THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE BUAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan, in its Criminal Case No. 5243 (for
serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence),
overruling a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.

Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:

The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company on July
23, 1962, along the MacArthur
Highway in the municipality
of Guiguinto,
Bulacan. 
Allegedly because of his neg­ligence and recklessness, the vehicle
driven by him struck and collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep and causing it to turn turtle,
and injuring its passengers.  Six of the
latter suffered slight physical injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to
9 days; three other riders came out with serious bodily injuries that needed
medical attention for 30 to 45 days; while the jeep was damaged to the extent
of P1,395.00.

A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and
acquitted on December 16, 1963.  Prior to this acquittal, however, the
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of
First Instance the information in the case now before us, for serious physical
injuries, and damage to property through reckless imprudence.  Admittedly, both charges referred to the same
highway collision.

When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance,
his counsel moved to quash the charges on the ground that he had already been
acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court.  The prosecution opposed the motion and the
Court denied the motion to quash.  Unable
to secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.

Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second case
placed the appellant twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and is barred by
the previous acquittal.

We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not
dismissing the information for “serious physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence,” in view of the appellant’s previous
acquittal by the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, for the same imprudence.

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act.  For
the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or neg­ligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.  The law penalizes thus the negligent or
careless act, not the result thereof. 
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine
the penalty; it does not qualify the subs­tance of the offense.  And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different
crimes and prosecutions.  This has been
the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, and is also that of this
Court in its most recent decisions on the matter.

Thus, in People vs. Silva, G.R. No.
L-15974, January 30, 1962,
where as a result of the same vehicular accident one man died, two persons were
seriously injured while another three suffered only slight physical injuries,
we ruled that the acquittal al a charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, was a bar to another Prosecution
for homicide through reckless imprudence. 
In People vs. Diaz, G.R. No. L-6518,
March 30, 1954, the ruling pas that the dismissal by the Municipal Court of a
charge of reckless driving barred a second information of Damage to Property
Through Reckless Imprudence based on the same negligent act of the
accused.  In People vs. Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence as a result of a collision
between two automobiles was declared to block two other prosecutions, one for
damage to property through reckless imprudence aid another for mul­tiple
physical injuries arising from the same collision.  The same doctrine was reasserted in Yap
vs. Lutero et al., G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959.  In none of the oases cited did the Supreme
Court regard as material that the various offenses charged for the same
occurrence were triable in Courts of differing
category, or that the complainants were not the same individuals.

As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p.
439, has this to say:

“Aun cuando
de un solo hecho imprudente
se originen males diversos , como el hecho culposo
es uno solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia.  Esta es juris­prudencia
constante del Tribunal Supremo.  De acuerdo con esta doctrine el automovilista imprudente que atropella y cause lesiones a dos personas y ademas daños, no respondera de dos delitos de lesiones y uno de daños por imprudencia,
sino de un solo delito culposo.”

The said author cites in support of the
text the following decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain (footnotes 2 and 3):

“8 octubre 1887,
18 octubre 1927.”

“Si con el hecho
imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona y edemas se
ocasionan daños, existe un solo hecho punible, pues uno
solo fue el acto, aun cuando deben
apreciarse dos en orden a
la responsabili­dad civil, 14 diciembre
1931; si a consecuencia de
un solo acto imprudente se produjeron tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de daftos como
todos son consecuencia de
un solo acto culposo, no cabe penarlos por
separado, 2 abril
1932.”

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with
the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies.  This same argument was considered and
rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. Diaz, supra:

“x x x.  The
prosecution’s contention might be true. 
But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical in­juries through
reckless imprudence.  Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical in­juries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same
alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared
by the inferior court.”

In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exonera­tion
of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the
Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan is directed to
quash and dismiss the charge in its Criminal Case No. 5243.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Dizon, Makalintal,
Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro, J., did not take part.