IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF KU E ALIAS TAN TO BE ADMITTED TO A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Ku E versus Republic

The Case

This is the case of Ku E, also known as Tan, an applicant for Philippine citizenship, against the Republic of the Philippines, which opposed his petition. The action is a naturalization proceeding: Ku E asked the Manila Court of First Instance to admit him as a Filipino citizen, and the Republic, through the Solicitor General, resisted on the ground that he had failed to comply with a statutory condition. The case matters because it fixes, in plain terms, that the duty to enroll one's minor children of school age in recognized schools must be observed during the entire period of residence required of the applicant — not merely at the time the petition is filed, and not excused by the child's having reached majority by then.

Procedural History

Ku E filed his petition for naturalization with the Manila Court of First Instance in July 1954. The trial court granted the petition and declared him entitled to Philippine citizenship. The Republic appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, and the appeal was resolved in favor of the Government. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Bengzon, found the appeal meritorious, revoked the decision of the trial court, and denied the application for citizenship, with costs against the applicant.

Facts

Ku E, also known as Tan, was a Chinese national who sought admission as a citizen of the Philippines. He had a son, Ku E Tao, who was born on February 21, 1927, and who was brought to the Philippines from China in 1938.

Ku E Tao never attended school in the Philippines. At the time Ku E filed his petition for naturalization in July 1954, this son had already reached the age of majority. The applicant relied on that fact, arguing that because the son was no longer a minor when the petition was filed, the statutory requirement concerning the enrollment of minor children of school age did not apply to him.

The Solicitor General, opposing the petition, argued that the failure to enroll the son in school was a legal obstacle to naturalization. The ten-year period of Philippine residence required of Ku E ran from 1944 to 1954, and during that period, in 1944, Ku E Tao was only seventeen years old and therefore of school age.

Issues

• Whether or not an applicant for naturalization must enroll his minor children of school age in recognized schools during the entire period of residence required of him, and not merely at the time of the filing of his petition.
• Whether or not the fact that the applicant's child had already reached the age of majority by the time the petition was filed excuses the applicant from the enrollment requirement.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2, sixth paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:

He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him, prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.

This is the provision the Court applies: it imposes the enrollment duty across the whole required residence period, and Ku E failed to satisfy it.

Section 2, second paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law, as referred to in the decision, fixes the required period of residence at ten years, which in this case ran from 1944 to 1954.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the enrollment requirement must be met during the entire period of residence required of the applicant. Since the entire period required of Ku E was the ten years from 1944 to 1954, and since in 1944 his son Ku E Tao was only seventeen years old and of school age, the applicant did not enroll all his minor children of school age in the schools indicated during the entire period of his required Philippine residence. He therefore failed to meet the statutory condition.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the applicant's reliance on his son's majority status at the time of filing. The question was not new, and the Court had decided it in previous cases. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in Ng Sin versus Republic, which construed the same provision:

The provision of law invoked by the trial Court clearly and expressly requires of the applicant that during the entire period of residence required of him (ten years in this case) he should enroll his minor children of school age in recognized schools.

The Court also explained the purpose of the requirement, quoting a commentator: the law demands the enrollment of the applicant's children in our schools not only to insure that they are trained in our own way of life, but also as evidence of the petitioner's honest and enduring intention to assume the duties and obligations of Filipino citizenship.

Doctrine

An applicant for naturalization must enroll his minor children of school age in public schools or in private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed, during the entire period of residence required of him, prior to the hearing of his petition. Compliance is measured across the whole required residence period, not at the moment of filing. The subsequent attainment of majority by the child does not cure the failure to enroll him while he was of school age during that period. The requirement serves a dual purpose: to train the children in the Filipino way of life, and to serve as evidence of the applicant's honest and enduring intention to assume the duties and obligations of citizenship.

Disposition

The Supreme Court revoked the decision of the trial court, denied Ku E's application for citizenship, and imposed costs against him.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the enrollment of minor children of school age in recognized schools must be shown for the entire period of required residence, and a child's later majority does not excuse the omission. Examiners use this case to test the statutory conditions for naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, especially the sixth paragraph of Section 2 and its strict, period-wide application.