CHI CHAN LIEU @ “CHAN QUE,” AND HUI LAO CHUNG @ “LEOFE SENGLAO”, COMPLAINANTS, VS. HON. INOCENCIO M. JAURIGUE IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 44, MAMBURAO, OCCID…

Chi Chan Lieu versus Jaurigue

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed with the Supreme Court against a presiding judge of a Regional Trial Court, arising from his handling of a criminal case for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The complainants, two Chinese nationals who are the accused in that criminal case, charge the judge with ignorance of the law, gross negligence and gross inefficiency, abuse of authority, bias, partiality, and pre-judgment. The case matters because it shows how the Court disciplines judges not for the mere content of their rulings, but for carelessness with the records, for dishonest explanations, and for failing to resolve motions promptly. It is a study in the administrative liability of judges under the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Procedural History

The complainants filed an administrative complaint dated July 25, 2002 directly with the Supreme Court, docketed as an administrative matter. The respondent judge filed a letter-comment dated November 20, 2002 denying the charges. The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator, which submitted a report dated October 6, 2003. The Court Administrator found that the judge's actions were not attended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or malice, but recommended that he be admonished and directed to promptly dispose of all matters submitted to him, with a warning. The Supreme Court resolved the administrative complaint itself, disagreeing with the recommendation as too generous and imposing a heavier penalty.

Facts

The complainants were the accused in a criminal case pending before the sala of the respondent judge. They filed a motion to take the deposition of a barangay captain, Maximino Torreliza, whom they intended to present as a witness. The judge denied the motion, reasoning that other witnesses were available and that holding a session in Looc, Occidental Mindoro would cause unnecessary delay. In denying the motion, the judge relied on two telegrams which he said showed that the witness was willing and able to testify. In truth, the telegrams had been sent not by Torreliza but by the former mayor of Looc, a fact the judge later admitted having overlooked. Torreliza eventually passed away on January 26, 2001.

The complainants also filed an omnibus motion on December 11, 2000 and a motion for deposition on January 17, 2001. They inquired about the status of these motions in March and again on June 12, 2001, and were told the motions had not yet been resolved. On June 13, 2001, their collaborating counsel went to court to file a motion for early resolution, only to be told that the orders disposing of the motions had been mailed that same day. The orders, dated January 16, 2001 and February 15, 2001, were both postmarked June 13, 2001. The judge claimed the motions had been resolved in open court on December 19, 2000, an explanation the Court found obviously contrived, since a motion filed on January 17, 2001 could not have been resolved twenty-nine days earlier.

The complainants further alleged that the judge made a sweeping misstatement of Rule 137 when he denied their motion for inhibition, saying there was nothing in the Rules of Court directing a presiding judge to inhibit himself except delicadeza. They also cited his intemperate language during the hearing of their motion for deposition as evidence of bias and pre-judgment. The judge denied all charges and insisted he acted without malice.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross negligence for relying on telegrams he failed to verify, and for issuing an order compelling a doctor to testify on the witness's capacity despite the denial of the deposition.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence and inefficiency for failing to resolve the pending motions within the required period and for the anomalous service of orders dated months earlier but mailed only on June 13, 2001.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of dishonesty for his contrived claim that the motions had been resolved in open court on December 19, 2000.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of abuse of authority, bias, partiality, and pre-judgment, and of ignorance of the law for his statement on inhibition.

Applicable Provisions

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 8. Serious charges. — Serious charges include: x x x Dishonesty x x x.

The Court cites this provision in classifying the respondent's contrived explanation as dishonesty, a serious charge.

Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Canon 3. A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.

The Court invokes this canon because the respondent's pretext violated the command to perform official duties honestly.

Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. x x x All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

The Court reminds judges that they must strictly observe this provision on the prompt and expeditious disposition of cases submitted for decision or resolution.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the respondent negligent. His failure to ascertain from the records that the telegrams were sent by the former mayor and not by Torreliza was uncontroverted and admitted, and the Court held this was a serious lapse that must not go unsanctioned.

On the second issue, the Court found him guilty of gross incompetence and inefficiency. He should have known and prevented the anomalous situation in which orders supposedly dated January 16 and February 15, 2001 were served only on June 13, 2001. He should have adopted a system of checklisting all matters submitted for resolution, including the dates when these were resolved and served. Failing this, the Court said, it is difficult to dispel the impression that the orders were ante-dated to cover up the contravention of the ninety-day requirement.

On the third issue, the Court found his explanation contrived and his resort to a plain pretext to smack of dishonesty, a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140, and a violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the fourth issue, the Court did not sustain the charges of bias, partiality, and pre-judgment, noting that the transcript did not bear out the allegations and that unfavorable orders do not by themselves prove partiality. The Court Administrator's finding that the actions were not attended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or malice was thus qualified, and the recommendation of mere admonition was rejected as too generous.

Doctrine

A judge's negligence in relying on unverified records, and the anomalous service of orders dated months before they were mailed, constitute gross incompetence and inefficiency. A contrived explanation for delay is dishonesty, a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and violates Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requiring judges to perform official duties honestly. Judges must strictly observe Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution on the prompt disposition of cases, and should adopt a system of checklisting all matters submitted for resolution. Unfavorable rulings alone do not establish bias or partiality.

Disposition

The Court severely reprimanded Judge Inocencio M. Jaurigue for gross incompetence, inefficiency, and negligence, ordered him to pay a fine of two thousand pesos for dishonesty, and warned him that a more drastic disciplinary action would follow for similar irregularities.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a judge's contrived explanation for delay is dishonesty, a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140, and violates Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Examiners use this case to test administrative liability of judges for gross negligence, gross inefficiency, and dishonesty, and the distinction between unfavorable rulings and bias.