CARMEN CASTRO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FRANCISCA SAGALES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Appeal
from an order of Hon. Jesus Y. Perez of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for workmen’s compensation on
the ground that the matter properly falls within the jurisdiction of
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

Republic Act No. 772
effective June 20, 1952 conferred upon the Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner “exclusive jurisdiction” to hear and decide claims for
compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, subject to appeal to
this Supreme Court. Before the passage of said Act demands for
compensation had to be submitted to the regular courts.

The
fatal accident which befell Dioscoro Cruz, husband of plaintiff Carmen
Cruz, having occurred in January 1952 and action having been commenced
in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in August, 1952, the
resultant issue is the proper forum: either the courts or the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission.

For the appellants it is contended that the date of the accident,
and not the date of filing the complaint, should be considered because
the right to compensation of the laborer or employees or his
dependents, like the obligation of the employer to pay the same, begins
from the very moment of the accident.

It is true that the
right arises from the moment of the accident, but such right must be
declared or confirmed by the government agency empowered by law to make
the declaration. If at the time the petition for such declaration is
addressed to the court, the latter has no longer authority to do so,
obviously it has no power to entertain the petition. Republic Act No.
772 is very clear that on and after June 20, 1952 all claims for
compensation shall be decided exclusively by the Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. This claim having
been formulated for the first time in August, 1952 in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, the latter had no jurisdiction, at that
time, to act upon it. No constitutional objection may be interposed to
the application of the law conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission,
because the statute does not thereby operate retroactively; it is made
to operate upon claims formulated after the law’s approval. As
attorney for appellee suggests, had the claim been filed before the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 772 in a court of first instance, the
question might be debatable whether such court should now continue
hearing the matter or not. “A retrospective law, in a legal sense, is
one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing
laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a
new disability, in respect of transactions or consideration already
past. Hence, remedial statutes, or statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights,
but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a
retrospective law, or the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes” (50 Am. Jur. p. 505).

A parallel
situation is not far to seek. The right of the heirs to the decedent’s
estate begins from the moment of death. And yet it undoubtedly could be
within the power of the Legislature to establish by law probate courts
to take charge even of estates of persons who had died before its
approval. The creation of the People’s Court to try treason cases
arising from acts committed during the Japanese occupation is another
example of recent times.

It is argued that Republic Act No.
772 should not be enforced as to accidents happening before its
approval, because it has introduced changes affecting vested rights of
the parties. Without going into details, it might be admitted that
changes as to substantive rights will not govern such “previous”
accidents. Yet here we are dealing with remedies and jurisdiction which
the Legislature has power to determine and apportion. And then it is
hard to imagine how one litigant could acquire a vested right to be
heard by one particular court, even before he has submitted himself to
that particular court’s jurisdiction.

In the United States
actions pending in one court maybe validly taken away by statute and
transferred to another (See 21 C. J. S., p. 148).

Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.