BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND PORO POINT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, V. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, RESPONDENT.
ELBINIAS, J.:
dated March 28, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (“RTC” for brevity) of
San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 28 in Civil Case No. 6993, which
affirmed the Decision[3] dated
July 1, 2004 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (“MTCC” for
brevity) of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
3919 for “Unlawful Detainer”[4]. The Petition also questions the RTC’s Order[5] dated September 2, 2011, which denied petitioners’ eventual Motion for Reconsideration[6].
The salient facts are those as stated in the RTC’s assailed Decision[7] dated March 28, 2005, to wit:
“xxx Plaintiff (respondent here) is the
absolute registered owner of parcels of land situated in Poro Point, San
Fernando City, La Union, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
T-3651, T-4244 and T-5220 (subject properties here) xxx. Plaintiff (respondent) has been in lawful and peaceful possession of said properties since its acquisition, until in the early part of February 2003 when defendants (petitioners here), by the implied tolerance or permission by the plaintiff (respondent), started occupying and even erected structures, covered and paved catwalks, depriving plaintiff (respondent) of the possession of said properties, and since then and up to the present, defendants (petitioners) have remained in possession of said properties.Plaintiff (respondent), represented by its legal counsel, demanded defendants (petitioners) to vacate the properties and pay reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. Despite plaintiff’s (respondent’s) lawful demands, defendants (petitioners) refused without lawful cause to vacate and to pay reasonable compensation for the occupancy of the properties.”[8] (Emphasis Supplied)
Due to the failure of petitioners Bases Conversion Development Authority and Poro Point Management Corporation[9]
(“petitioners BCDA and PPMC” or “petitioners” for brevity) to vacate
the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
T-3651[10], T-4244[11], and T-5220[12]
(“subject properties” for brevity), and which were owned by respondent
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (“respondent LCMC” or “respondent”
for brevity) despite the latter’s demand[13], respondent filed before the MTCC, a Complaint[14] for Unlawful Detainer against petitioners.
The rest of the facts are continued in the RTC’s assailed Decision[15] dated March 28, 2005, as follows:
“In their [A]nswer, defendants (petitioners) xxx contend that the complaint is essentially a nuisance suit and plaintiff (respondent) has no cause of action against defendants (petitioners).
The complaint is intended to delay three (3) expropriation proceedings
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Fernando City,
La Union in Civil Case Nos. 6515, 6516 and 6771, the final outcome of
said expropriation cases will necessitate the dismissal of the
complaint. Defendants (petitioners) further alleged that good faith of the parties is a crucial element in this case. The covered and paved catwalks are not occupied and were built not solely for the use of the defendants (petitioners). They are used by the public and for public purposes and for the stevedoring activities of the plaintiff (respondent) itself.”[16] (Emphasis Supplied)
On July 1, 2004, the MTCC rendered a Decision[17]
ordering petitioners to vacate and to surrender the possession of the
subject properties to respondent, and for petitioners BCDA and PPMC[18]
to pay respondent, jointly and severally, reasonable compensation for
the occupancy of the subject properties. The dispositive portion of the
MTCC’s Decision read:
“WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants Bases Conversion and Development Authority and John Hay Poro Point Development Authority:[19]
a) ordering them, their agents assigns and other persons
acting and/or claiming on their behalf to vacate the premises in
question and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff;b) ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and
severally a reasonable compensation for the occupancy of the properties
subject of this case from the time of actual occupancy of the portion
thereof to the time possession is actually returned to the plaintiff to
be determined by Commissioners to be appointed by the plaintiff and
defendants and the representative of this Court who shall be the City
Assessor of the City of San Fernando (La Union) or his duly authorized
representative subject to the approval of the court.SO ORDERED.”[20] (Emphasis and Italics were made in the original)
Upon petitioners’ appeal[21], the RTC rendered the assailed Decision[22] of March 28, 2005, which Decision[23] affirmed the MTCC’s Decision of July 1, 2004.
After petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration[24] was denied by the RTC in its assailed Order[25] dated September 2, 2011, petitioners filed the Petition[26] at bench praying for the following:
“ACCORDINGLY, Petitioners respectfully ask of this Honorable Court of Appeals that:
1. The questioned 28 March 2005 Decision, as well as the 2
September 2011 Order denying Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration be
reversed and set aside; and2. A new Decision instead be rendered dismissing the illegal (sic) detainer case against Petitioners.
Other equitable reliefs are likewise asked for.”[27] (Emphasis was made in the original)
Petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
“A. THE RTC ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE CASE FOR
UNLAWFUL DETAINER AGAINST PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE LATTER.B. THE RTC ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE CASE AND
LATER ORDERED BCDA’S EJECTMENT FROM THE PREMISES WHICH ARE WALKWAYS USED
FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE.”[28] (Emphasis was made in the original)
Contrary to petitioners’ assigned errors A. and B., respondent LCMC had the right to recover the possession of the subject properties from petitioners BCDA and PPMC[29].
Petitioners had raised the following arguments:
“23. The subject of the unlawful detainer complaint are in fact covered catwalks built (sic). They are used by the general public and are for public purpose and also used for LCMC’s stevedoring activities. There has never been any unlawful deprivation to speak of. Patently, such covered catwalks and walkways, built way back in July of 1998, clearly established by PPMC’s evidence, were
for the use of all concerned, more important, those of LCMC’s
personnel. Petitioners are not occupying these structures as they are
merely covered catwalks and walkways. The filing of the
unlawful detainer suit was clearly without any purpose, but to solely
saddle and irritate Petitioners. The properties where these walkways are
located were included in the properties currently under expropriation.”[30] (Emphasis Supplied)
Defeating petitioners’ contentions however, is that despite the
fact that the covered walkways were being used for public purposes,
respondent LCMC was the owner of the subject properties, as was
evidenced by TCT Nos. T-3651[31], T-4244[32], and T-5220[33]. The existence of the titles in turn, was admitted[34] by petitioners in their respective Answers[35]
before the MTCC, and was as stipulated upon by the parties during the
Pre-Trial Conference. All of these were as also found by the MTCC, which
findings were affirmed by the RTC, to wit:
“During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts and statement of issues:
1) Identities of the plaintiff and the defendants and their capacity to sue and be sued;
2) That the defendants admitted only as to the existence of the title(s)[36] enumerated in paragraph 4 of the complaint;”[37] (Emphasis Supplied)
As the owner of the subject properties, respondent LCMC therefore
had the right to possess the properties to the exclusion of petitioners[38], as is explicitly recognized under Article 428 of the Civil Code, which provides:
“Article 428, Civil Code of the Philippines. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.” (Italics was made in the original, Emphasis Supplied)
Here, petitioners BCDA and PPMC[39]
took possession of the subject properties by mere tolerance or
permission of respondent LCMC by the latter having impliedly allowed
petitioners to construct the covered walkways without any contract[40]. Petitioners’ possession became unlawful when they failed to vacate the subject properties upon respondent’s demand[41]. As a result, petitioners had unlawfully deprived respondent LCMC of its right to possess the subject properties.[42]
All of these matters were as also found by the RTC in its assailed Decision[43] dated March 28, 2005, as follows:
“These allegations sufficiently make out a case for
unlawful detainer. Plaintiff-appellee alleged ownership over the subject
properties as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Titles in its name. Defendants-appellants,
by tolerance or permission, occupied and erected covered and paved
catwalks, depriving plaintiff-appellee of the possession of said
properties. Plaintiff-appellee, through counsel, demanded
defendants-appellants to vacate the properties; and notwithstanding such
demands, defendants-appellants refused to vacate the same. The
allegations therein nonetheless amounts to unlawful withholding of the
subject properties by the defendants because they continuously refused
to vacate the properties even after the plaintiff-appellee’s counsel had
already sent them notice to the effect.xxx
The defendants-appellants claimed that the covered and paved
catwalks and walkways are not occupied and were built not solely for the
use of the defendants-appellants but are used by the general public and
for public purposes and for stevedoring activities for plaintiff
itself. Defendants-appellants further claimed as builders in good faith.These defenses cannot defeat the ejectment suit. The
properties are owned by the plaintiff-appellee. The
defendants-appellants subsequently took possession and constructed
covered and paved catwalks depriving (sic) of the physical
possession of the said properties. Defendants-appellants refused to
vacate despite the lawful demands of the plaintiff-appellee.A builder in good faith xxx does not apply in this case because
the defendants-appellants know at the very outset that they are not the
owners of the land on which they built the covered and paved catwalks.”[44] (Emphasis Supplied)
Evidently, an owner, such as respondent LCMC here, has the right
to eject any person or entity, such as petitioners BCDA and PPMC[45],
which had been illegally occupying the owner’s property. This is
pursuant to the following pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Jack Arroyo vs. Bocago Inland Dev’t Corp. (BIDECO), et al., G.R. No. 167880, November 14, 2012:
“At this juncture, it is best to emphasize the Court’s ruling in Labrador vs. Perlas, to wit:
xxx As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:
As registered owners of the lots in question, the
private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying
their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners’ occupation of the property, and
regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.” (Emphasis Supplied)
Given all these, no cogent or compelling reason was shown to
justify any deviation from the following findings of the MTCC, as
affirmed by the RTC, which were shown to be in accordance with the facts
and the law:
“The only issue in Ejectment cases is the physical possession of the premises,
independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. This must be so
because the issue of ownership cannot be definitely decided in an
ejectment case where the Metropolitan Trial Courts have no
jurisdictions. In this case, the plaintiff are (sic) the absolute and registered owners (sic)
as shown by the Certificate of Titles No. T-3651, T-4244 and T-5220.
Defendants cause[d] the construction of the permanent concreted
structures on plaintiff[‘s] properties without first securing the
express consent of the plaintiff and abusing the tolerance granted by
the plaintiff. The covered and paved catwalks and walkways effectively
deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the subject properties.
There is no contract or agreement that has been executed between the
parties allowing defendants[‘] continued possession thereof up to the
present.Unlawful detainer is proper when a person who occupies
the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission without any
contract between them, fails to vacate the premises upon the owner’s
demand. xxx”[46] (Emphasis Supplied)
Indeed, the findings of the MTCC, especially when affirmed by the RTC as is the case here, are accorded respect.[47]
After careful consideration of all the facts, arguments, and
issues appearing on the records, as well as of the pertinent laws and
jurisprudence, and, in accordance with what is best determined to be
proper under the circumstances, the following disposition is therefore
made on these matters.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dicdican (Chairperson) and Paredes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-24
[2] Rollo, pp. 30-36, penned by Judge Victor M. Viloria
[3] Rollo, pp. 39-51, penned by Judge Eugenio A. Dacumos
[4] Rollo, p. 39
[5] Rollo, pp. 37-38, penned by Judge Victor M. Viloria
[6] Rollo, pp. 150-156
[7] Rollo, pp. 30-36, penned by Judge Victor M. Viloria
[8] Rollo, p. 31
[9] formerly “John Hay Poro Point Development Authority”, Rollo, p. 40
[10] Rollo, pp. 61-62
[11] Rollo, pp. 63-64
[12] Rollo, pp. 65-66
[13] Rollo, pp. 67-70
[14] Rollo, pp. 53-60
[15] Rollo, pp. 30-36, penned by Judge Victor M. Viloria
[16] Rollo, pp. 31-32
[17] Rollo, pp. 39-51, penned by Judge Eugenio A. Dacumos
[18] formerly “John Hay Poro Point Development Authority”, Rollo, p. 40
[19] now petitioner PPMC
[20] Rollo, pp. 50-51
[21] Rollo, pp. 108-127
[22] Rollo, pp. 30-36, penned by Judge Victor M. Viloria
[23] Rollo, pp. 39-51, penned by Judge Eugenio A. Dacumos
[24] Rollo, pp. 150-156
[25] Rollo, pp. 37-38, penned by Judge Victor M. Viloria
[26] Rollo, pp. 9-24
[27] Rollo, p. 20
[28] Rollo, pp. 15-16
[29] formerly “John Hay Poro Point Development Authority”, Rollo, p. 40
[30] Rollo, pp. 17-18
[31] Rollo, pp. 61-62
[32] Rollo, pp. 63-64
[33] Rollo, pp. 65-66
[34] Rollo, pp. 71-79
[35] Rollo, pp. 71-78 and 79-85
[36] TCT Nos. T-3651, T- 4244 and T-5220, Rollo, pp. 61-66
[37] Rollo, p. 42
[38] Spouses Richard B.
Pascual and Cristina D. Pascual vs. Spouses Reynaldo P. Coronel and
Asuncion Malig Coronel, G.R. No. 159292, July 12, 2007; Asuncion Urieta
Vda. De Aguilar vs. Spouses Ederlina B. Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5,
2010
[39] formerly “John Hay Poro Point Development Authority”, Rollo, p. 40
[40] Rollo, pp. 56, 67, 69
[41] Rollo, pp. 67-70
[42] Fiorello R. Jose vs. Roberto Alfuerto, et al., G.R. No. 169380, November 26, 2012
[43] Rollo, pp. 30-36, penned by Judge Victor M. Viloria
[44] Rollo, pp. 34-35
[45] formerly “John Hay Poro Point Development Authority”, Rollo, p. 40
[46] Rollo, pp. 46-47
[47] Erasmo Tayao v. Rosa Mendoza, et al., G.R. No. 162733, April 12, 2005.