MARIO BENGZON, PETITIONER, VS. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, RESPONDENT.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:


This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set
aside an order of respondent Judge declaring petitioner and three
others guilty of direct contempt and imposing upon each of them five
(5) days imprisonment and P200 fine.

In the morning of February 13, 1957, the trial of
Civil Case No. 31319 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
Alfonso Encarnacion, et al. vs. Prudencio Castrense, et al., was held in the sala
of respondent Judge. Atty. Eusebio B. Encarnacion was appearing for
plaintiffs while petitioner for defendants. Around 10:00 o’clock of the
same morning, respondent Judge suspended the trial and declared a
recess. During the recess, Atty. Encarnacion asked petitioner if he
could admit the truth of the contents of a certain document which he
wanted to submit as evidence, to which petitioner replied that he could
admit the authenticity and due execution thereof but not the truth of
its contents. Upon hearing this reply, Atty. Encarnacion, in a
threatening voice, inquired why he could not admit the truth of the
contents of said document when the same has been duly signed by his
client, to which petitioner retorted saying that he could not do so
because it would be contrary to the interest of his client. An exchange
of hot words followed at which moment the two sons of Atty. Encarnacion
came along, also in a threatening attitude, and then and there they
started pushing each other and exchanging blows which resulted in the
breaking of one or two chairs of the court. At this juncture,
respondent Judge came out of his room and ordered the parties to stop.
Because of this misbehavior, respondent Judge found petitioner and
Atty. Encarnacion, as well as his son Alfonso and defendant Erudencio
Castrense, guilty of direct contempt and imposed upon each a penalty of
five days imprisonment and a fine of f£00. However, because petitioner
was then a Congressman and raised his parliamentary immunity from
arrest, respondent Judge suspended the effects of his order in order to
give him an opportunity to raise the issue in a proper case before the
Supreme court. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

The issues raised by petitioner are; (1) Under the
facts of this case, has respondent Judge the power and jurisdiction to
punish him for direct contempt?; and (8) In the affirmative case,has
respondent Judge the power and jurisdiction to enforce a penalty of
five days imprisonment imposed upon petitioner considering that he is a
member of Congress?

Section 1, Rule 64, provides:

“SECTION 1. Direct contempt punished summarily; appeal from inferior court.—A
person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the administration of justice, including
disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward
others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required so to do,
may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and
punished by fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding ten days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge
thereof, or by fine not exceeding ten pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one day, or both, if it be an inferior court.”

From the above-quoted provision it is clear that in
order that a person may be adjudged guilty of direct contempt he must
commit a “misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as
to interrupt the administration of justice, including disrespect toward
the court or judge.” In other words, the misbehavior should be
committed either in the presence of or so near a court, while in
session, or in the presence of the judge, even if not in session, in
connection with the administration of justice. “What characterizes
direct contempt is the act of disrespect to the court or to the judge
who is performing an official function. There are no authorities in
this jurisdiction actually interpreting the extent and scope of direct
contempt, but there are authorities in the United States, among which
we may cite the following:

“A direct contempt of court is a contempt committed in the presence of the court while it is in session. (People vs.
Anderson, 13 N.E. 2d 690, 294 111. App. 109) There a statute so
provides, a contempt in the presence of the judge at chambers may be a
direct contempt, (Cal.-Lapique vs. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 229 P. 1010, 68 Cal. App. 407), but it is not such a
contempt under a statute defining it as disorderly, contemptuous, or
insolent conduct toward a judge while holding court.” (Or.State vs. Dirscoll, 50 P. 2d 581, 151 Or. 363; 17 C.J.S., p. 6)

In the light of the foregoing authorities, does the
misbehavior committed by petitioner in the courtroom of respondent
Judge during recess partake of the nature of direct contempt?

We are inclined to answer the question in the
negative considering the fact that the act was committed at a time when
the court was not in session and the judge has already retired to his
room. There is nothing in the record to indicate the particular act or
work which the judge was then attending to or in which he was engaged.
There is no showing that he was then performing an official duty. The
circumstances during which the alleged misbehavior was committed
developed in connection with a case that was then being tried and if
some hot words were exchanged between the counsel of both parties, they
were so uttered with no intention to obstruct the administration of
justice but simply as a result of the heated argument that ensued in
connection with a certain document which was to be introduced as
evidence. It cannot therefore be said that petitioner acted with intent
to interrupt the administration of justice Dr offend the dignity of the
court or of the judge. And it has been held that “A doubt as to whether
a contemnor has been guilty of a direct or a constructive contempt
should be resolved in favor of constructive contempt.” (Ex parte
Redmond, 132 So. 328, 159 Miss. 449.)

The most that can be said against petitioner and his
companions is that they committed an act of misbehavior which may be
considered a constructive contempt. Thus, their act may be considered
either as a “Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions” (section 3 (a),
Rule 64), or as an “improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice” (Section
3 (d), Rule 64). But in order that they may be held liable, it is
necessary that a charge in writing be first filed against them, and in
that event, they should be given an opportunity to be heard personally
or by counsel, such however is not the case here, for they were dealt
with summarily by respondent Judge. We are therefore constrained to
hold that respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in finding
petitioner guilty of direct contempt and in convicting him accordingly.

Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon the second issue.

Wherefore, petition is granted. The order subject matter of the petition is hereby set aside. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Edencia, and Felix, JJ. concur.