BUENAVENTURA B. VERGARA AND ROSELYN T. TUMASIS, PETITIONERS, VS. GLORY PHILIPPINES, INC., AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.
BERSAMIN, L. P., J.:
We adopt the rendition of the antecedent facts contained in the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated October 29, 1999, to wit:
Complainants Tumasis and Vergara were employed by respondent on July 6, 1998 initially as staff members of the parts Inspection Area, of respondent corporation. However, when they signed their employment contract on August 18, 1998, they were actually hired as Production Operators in the Production section with a daily wage of P188.00. Although complainants actually started to work on July 6, 1998, their respective employment contracts did not state this fact (Annex “A” of complainant’s position paper).
For the period July 31, 1998 to November 30, 1998, complainant were made to sign uniformed employment contracts which both indicated their designations as Parts Inspection Staff and their respective employment was continuously extended every month: first, from July 31, 1998 to August 30, 1998; second, from August 31, 1998 to October 20, 1998; third, from October 21, 1998 to November 30, 1998.
From December 1, 1998 until April 27, 1999, they were allowed to work with the same function but without any employment contract. On April 27, 1999, they were separately made to signify conformity to an employment contract for the period 28 February to 30 April 1999, with the same rate of P188.00 per day.
After April 30, 1999, despite the lapse of their last employment contracts, complainants were made to conform to their new employment contracts “effective 01 to 15 May 1999,” but a higher wage of P200 per day.
Although the contract was only until May 15, 1999, complainants were allowed to continue their employment until May 25, 1999. However, at the close of working hours, respondent, through its security guard on duty, advised them that their employments were terminated and thereafter would not be allowed to enter the premises of respondent company. Allegedly, without cause and prior notice, the services of complainants were illegally terminated by respondent Glory.
Hence, on May 27, 1999, complainants filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal at DOLE, Region IV. In the subsequent hearing, complainant declared that they both preferred reinstatement to their respective positions or other employment with respondent glory, which was however turned down by Annie Furukawa, respondent’s representative. Instead, Furukawa instructed complainants to collect the wages that might have been due them.
Upon reaching respondent’s office, Furukawa tried to persuade the complainants to sign a “quitclaim” before payment of their wages. However, complainants refused to sign said “quitclaim”. Furukawa thereafter, refused payment of complainants’ wages.
Upon the other hand, respondent averred in its position paper that the corporation is engaged in the business of manufacturing money-counting machines. Sometime in June, 1998, respondent established the parts Inspection Section (“PIS”) which was in charge of inspection, to detect possible defects, of the manufactured money-counting machines parts supplied by Megastamp before exportation to its exclusive buyer, Glory Limited Japan (“Glory Japan”). The continued existence of PIS was subject to the condition that the quality of the machine parts would adhere to the strict quality standard of Glory Japan. In July, 1998, respondent conducted dry-run activities to test the viability of the PIS in relation to the business operations of respondent. Thus, on July 6, 1999, respondent hired complainants as PIS personnel.
Respondent claimed that, at the time of their employment it carefully explained to the complainant the fixed period of their employment, that it would automatically expire on July 30, 1998, unless renewed by the parties. Hence, as college graduates, complainant understood the status of their employment and thus voluntarily agreed to the same. However, the training period of complainants were not completed on time. Thus, parties agreed to extend the contract until August 30, 1998 (Annexes “3” and “4” of respondents’ position paper).
Respondent now asserted that inspite of the declining order from Glory Japan coupled with complainants’ poor performance, respondent extended complainants’ employment from October 21, 1998 until February 27, 1999. The extension of the period was due to complainants’ alleged insistent pleas, citing the difficulty in finding other work caused by the economic crisis.
Complainant, as alleged by respondent, requested again for an extension of their employment. Respondent agreed to extend complainants’ employment until 30 April 1999 (Annexes “5” and “6” of respondents’ position paper).
On April 26, 1999, Mr. Takeo Oshima, respondent’s President formally advised Annie Furukuwa, respondent’s Assistant Manager that Glory Japan had cancelled its orders for Machine Part (Annex “7”).
However, respondent reluctantly agreed to prolong complainants; employment until May 15, 1999.[4]
On October 29, 1999, Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Medroso, Jr. rendered a decision,[5] declaring the petitioners to be regular employees as defined under Art. 280, Labor Code, for having been engaged to perform activities that were desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer for almost 11 months continuously, that is, from July 6, 1998 to May 25, 1998, and finding them to be illegally dismissed for lack of just cause and for the non-observance of due process. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the DISMISSAL of complainants BUENAVENTURA VERGARA and ROSELYN TUMASIS by respondent GLORY PHILIPPINES, INC. as ILLEGAL and hereby order said respondent to pay complainants Vergara and Tumasis the followint to wit:
| A.) BUENAVENTURA VERGARA: | |
|
=P19,200.00 |
|
2,933.00 |
|
= 1,000.00 |
|
=P23,133.00 |
| B.) EVELYN TUMASIS: | |
|
=P19,200.00 |
|
2,933.00 |
|
= 1,000.00 |
|
=P23,133.00 |
SO ORDERED.[6]
The private respondent appealed.[7]
On June 8, 2001, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter, holding and ruling thus:
We have to point out, preliminarily, that the appealed decision is supported by substantial evidence, particularly “that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion” [Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court, Enrique Barros vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 123901, September 22, 1999]
The only way, therefore, that we can disregard the findings and conclusions of the Arbiter is by our coming out with facts separate from those he found as stated in the appealed decision. But as an appellate body exercising appellate jurisdiction under Article 223 of the Labor code, we basically are not trier of facts. [Nagkakaisang Mangagawa sa Sony vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 209, 218 (1997)]. Worse is that even by way of exception, we do not find that exceptional need to stray away from our appellate function and conduct a trial on the merits in this case.
Of course, the appellant may fault the Arbiter for giving credence to the factual version of appellee. But the Supreme Court already held that “(w)hen confronted with conflicting versions of factual matters,” the Arbiter has the “discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of evidence received” [Gelmart Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Leogardo, 155 SCRA 403, 409]; and that “(t)he matter of evaluating the merits and demerits of the case, as long as the decision is supported by the facts and the evidence is left to the sound discretion of the Labor Arbiter [Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. NLRC, et al., 235 SCRA 400, 403 (1994)].
So convincing in fact are the findings of the Arbiter as substantially supported by the facts on record that we find “it unnecessary to make a separate discussion” on “each of the errors enumerated” in the subject appeal [Audion Electric Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 106648, June 17, 1999]).
All told, the “findings of the Labor Arbiter should be respected and left undisturbed there being substantial evidence to support them” [Union of Filipino workers vs. NLRC, et al., 221 SCRA 267, 280 (1993]).
WHEREFORE, respondent’s appeal is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On August 7, 2001, the private respondent filed its motion for reconsideration.[9]
On December 20, 2001, the NLRC promulgated another decision,[10] disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, Our decision dated June 8, 2001 is set aside. The complainant’s urgent ex-parte motion to order the release of additional amounts garnished from respondent’s account is denied. The complaint below is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Thereby, the NLRC entirely changed its stand. It adopted the entire report of Labor Arbiter Thelma M. Concepcion to whom the NLRC had meanwhile assigned the review of the case for purposes of resolving the private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. Labor Arbiter Concepcion’s report essentially found that the petitioners were project employees because they were informed at the time of their employment that their tenure would depend on the Parts Inspection Section (PIS) being able to meet the stringent quality standards for the machine parts exported to the private respondent’s exclusive buyer, Glory Limited Japan (Glory Japan); that the dry run would last up to October 20, 1998; and that when Glory Japan subsequently cancelled its order, the operation of PIS was discontinued, leading to the termination of the petitioners’ employment.[11]
As expected, the petitioners sought reconsideration of the second decision,[12] but the NLRC denied their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 2002.[13]
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, wherein the petitioners submit that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to loss of jurisdiction by reversing itself.
The petitioners anchor their petition on the inconsistency of the NLRC because although it had initially affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter Medroso, Jr. for being supported by substantial evidence it later on discarded such affirmance to adopt “hook, line and sinker” the report of Labor Arbiter Concepcion despite the report being baseless and constituting merely Labor Arbiter Concepcion’s rendition of her own judgment over the case, not confining herself to merely a review of the case that she had been tasked to do.
They claim that the NLRC had questionable motive in assigning the review to a different reviewing Labor Arbiter, ignoring the Labor Arbiter who had previously reviewed the case on appeal; and that such assignment was an irregularity and a mere ploy to set the stage for reversal.
We would not find anything radical and questionable on the part of the NLRC in reversing its original decision had the reversal been supported by substantial evidence, for the precise purpose of a motion for reconsideration is concededly to point out the findings and conclusions of the decision that, in the movant’s view, have no support from the law or the evidence. The movant is, at that point, frequently delimited to the amplification or further discussion of the same issues already passed upon by the court. A reversal will not be out of place, therefore, considering that it is within the inherent power of the courts, as it is also within that of the quasi-judicial bodies, to amend and control their processes in order to make them conformable to law and justice, especially when in their opinion they have committed an error in judgment that they would cause injustice to a party or parties by their adherence to their promulgated decisions.[14]
Yet, after a careful study of the premises used for rendering the assailed second decision, with a view to fathoming whether the NLRC had sufficient justification for its self-reversal, we are unable to accept why the NLRC reversed its earlier but well-founded decision.
In its assailed second decision, the NLRC held that the petitioners were project employees at the time of their employment, observing that they were then informed that their tenure depended on the PIS being able to meet the strict quality standards for the machine parts to be exported to Glory Japan. But the holding was bare, with nothing to support it. The terms of the employment contracts of the petitioners readily shows that nothing therein suggested or even hinted that their employment was dependent on the continuous patronage of Glory Japan.[15]
There is no question that stipulations in the employment contract providing for a fixed period of employment are valid provided the period was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon between the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatsoever being exercised by the former over the latter. Where it is apparent from the circumstances, however, that periods have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employees, the periods should be struck down and the stipulations disregarded for being contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or public order.[16]
The manner by which the private respondent dealt with the petitioners was obviously plagued with basic irregularities. Although they were supposedly hired as PSI staff and started working on July 6, 1998, they were still made to sign individual pro forma employment contracts only much later, i.e., on August 18, 1999,[17] with their employment position being stated therein as production operators in the Production Section being purportedly extended from July 31, 1998 to August 30, 1998. From then until October 20, 1998, they were made to sign employment contracts on more or less month-to-month terms for the position of PSI staff.[18] Thereafter, they continued working for the private respondent from December 1, 1998 until April 27, 1999 even if they had signed any written contract for such employment period. We are baffled why they were once again made to signify on April 27, 1999 their conformity to an employment contract for the period from February 28, 1999 to April 30, 1999 and later to another contract for the period from May 1, 1999 to May 15, 1999.
To us, the private respondent’s illegal intention became clearer from such acts. Its making the petitioners sign written employment contracts a few days before the purported end of their employment periods (as stated in such contracts) was a diaphanous ploy to set periods with a view for their possible severance from employment should the private respondent so willed it. If the term of the employment was truly determined at the beginning of the employment, why was there delay in the signing of the ready-made contracts that were entirely prepared by the employer? Also, the changes in the positions supposedly held by the petitioners in the company belied the private respondent’s adamant contention that the petitioners were hired solely for the purpose of manning PIS during its alleged dry run period that ended on October 20, 1998.[19] We view such situation as a very obvious ploy of the private respondent to evade the petitioners’ eventual regularization.
It is relevant to state at this juncture that the compulsion that forced the petitioners to set their hands on the evidently lopsided and inequitable employment contracts that repeatedly limited their employment to unconscionably brief terms was not rendered irresistible by their lack of education (for, as the private respondent has insisted, they were college graduates), but by their economic need. As the private respondent even admitted, the petitioners pleaded for extensions of their employment by citing difficulty in finding work due to the economic crisis. The private respondent took advantage of their necessitousness, for anyone who pleads in such manner has no bargaining power. Hence, we have no reluctance in disregarding the lopsided and inequitable contracts.
Moreover, the private respondent’s justification for the dismissal of the petitioners by attributing poor performance ratings to them was incredible and improbable. To prove so, the private respondent presented the individual performance appraisal reports.[20] But such reports, being self-serving in favor of the employer, have little, if any, value. Not only were the reports unsigned by Chill Rodriguez, their supposed evaluating immediate superior, but a perusal of them reveals an apparent irregularity in the conduct of the evaluations. The word conforme on both reports (pertaining to the acquiescence to the evaluation of the section/department head supposedly made by the immediate superior of the petitioners) was cancelled out and the word evaluated was then inserted in its stead to make it appear that the department head, Annie Furukawa, had herself conducted the evaluations. It is quite remarkable, however, that Furukawa, the private respondent’s Assistant Administrative Manager, was the one who commented “finish contract” in behalf of the Administrative Section seemingly based on her own evaluation of the petitioners. We note, too, that the evaluation reports were dated April 1, 1999 but the petitioners were nonetheless made to sign another employment contract corresponding to the period from May 1, 1999 to May 15, 1999 with increase in their salaries.
The private respondent’s contention, that despite the end of the term of their contract, the cancellation of the orders for machine parts by Glory Japan and the abysmal work performance of the petitioners, it still prolonged their employment until May 15, 1999 out of sheer generosity, is another incredible claim. We find it inconceivable that the private respondent was that magnanimous to them if it was true, as the private respondent would have us believe, that the petitioners were poor in performance. What we see to be more in keeping with human experience is that the petitioners deserved the prolonging of their employment because they were even granted the increase in their salary to P200.00/day.
Art. 280, Labor Code, distinguishes the 3 kinds of employees, to wit:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employees. – The provision of written agreement to the contrary not withstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exist.
Verily, the nature of employment is determined according to the distinctions outlined in the aforecited law. The parties to the employment relationship are not allowed to vary from such legally-defined distinctions. We should consider the reality that Art. 280, supra, was included in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employee’s right to security of his tenure through the indiscriminate and complete ruling out of all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of regular employment thus clearly defined therein.[21]
To be exempted from the presumption of regularization of the employment, therefore, the agreement between a project employee and his employer must strictly conform with the requirements and conditions set forth in Art. 280, supra.[22] It is not enough, indeed, that the employee is hired for a specific project or phase of work;[23] there must also be a determination of or a clear agreement on the completion or termination of the project at the time the employee is engaged if the objective of Art. 280 is to be achieved.[24]
The written employment agreements of the petitioners and the private respondent did not meet the requirements, because nothing in them stated nor even hinted that the petitioners were hired for a specific project or phase to be undertaken by the private respondent apart from its principal business and because nothing in them showed that the completion or termination of the project was determined at the time the employees were engaged.
It is axiomatic in the law of contracts that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, the writing is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successor in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[25] Likewise, where a contract of employment, being a contract of adhesion, is ambiguous, any ambiguity therein should be construed strictly against the party who prepared it.[26] Furthermore, Art. 1702, Civil Code, provides that in case of doubt all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of labor.[27]
Finally, the fact that petitioners have not rendered a year of service before their termination should not affect their status of being regular employees. Art. 280, supra, classifies regular employees into 2:- (1) the regular employees by the nature of their work; and (2) the regular employees by the length of their service. The petitioners unquestionably fell under the first class, because the work or activities they performed were usually necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer. Yet, the private respondent failed to show the contrary, despite its knowing that it had the burden of proof to overcome the security of tenure recognized by the Constitution. Indeed, in termination cases, the burden of proof lies with the employer who must affirmatively show by adequate evidence that the dismissal was for just and valid cause.[28]
Consequently, the petitioners as regular employees could not be terminated except for just cause and upon the observance of due process. The law requires the employer to give the worker to be dismissed 2 written notices prior to the dismissal, namely: (1) a notice to appraise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice to inform the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.[29] No such notices were given prior to the termination of the petitioners.
Finally, it is important to clarify that the petitioners, having been illegally dismissed, are entitled (1) to reinstatement, if feasible, or, if reinstatement is no longer feasible because the section/division to which they used to be assigned no longer exists, to payment of separation pay; (2) to full backwages; (3) to service incentive leave[30] and 13th month pay[31] from their termination until the date of reinstatement.
In light of all the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is given due course. We discern a clear showing that the NLRC committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As stated in Philippine Airlines v. Confessor:[32]
xxx there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction where the respondent board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions exercised its judgment in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary and despotic manner. However, it has also been said that grave abuse of discretion is committed when the ‘lower court acted capriciously, and whimsically or the petitioner’s contention appears to be clearly tenable or the boarder interest of justice or public policy [so] require xxx
WHEREFORE, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is GRANTED.
The DECISION dated December 20, 2001 and the ORDER dated July 22, 2002 are SET ASIDE and the DECISION of Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Medroso, Jr. dated October 29, 1999 is REINSTATED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
- Should the reinstatement of the petitioners be no longer feasible because the section/division to which they used to be assigned no longer exists, separation pay equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of service from the time of dismissal until finality of this DECISION shall be paid;
- Full backwages to be paid to the petitioners shall be from time of dismissal until actual reinstatement or, in case separation pay is proper, until finality of this DECISION; and
- Other monetary awards granted in the DECISION dated October 29, 1999 shall be paid reckoned from the start of their employment until their actual reinstatement or, in case separation pay is proper, until finality of this DECISION.
The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the prompt computation of the benefits in favor of the petitioners as hereby determined.
The private respondent shall pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Villarama, Jr., and Arevalo-Zenarosa, JJ., concur.
[1] Annex E, petition; rollo, pp. 76-83.
[2] Annex G, petition; rollo, pp. 91-94.
[3] NLRC NCR CA No. 022914-00 was a consolidation of NLRC NCR Case No. 7-11224-99-C and NLRC NCR Case No. 7-11225-99-C.
[4] Annex A, petition; rollo, pp. 16-18.
[5] Annex A, petition; rollo, pp. 14-20.
[6] Rollo, p. 20.
[7] Annex B, petition (memorandum of appeal); rollo, pp. 21-42.
[8] Annex C, petition; rollo, p. 52-53.
[9] Annex D, petition; rollo, pp. 54-75.
[10] Annex E, petition; rollo, pp. 76-83.
[11] The substance of the report of LA Concepcion is reproduced verbatim in the NLRC’s second decision; rollo, pp. 78-81.
[12] Annex F, petition; rollo, pp. 84-91.
[13] Annex G, petition; rollo, pp. 92-95.
[14] Mauricio v. NLRC, G.R. No. 164635, November 17, 2005; 475 SCRA 323.
[15] Rollo, pp. 88-91.
[16] Carmol v. NLRC, 225 SCRA 587.
[17] Rollo, pp 87-88.
[18] Rollo, pp. 89-90.
[19] Rollo, p. 58.
[20] Rollo, pp. 72-75.
[21] Violeta v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 528.
[22] Violeta v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 528, 532.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Sec. 9, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[26] Philippine Federation of Credit Cooperatives, Inc. v. NLRC, 300 SCRA 79.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Gloria dela Cruz v. NLRC, 268 SCRA 459.
[29] Heavylift Manila, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 437 SCRA 550.
[30] Sanyo Travel Corporation v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 140.
[31] Rasonable v. NLRC, 253 SCRA 815.
[32] 231 SCRA 41, 53 (1994).