PAULINO V. NERA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. FELIPE L. VACANTE, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF LAMBUNAO, ILOILO, AND SANTIAGO P. DAKUDAO, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

Santiago P. Dakudao appeals from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo holding that the Justice of the Peace Court of
Lambunao, province of Iloilo, is without jurisdiction to hear and
determine civil case No. 214, Santiago P. Dakudao, plaintiff, vs.
Paulino V. Nera, defendant, and that its order dated 6 January 1959,
denying the therein defendant’s motion to dismiss and setting the case
for hearing on 19 January 1959 at 8:00 o’clock in the morning is null
and void, declaring permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued
on 30 January 1959, and granting the petitioner’s prayer for a writ of
certiorari (civil No. 5094).

On 22 October 1958 Santiago P. Dakudao (the appellant) filed a
complaint dated 21 October 1958 for detainer against Paulino V. Nera
(the appellee) in the Justice of the Peace Court of Lambunao, Iloilo
(the respondent Court), alleging that on 17 October 1956, in the City
of Iloilo, the appellant and the appellee entered into a contract
whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter seven parcels of
agricultural land for and in consideration of the sum of P32,000
payable as follows: P7,000 upon signing the contract and the balance of
P25,000 by installment, P10,000 on 30 June 1958 and P15,000 on June
1960, the unpaid balance to draw interest at the rate of 6% per annum,
payable in Davao City within thirty days after 31 December of each and
every year; that in addition to the foregoing terms and conditions, the
contracting parties stipulated that the appellant would deliver
possession of the seven parcels of land to the appellee after signing
the contract, including the standing crop during the year 1956-1957 and
the improvements thereon; and that a violation of any of the terms and
conditions of the contract would render it null and void and whatever
amount paid would be considered as rentals of the land and the
improvements existing thereon would be forefeited in favor of the
appellant, who is authorized to take possession of the land and
improvements, from the appellee or anybody acting in his behalf,
without any court order or permission; that the appellee had failed to
pay the sum of P10,000 when it fell due on 30 June 1958; that despite
repeated demands made by the apfpellant to pay the said sum the
appellee had refused and failed to pay it; that the appellant had made
demands upon the appellee to deliver to him the possession of the seven
parcels of land but the latter had refused and failed to comply with
the former’s demands and instead by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, since 30 June 1958, has unlawfully
withheld possession of the said parcels of land and has deprived the
appellant of the enjoyment thereof, to his damage and prejudice; that
as a result of the appellee’s unlawful withholding of the possession of
the parcels of land the appellant has suffered damage in the sum of
P4,000 and will continue to suffer it at rate of P400 a month until
possession thereof shall have been restored to him; that in seeking
redress and vindication of his right the appellant has to employ the
services of counsel whom he had paid the sum of P600, and praying that
the appellee be ordered to vacate the seven parcels of land and restore
possession thereof to the appellant; to pay the appellant damages in
the sum of P4,000 and P400 monthly thereafter as reasonable rental for
the use and occupation of the parcels of land; and to pay the appellant
the sum of P600 as attorney’s fees, the cost of litigation, and the
Court to grant him other just and equitable relief (civil No. 214,
Annex A).

On 3 December 1958 the appellee filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action and that the
respondent Oourt has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit.
He argued that the contract entered into by and between him and the
appellant is a consummated sale, and both of them have reciprocal
obligations thereunder; that granting that there has been a violation
of the terms and conditions of the contract on his part, yet the
appellant singly or unilaterally cannot rescind the contract; that such
being the case the appellant should first seek a judicial rescission of
the contract before instituting an action for detainer against the
appellee; and that the respondent Court has no jurisdiction over
actions for rescission of contracts (Annex B).

On 22 December 1958 the appellant filed a reply to the appellee’s
motion to dismiss contending that having failed to pay the stipulated
amount on the due date, the appellee’s right to hold possession of the
parcels of land, pursuant to their contract, already has ceased; that
for that reason the appellee is unlawfully withholding possession of
the parcels of land; and that his remedy is a detainer action
cognizable by the respondent Court (Annex C).

On 6 January 1959 the respondent Court denied the appellee’s motion
to dismiss and set the case,for hearing on 19 January 1959 at 8:00
o’clock in the morning (Annex D).

On 29 January 1959 the appellee filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against
the appellant and the respondent Court alleging that the object of the
former’s complaint is not for detainer but for rescission of contract,
which is not cognizable by the latter; that the denial by the
respondent Court of the appellee’s motion to dismiss and setting the
case for hearing amounts to grave abuse of discretion and constitutes
lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the appellee has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except this
petition for certiorari; and that the forcement of the order of the
respondent Court dated 6 January 1959 would cause great and irreparable
injury and would work injustice to the appellee, and praying that the
order of the respondent Court, dated 6 January 1959, denying the
appellant’s motion to dismiss civil case No. 214 for detainer and
setting it for hearing on 19 January 1959 at 8:00 o’clock in the
morning (Annex D), be annulled and set aside; that pending
determination of the case, and upon the filing of a bond to be fixed by
the Court, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the
respondent Court from enforcing the order complained of (Annex D); and
that the appellee be ordered to pay the costs, and for other just and
equitable relief (civil No. 5094). On 30 January 1959 the Court entered
an order directing the appellant and the respondent Court to answer the
petition within ten days from receipt of notice and granting the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for upon the filing of a bond by the
appellee in the amount of P500. Upon the filing of the required bond,
on the same date, 30 January 1959, the Court issued the writ. The next
day it was served upon the appellant and the respondent Court.

On 9 February 1959 the appellant filed his answer to the petition
for certiorari contending that it is premature because the appellee had
not sought a reconsideration of the order of the respondent Court
denying his motion to dismiss ; that it lacks legal basis because the
appellee has not shown that the respondent Court has no jurisdiction;
and that it is filed for the sole purpose of molesting and harassing
the appellant and delaying the disposition of the case. On the same
date, the respondent Court filed its answer contending that on the face
of the complaint filed in civil case No. 214, it appears that the
action is for detainer which is within its exclusive original
jurisdiction and that the appellee’s allegations tending to divest it
of jurisdiction are matters of evidence. Both of them prayed for
dismissal of the petition, with costs against the appellee.

On 25 February 1959 the appellant filed an “urgent motion” to set
the hearing of the case on a date much earlier than 30 March 1959, the
date originally set by the Court. On 28 February 1959 the Court
directed the Clerk of Court to set the case for hearing as soon as
possible. The Clerk of Court set the case for hearing on 16 March 1959
at 8:00 o’clock in the morning. After hearing, on 18 March 1959, the
Court rendered judgment holding that the mere failure of a party to a
contract imposing reciprocal obligations upon the parties thereto, to
comply with the terms of the contract, does not automatically operate
to rescind it; that to rescind a contract of that nature judicial
action is necessary; that there being no allegation in the appellant’s
complaint that the contract to sell had been judicially rescinded, it
follows that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action; and that since justice of the peace
courts have no jurisdiction to hear and determine cases of rescission
or annulment of contracts, the respondent Court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in denying the appellee’s motion to dismiss and
setting the case for hearing. The dispositive part of the judgment is
as stated in the early part of this opinion.

On 3 April the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and on
10 April 1959 the appellee, an objection thereto. On 9 May 1959 the
Court denied the motion for reconsideration. On 28 May 1959 the
appellant filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond. In his notice
the appellant states that he appeals to this court from the judgment
rendered in the case “as the questions at issue involve questions of
law purely.” In his brief he discusses only questions of law.

The facts are stated by the trial court, as follows:

* * * On October 17, 1956, in the City of Iloilo,
respondent Santiago P. Dakudao as vendor and petitioner as vendee,
entered into a “Contract to Sell” whereby the vendor, in consideration
of P32,000.00, agreed to sell to the vendee seven (7) parcels of land
located in the Municipality of Lambunao. According to the agreement,
the amount was to be paid as follows:

P 7,000.00 upon the signing of the document;
10,000.00 on June 30, 1958; and
15,000.00 on June 30, 1960.

Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the agreement read as follows :

“3. That the sums of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
and fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall earn interest at the
rate of six (6%) per cent per annum, payable in Davao City, within
thirty days (30) after December 31st of every year, until after
complete payment is effected.

“4. That upon full payment in
cash of the balance of twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) and its
interest of 6% per annum, a Deed of Sale shall be executed by Santiago
P. Dakudao, the vendor, in favor of Paulino V. Nera.

“5. That
violation of any condition and stipulation of this contract shall
render the same null and void and whatever sum paid previous thereto
shall be considered as rentals of the land subject of the contract, and
whatever improvements existing thereon shall belong to the vendor who
is hereby authorized to take possession of the land without benefit of
Court Order or permission thereby Excluding Paulino V. Nera or his
laborers or others who act in his representation from the premises in
question.

“6. That the vendor shall deliver the possession of
the above mentioned seven parcels of land to the vendee after signing
of this contract including all the present crop of 1956—1957, with the
improvements thereon, and relocation of boundaries shall be at the cost
of the vendee.”

On October 21, 1958, Santiago P. Dakudao
commenced an action of illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 214) against
the herein petitioner in the Justice of the Peace Court of Lambunao,
Iloilo. He alleged in his complaint that defendant therein (petitioner
in this case) had violated paragraph five of the “Contract to Sell”
because he had not paid the first installment of P10,000.00 when it
fell due on June 30, 1958. He prayed that said defendant be ordered to
restore unto him the possession of the seven (7) parcels of land
aforesaid. (See Annex A of the petition) On December 3, 1958, the
herein petitioner filed motion to dismiss on the grounds (1) that the
complaint stated no cause of action and (2) that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. (See Annex B of the
petition). On January 6, 1959, the court denied the motion to dismiss
and set the case for trial on the merits on January 19, 1959, at 8
o’clock A. M. (See Annex D of the petition.) A violation by a party of
any of the stipulations of a contract or agreement to sell real
property would entitle the other party to resolve or rescind it. An
allegation of such violation in a detainer suit may be proved by
competent evidence. And if proved a justice of the peace court might
make a finding to that effect, but it certainly cannot declare and hold
that the contract is resolved or rescinded. It is beyond its power so
to do. And as the illegality of the possession of realty by a party to
a contract to sell is premised upon the resolution of the contract, it
follows that an allegation and proof of such violation, a condition
precedent to such resolution or rescission, to render unlawful the
possession of the land or building erected thereon by the party who has
violated the contract, cannot be taken cognizance of by a justice of
the peace court. A stipulation entitling one party to take possession
of the land and building if the other party violates the contract does
not ex proprio vigore confer upon the former the right to take possesion thereof if objected to without judicial intervention and determination.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.