G.R. No. L-27754. April 08, 1981
GREGORIO STA. ROMANA SUBSTITUTED BY DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MARIANO M. LACSON, ALIAS MAYO LACSON OR MARIANO M. LACSON, JR., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial District, Branch XXIII, dated February
27, 1967, dismissing an action for revival of judgment on the
finding that the same has already prescribed, with costs against the plaintiff.[1]
In Civil Case No. 13717 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled “Macondray & Co., Inc., plaintiff,
versus Jose Puno Pineda, et al., defendants; Gregorio
Sta. Romana, plaintiff-intervenor
vs. Mariano M. Lacson, defendant-intervenee“,
a decision dated March 18, 1954 was rendered, the dispositive
portions of which reads:
“For the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor plaintiff and against defendants Jose Puno
y Pineda and Juanito Baldeo,
ordering the latter two to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the
amount of P27,500.00, with legal rate of interest from
date the complaint was filed, plus the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney’s fee,
until the full amount shall have been paid; with costs against said defendants.
The sale of the six recovered
vehicles made by the Sheriff of Manila and the delivery of the proceeds to
plaintiff are approved and confirmed.
“In regard to the complaint in intervention, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff-intervenor
Gregorio Santaromana and against cross-defendant
Mariano M. Lacson Jr., ordering the latter to pay to
the former the amount of P8,000.00, representing the value of the Packard 8
Club Sedan seized from him, and the amount of the unredeemed promissory note,
as stated above, plus legal rate of interest from the date the complaint in
intervention was filed, until the full amount shall have been paid; to
reimburse said plaintiff-intervenor the amount of
P200.00 as expenses, and the amount of P500.00 as attorney’s fee; with costs
against said cross-defendant.
“SO
ORDERED.”[2]
A copy of the decision
was received by counsel for the defendants on March 23, 1954.
On motion for reconsideration
filed by the plaintiff Macondray & Co., Inc., the
lower court rendered an amended and clarified judgment dated July 13,
1954, the dispositive part of which reads:
“The dispositive part
(first paragraph) of the said decision of March 18, 1954, is hereby amended, to read, as follows:
‘For the foregoing consideration, the Court hereby renders judgment
in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants Jose Puno
Pineda and Juanito Baldeo,
ordering said two defendants to deliver to the plaintiff the following
described cars to be disposed off on the foreclosure proceedings, and the
proceeds thereof to satisfy the indebtedness of the defendants in favor of the
plaintiff:
ONE (1) New Packard 8 Club
Sedan Engine No. G-27963CE
ONE (1) New Packard Super de Luxe Convertible, Engine No. G-4139060, Serial No. 2279-7787
ONE (1) New Super de
Luxe Packard 8 Sedan
Engine No. G-425762Ce, Serial No.
2272-9-15422
Upon failure of the defendants to turn over
the above described cars, the defendants are hereby ordered to pay the
corresponding value of these three cars to the plaintiff to be applied to their indebtedness. Defendants shall pay the plaintiff the sum of
P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and shall pay the costs.
‘The sale of the six (6)
recovered vehicles made by the Sheriff of Manila and the delivery of the
proceeds to the plaintiff are hereby approved and confirmed.’
“The second paragraph of the dispositive part and the rest of the decision shall remain unaltered and unamended.
“SO ORDERED.
“Manila, Philippines,
July 13, 1954.”[3]
A copy of the amended
decision was received by the counsel for the cross-defendant on July 19,
1954.
The judgment dated March
18, 1954, as amended
and clarified on July 13, 1954 was not satisfied,
hence Gregorio Sta. Romana filed on July 3,
1964 an action for
the enforcement of the said amended and clarified judgment against Mariano M. Lacson in the Court of First Instance of Manila.[4]
The defendant filed his
answer to the complaint for revival of judgment alleging as affirmative
defense that the action to revive is barred by the Statute of Limitations said
action having been filed more than ten (10) years from the date the judgment
sought to be enforced had become final and executory.[5]
The Court of First
Instance of Manila dismissed the case on the ground of prescription because:
“An examination of the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Manila dated March 18, 1954 shows that the said judgment contains two
parts: (a) the first paragraph which
adjudicated the controversy between the plaintiff Macondray
& Co. Inc. vs. Jose Puno Pineda, et als., and (b) the second paragraph which adjudicated the
controversy between plaintiff-intervenor Gregorio
Sta. Romana vs. Mariano M. Lacson,
defendant-intervenee. The
amendatory order of July 13, 1954 amended only the first paragraph of the
aforementioned judgment. It did not in any manner amend, modify or alter the second paragraph of the judgment
which concerned Gregorio Sta. Romana and Mariano M. Lacson. The two
paragraphs of the judgment were
independent and separate from each other and involved different parties. The amendment of the first paragraph of the
judgment did not in any manner alter, modify or affect the second
paragraph. So as not to leave any doubt
of its intention not to modify or alter the second paragraph of the judgment,
the Court expressly stated in its order of July 13, 1954 that ‘The second paragraph of the dispositive part and the rest of the decision shall
remain unaltered and unamended.’
“The plaintiff in his manifestation dated November 29, 1966 stated that Mariano M. Lacson’s lawyer received a copy of the decision of March 18, 1954 on March 23, 1954. If that is so and considering that neither
Mariano M. Lacson nor Gregorio Sta. Romana filed any motion for reconsideration or for new
trial in connection with the second paragraph of the judgment of March 18, 1954, the said judgment
became final thirty (30) days thereafter or on April 23, 1954. Gregorio
Sta. Romana could have obtained execution as a matter
of right on the second paragraph of the judgment against Mariano M. Lacson at any time from April 24, 1954 until five (5) years from that date. After the expiration of such 5-year period,
Sta. Romana could have filed an action to revive the
said judgment before the expiration of ten (10) years (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
Since the present action was filed after the expiration of ten (10)
years from April 24, 1954,
the action to revive the judgment has already prescribed as contended by the
defendant.”[6]
The plaintiff-appellant assigned the following errors:
“I
“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TEN-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR ENFORCING ITS
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE COMPUTED FROM AUGUST
19, 1954, WHEN ITS AMENDED DECISION BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY, AND
NOT FROM APRIL 23, 1954, WHEN
THE SECOND PART OF THE FALLO OF SAID JUDGMENT ALLEGEDLY BECAME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.
“II
“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REGARDING THE FALLO OR
DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF ITS 1954 JUDGMENT
AS AN INTEGRAL AND INDIVISIBLE WHOLE, ALTHOUGH CONSISTING OF TWO PARAGRAPHS,
AND IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE WHOLE JUDGMENT BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY ONLY FROM
THE EXPIRATION OF THE THIRTY-DAY PERIOD FROM NOTICE OF THE AMENDED JUDGMENT
CONTAINING THE AMENDMENT OF PARAGRAPH
ONE OF SAID FALLO.
“III
“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT ON
THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.”[7]
The only issue to be resolved in this appeal is from what date
the period of ten (10) years should be counted.
It is not disputed that an action to revive should be brought within ten (10) years from the date
of entry of final judgment.
The provisions of substantive law (Art. 1144 [3] and Art. 1152, New Civil Code) in
relation to the adjective law (Section 6, Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court) are
applicable to this case.
The Civil Code of the Philippines
provides:
“ART. 1144. – The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Upon a judgment.
“ART. 1152. – The period for prescription of action to demand
the fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment commences from the time
the judgment became final.”
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court reads:
“Sec. 6. – Execution by motion or
by independent action. – A judgment may be executed on motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry or from the date of it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it
is barred by the Statute of Limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action.” (Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court)
Applying the above cited provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and the Rules of Court, the judgment appealed from dismissing the revival
action filed for the enforcement of the amended and clarified judgment dated July 13, 1954 on the ground of
prescription cannot be sustained.
The record of the case shows that the subject matter of the suit
in intervention is a Packard 8 Club Sedan which is part and parcel of the whole
transaction of nine (9) motor vehicles purchased on credit and secured by
chattel mortgage executed by the original defendants in favor of the original
plaintiff. A joint trial was held for
both the original parties plaintiff and defendants
with the plaintiff-intervenor and defendant-intervenee or cross-defendant as a single case. In the amended and clarified judgment dated July 13, 1954 the lower court not
only passed upon the validity of the first paragraph of its original decision
but likewise clarified and reaffirmed the second paragraph of said judgment in
favor of the plaintiff-intervenor.
The court of origin made a thorough restudy of the original
judgment and rendered the amended and clarified judgment only after considering
all the factual and legal issues. The
amended and clarified decision dated July
13, 1954 is an entirely new decision which superseded the original
decision dated March 18, 1954. For all intents and purposes, the lower court
rendered a new judgment from which the time to appeal must be reckoned.[8]
The counsel for the defendant-appellee
received a copy of the amended and clarified judgment on July 19, 1954.
The reglementary period within which to appeal
lapsed on August 19, 1954
which is the date of the finality of the judgment there being no motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial.
The filing of the revival action on July 3, 1964 for the enforcement of the amended and
clarified judgment dated July 13, 1954
is well within the reglementary period of ten (10)
years provided by law. The judgment of
dismissal is a palpable error.[9]
At the pre-trial the parties agreed that the question involved in
this case is whether the second
paragraph of the decision in Civil Case No. 13717 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila has prescribed or not.[10]
There is no dispute as to the correctness of said decision. Hence the second paragraph thereof may now be
ordered executed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment dismissing Civil Case No. 57587 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby set aside and the defendant
Mariano M. Lacson alias Mayo Lacson or Mariano M. Lacson, Jr.,
is ordered
to pay the plaintiff, Diosdado Sta. Romana, as successor in interest of the original plaintiff,
Gregorio Sta. Romana, the sums of P8,000.00, P200.00 and P500.00 plus
legal interest on the sum of P8,000.00 from October 12, 1951 when the complaint
in intervention was filed and legal interest on all the sums and on the accrued
interest since July 3, 1964 when the action to revive was filed, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., in the result.
[1]
Record on Appeal, pp. 41-45.
[2] Record on Appeal, pp. 9-10, Rollo, p. 6.
[3] Idem., pp. 12-14.
[4] Idem., pp. 1-3.
[5] Idem., pp. 14-16.
[6]
Record on Appeal, pp. 43-45.
[7]
Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant, pp.
1-2.
[8] Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs.
Caluag, G.R. NO. L-16250, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 333, 337.
[9] Continental Bank vs. Tiangco, G.R.
NO. L-50480, December 14, 1979,
94 SCRA 715, 718-719.
[10]
Record on Appeal, p. 42.