CESAR P. PARINAS[], PETITIONER, VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) REPRESENTED BY WINSTON F. GARCIA, PRESIDENT & GENERAL MANAGER, RESPONDENT.
ELBINIAS, M.P., J.:
(“Petition” for brevity) filed by petitioner Cesar P. Parinas
(“petitioner Parinas” or “petitioner” for brevity) under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
However, the Petition[2]
is dismissible due to petitioner’s failure to observe the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. This was as had been declared by
the Supreme Court in Leonardo A. Paat, etc., et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 111107, January 10, 1997, to wit:
“This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before
a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought, The
premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.” (Emphasis supplied)
Here, petitioner questioned the Decision[3]
dated October 19, 2006 issued by Winston F. Garcia, President and
General Manager of respondent Government Service Insurance System
(“respondent GSIS” for brevity) in ADM Case No. 06-088, which Decision[4] found petitioner Parinas guilty of “Dishonesty” and “Grave Misconduct”. The dispositive portion of the Decision[5] read as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Government Service Insurance System finds respondents Reynaldo Untalan, Ma. Joji M. Monton, and Cesar P. Pariñas guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. They are meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE together with the appurtenant accessory penalties.
It is so ordered.”[6] (Emphasis was made in the original, underscoring supplied)
Because the assailed Decision[7]
of respondent GSIS involved an administrative case against its
employee, petitioner Parinas, then petitioner’s remedy from such
Decision[8] was to file an
appeal to the Civil Service Commission (“CSC for brevity). The reason is
that the employees of respondent GSIS, including petitioner Parinas,
“are part of the [C]ivil [S]ervice [S]ystem and are subject to the law
and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on
discipline, attendance and general terms and conditions of employment.”[9]
This, also considering that respondent GSIS is a “government-owned or
controlled corporation with an original charter” which forms part of the
Civil Service.[10]
That decisions of heads of government-owned or controlled
corporations which are agencies forming part of the Civil Service, such
as respondent GSIS, in an administrative case against their employees,
such as petitioner Parinas, are appealable to the CSC is in accordance
with the following pronouncement of the Supreme Court in University
of the Philippines and UP School of Economics vs. The Hon. Teodoro P.
Regino, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 83 National Capital Region, Q.C.,
Angel Pamplina, and the Civil Service Commission[11]:
“As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 607 and administrative
cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.” (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, considering that the assailed Decision[12] imposed upon petitioner the penalty of dismissal from service, such Decision[13]
was therefore appealable to the CSC Proper, as is provided for under
Section 5(A)(2), Rule I of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service[14]
(“URACCS” for brevity), and under Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Title I(A),
Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
“Administrative Code of 1987” (“Administrative Code” for brevity).
Section 5(A)(2), Rule I of the URACCS states:
“Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
Proper. – The Civil Service Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction
over the following cases:A. Disciplinary
xxx
2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities, imposing
penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary brought before it on appeal;” (Italics was made in the original, Emphasis Supplied)
Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Title I(A), Book V of the Administrative Code states:
“SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—(1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. xxx” (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, petitioner’s failure to exhaust an available administrative
remedy results to a premature invocation of the court’s intervention and
renders the Petition[15] at bench dismissible. That this is the consequence is pursuant to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Rosita
A. Montanez vs. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), etc.,
The Landbank of the Philippines, Mauro T. Alfonso, et. al., G.R. No.
183142, September 17, 2009, to wit:
“It is settled that the premature invocation of the
court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. If a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must first be exhausted
before the courts power of judicial review can be sought. The
party with an administrative remedy must not only initiate the
prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it
to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in
order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to
the court.Corollary to the exhaustion rule is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, a basic postulate which precludes courts from
resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.” (Emphasis supplied)
The right to appeal by Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court “is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege
[and] [t]he party who seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply
with the requirements of the rules”.[16]
IN VIEW OF ALL THESE, the Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Dicdican (Chairman) and Paredes, JJ., concur.
[*] Alternately spelled as Parinas and Pariñas in the records
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-24
[2] Rollo, pp. 7-24
[3] Rollo, pp. 61-69
[4] Rollo, pp. 61-69
[5] Rollo, pp. 61-69
[6] Rollo, p. 69
[7] Rollo, pp. 61-69.
[8] Rollo, pp. 61-69.
[9] Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General Manager of GSIS vs. Mario I. Molina and
Albert M. Velasco, G.R. No. 157383, August 10, 2010
[10] Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General Manager of GSIS vs. Mario I. Molina and
Albert M. Velasco, G.R. No. 157383, August 10, 2010
[11] G.R. No. 88167, May 3, 1993
[12] Rollo, pp. 61-69.
[13] Rollo, pp. 61-69.
[14] CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999, circulated through CSC Memorandum Circular No.
19, s. 1999
[15] Rollo, pp. 7-24
[16] BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., PETITIONER, vs. Pryce Gases, Inc., International Finance Corporation,
et. al, G.R. No. 188365, June 29, 2011