court erred, therefore, in
holding, on the basis of the documentary evidence, that the appellees
are acknowledged natural children.

However, the court finds and declares Exhibit A as an authentic
document or indubitable writing within the meaning of article 135,
paragraph 1, of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:

1. When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity.
* * * .

And as it does not appear from the record whether or not the
appellees had knowledge of the existence of this indubitable writing
prior to the death of their father, in the interest of justice,
sufficient opportunity should be granted them to bring their case under
the provisions of article 137, paragraph 2, of the Spanish Civil Code,
which provides:

ART. 137. Actions for the acknowledgment of natural
children ‘may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative
parents except in the following cases:

1. * * *

2.
If, after the death of the father or mother, some document, before
unknown, should be discovered in which the child is expressly
acknowledged.

In this case the action must be commenced within the six months next following the discovery of such document.

The record discloses that the deceased died during the war, and that
the petition for administration was presented by Paz Pareja on May 21,
1945. No allegation is made therein that Paz Pareja and the other
appellees are natural children of the deceased. From these facts we
infer that the appellees herein may not have been aware of the
existence of Exhibit A. Exhibit A appears to have been secured from the
Government Service Insurance System on December 2, 1949, while the
trial took place on December 10, 1949. However, unless evidence is
submitted that the appellees had no knowledge of the existence of the
said document more than six (6) months prior to December 2, 1949, they
may not invoke or take advantage of the provisions of said article 137,
paragraph 2, of the Spanish Civil Code.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, but the
appellees are hereby granted the right to secure u declaration that
they are recognized natural children under the provisions of article
137, paragraph 2, of the Spanish Civil Code, the same to be exercised
within thirty (30) days from the date on which this decision becomes
final, subject to the condition above-mentioned. Without costs.

Pablo, Dengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.