SALVADOR VILLACORTA AS CITY ENGINEER OF DAGUPAN CITY, AND JUAN S. CAGUIOA AS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAGUPAN CITY, PETITIONERS, VS. GREGORIO BERNARDO AND HON. MACARIO OFILADA AS JU…

Villacorta versus Bernardo

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Salvador Villacorta, as City Engineer of Dagupan City, and Juan S. Caguioa, as Register of Deeds of Dagupan City, against Gregorio Bernardo and the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to reverse a decision annulling Ordinance Number 22 of the Municipal Board of Dagupan City, a measure that regulated subdivision plans over parcels of land in the city. The case matters because it fixes the outer boundary of local legislative power: a municipal board may not, in the guise of implementing a national law, add requirements, fees, and penalties that the national law itself does not impose.

Procedural History

Gregorio Bernardo challenged Ordinance Number 22 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void. The trial court held that the ordinance conflicted with the provisions of the land registration law, because it imposed upon subdivision owners additional conditions not found in the general law. The petitioners then came directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari against that decision of the Court of First Instance. The Supreme Court affirmed the annulment.

Facts

The Municipal Board of Dagupan City enacted Ordinance Number 22, entitled an ordinance regulating subdivision plans over parcels of land in the City of Dagupan. Section 1 required that every proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the city be submitted first to the City Engineer before it was submitted for approval or verification by the Bureau of Lands or the Land Registration Commission, so that the City Engineer could see to it that no encroachment was made on any portion of the public domain and that the zoning ordinance and all other pertinent rules and regulations were observed.

Section 2 imposed a service fee equivalent to three centavos per square meter of every lot resulting from the subdivision, to be charged by the City Engineer's Office. Section 3 made it unlawful for the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to allow the registration of a subdivision plan unless there was a prior written certification from the City Engineer that the plan had been submitted to his office and was in order. Section 4 penalized any violation with a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, in the discretion of the judge. Section 5 provided that the ordinance would take effect immediately upon approval.

Gregorio Bernardo assailed the ordinance in court. The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan annulled it, reasoning that its several sections conflicted with the land registration law, which did not require submission of subdivision plans to the City Engineer, did not provide for the service fee, did not require the City Engineer's certification before registration, and imposed no such penalty. The trial court acknowledged the laudable purpose of halting the surreptitious registration of government lands, but held that the ordinance could not stand where it impeded rights granted by a general law and made that general law subordinate to a local ordinance.

Issues

• Whether or not Ordinance Number 22 of the Municipal Board of Dagupan City is a valid exercise of the local legislative power, or is instead an ultra vires act because it adds requirements, a service fee, and a penalty not found in the national law it purports to implement.
• Whether or not the laudable purpose of the ordinance, namely to prevent the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government, saves it from invalidity.

Applicable Provisions

The decision turns on the requirements of the land registration law, which the trial court cited as Section 44 of Act 496 and which the ordinance was found to contravene. The ordinance itself is set out in the decision, and its operative sections provide:

Section 1. Every proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the City of Dagupan, shall, before the same is submitted for approval and/or verification by the Bureau of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission, be previously submitted to the City Engineer of the City who shall see to it that no encroachment is made on any portion of the public domain, that the zoning ordinance and all other pertinent rules and regulations are observed.

This is the provision that adds a step to the national registration process, and it is the core of the conflict found by the courts.

Section 2. As service fee thereof, an amount equivalent to P0.03 per square meter of every lot resulting or will result from such subdivision shall be charged by the City Engineer's Office.

This is the exaction the general law does not authorize, and it illustrates the ordinance's attempt to raise revenue under the guise of regulation.

Section 3. It shall be unlawful for the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to allow the registration of a subdivision plan unless there is prior written certification issued by the City Engineer that such plan has already been submitted to his office and that the same is in order.

This provision conditions a act committed under national law upon a local official's certificate, subordinating the general law to the ordinance.

Section 4. Any violation of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred (P200.00) pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both in the discretion of the judge.

This is the penalty the national law does not impose, and it marks the ordinance as a penal measure beyond the board's authority.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court affirmed the annulment. To sustain the ordinance, the Court warned, would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Ordinances could then be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses to prevent bigamy, for the registration of vehicles to minimize car napping, for the execution of contracts to forestall fraud, for the validation of passports to deter imposture, and for the exercise of freedom of speech to reduce disorder. The list is endless, the Court said, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires, that is, beyond the power conferred.

On the second issue, the Court held that the laudable purpose did not save the ordinance. It acknowledged the trial court's observation that the ordinance sought to halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government, but held that the powers of the board cannot be valid when the ordinance impedes the exercise of rights granted in a general law or makes a general law subordinate to a local ordinance. The Court stressed that local governments exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause, and that Ordinance Number 22 suffered from the additional defect of legislating in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

The Court took the occasion to admonish that regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community, and that the police power grows ever more pervasive as society grows more complex, for the individual must subordinate his interests to the common good on the time-honored justification that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. Yet it cautioned that unless the creeping interference of government in essentially private matters is moderated, it is likely to destroy the prized virtue of individualism. Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must not be deprived of the right to be left alone, and as long as he does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly curtailed. The so-called general welfare, the Court said, is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness, and in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public.

Doctrine

A local government unit exercises the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. It cannot, under the guise of implementing a national law, add requirements, impose fees, or provide penalties that the national law does not impose, for that would amend the general law and subordinate it to a local ordinance, an ultra vires act. The validity of an ordinance is not saved by the laudable purpose behind it; the end does not justify means beyond the delegated power. The general welfare clause is not a license for official arbitrariness, and the right of the individual to be left alone, so long as he does not prejudice others, must be protected alongside the public interest.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court annulling Ordinance Number 22, without any pronouncement as to costs; the petitioners lost and the ordinance remained void.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a local ordinance may not amend a national law in the guise of implementing it, for the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. Examiners use this case to test the limits of local police power and the general welfare clause, and to ask whether a laudable purpose can cure an ordinance that adds to the requirements of a general law.