MINDANAO RAPID CO., INC. (MINRAPCO), REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, DALMACIO S. ENRIQUE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CRESENCIO OMANDAM, LABOR LEADER, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

A common basic issue in these six (6) cases – which court has
jurisdiction over the same, the Court of First Instance or the Court of
Industrial Relations – has prompted the rendition of this joint decision.

L-23058. Plaintiff, Mindanao Rapid Co., Inc. (MINRAPCO),
filed with the Court of First Instance of Cotabato a
complaint – docketed as Civil Case No. 1920 – for the recovery of actual and
moral damages, as well as attorney’s fees, owing to the following acts,
allegedly committed by defendants Cresencio Omandam, Angel Matondo, Arturo Tero, Feliciano Carreon, and
other persons whose names do not appear in the records before Us, namely:  (1) leaving or abandoning “their
respective jobs or works” as em­ployees of MINRAPCO and dumping eleven
(11) passenger buses there­of at Bangkal, Davao City, “thereby exposing them to the elements and
to the hazards of being damaged or lost”; (2) coercing and inti­midating
MINRAPCO officials thereby exposing them to “humiliation, public ridicule
and mental anguish”; and (3) thereby compelling MIN­RAPCO to engage the
services of counsel.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complaint, the acts
complained of by MINRAPCO having arisen from a labor dispute between their, and
that the defendants, who are members of the Cota­bato
Employees and Laborers’ Union (CELU), had participated in a strike declared by
CELU against MINRAPCO and picketed its garage at Bangkal,
Davao City, “where the eleven buses in question
are found.” The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the com­plaint.  Hence, this appeal by MINRAPCO, upon the
theory that, in finding that the aforementioned labor dispute existed, the
lower court had indulged in “a mere conjecture,” unsupported by any
of the allegations in the complaint, which must be assumed to be true and are
ex­clusively determinative of the merits of the motion to dismiss and of the
order of dismissal appealed from.

L-23473. Plaintiff Rudy Dominguez filed with the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental – where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6912 – a complaint for reinstatement and damages
owing to his dismissal by defendant Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., as truck
driver thereof, “without due warning and without possible cause or
causes.” The company moved to dismiss for lack of juris­diction of said
court over the subject-matter of the case, the same being within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Court of Indus­trial Relations owing to
plaintiff’s prayer for reinstatement. 
The motion having been denied, the case was, after the filing of defen­dant’s
answer, subsequently heard on the merits. 
Judgment was later rendered directing plaintiff’s reinstatement without
back wages, for, although he had, without just cause, assaulted the officer-in­-charge
of defendant’s motorpool, such act is – in the lower
court’s opinion – insufficient to warrant plaintiff’s dismissal, this being his
“first offense.” In its appeal, the defendant insists, inter alia, that the case is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.

L-23871. In his complaint filed with the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon, plaintiff Juan Glipo seeks to recover P3,969.00, plus moral and exemplary
damages apart from attorney’s fees, upon the ground that, as night watchman of
defendant A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., working
from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m., since May 13, 1960, he had been receiving P90.00 less,
every month, than the minimum provided for in the Minimum Wage Law, and had not
been given the prescribed overtime pay. 
On motion of the company, the lower court dismissed the case, upon the
ground that it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations.  A reconsideration of the order
to this effect having been denied, plaintiff interposed the present appeal.

L-24232. Petitioner Democratic Labor Association having
staged a strike against respondent Cebu Stevedoring
Co., for alleged unfair labor practices thereof, the company filed with the
Court of First In­stance of Cebu a complaint –
docketed as Civil Case No. 8725 thereof – to restrain the Association from
preventing, through force, intimida­tion and coercion, the ingress and egress
of non-striking employees into and from the compound of the company.  The latter, likewise, sought to recover
damages, for unearned income during the strike, and prayed for a writ of
preliminary injunction, which was granted ex parte
by respondent Judge Guillermo Villasor.

The Association moved to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of
the lower court, upon the theory that the damages claimed by the com­pany and
the picketing it sought to restrain had arisen out of a labor dispute between
the parties owing to unfair labor practices of the com­pany, which are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Indus­trial Relations.  The court of first instance having denied the
motion and thereafter made the injunction permanent, the Association com­menced
the present original action for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary
injunction – which We issued – upon the ground that the main case is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Indus­trial Relations, the issue in the
court of first instance being an inte­gral part of a labor dispute between the
parties, arising from an un­fair labor practice of the company.

L-24718. Petitioner Manila Cordage Workers’ Union-PAFLU
having given a notice of strike, respondent Manila Cordage Company filed with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition –
docketed as Civil Case No. 8617 of said court – “for declaratory relief
and injunction” against the union and its officers, to restrain them
“from demanding and insisting on their demand and from threatening to en­force
their demand,” as well as from compelling the company to “nego­tiate
with the respondents on bargainable matters x x x.” The trial court issued
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the Com­pany, and later
refused to lift said writ.  Soon,
thereafter, the union and several members thereof filed, with the Court of
Industrial Rela­tions, an unfair labor practice charge against the Company for
having dismissed the “individual complainants discriminatorily” on
account of their union activities. 
Thereafter, the union went on strike.  On motion of the Company, the court of first
instance required the res­pondents in case No. 8617 to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt of court for having allegedly violated the
injunc­tion.  Thereupon, the Union
initiated in the Supreme Court the present special civil action for
“certiorari with injunction,” alleging lack of jurisdiction of the
court of first instance to hear and decide said case No. 8617, the issue
therein being inextricably connected with a labor dispute arising from the
Company’s unfair labor practices, which are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of Industrial Relations.

L-24956. Petitioner National Mines and Allied Workers’ Union
(NAMAWU-MIF) preferred an unfair labor practice charge against respondent Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. in view of the dismissal, due
allegedly to union activities, of a number of its employees, who are Union
members.  Soon later, the Union
struck against the Company and established a picket line along its premises in Arimbay, Legaspi
City.  The Company, in turn, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Albay a complaint for injunction
and damages – docketed as Civil Case No. 2772 of said court – alleging that,
despite the absence of a collective bargaining agreement between the parties,
the Union had declared a strike and picketed the Company premises; that, by
means of threat and violence, the Union had thus prevented laborers, em­ployees
and customers of the Company from going in and out of said premises; and that,
in consequence thereof, the Company stood to lose P10,000 daily.  As prayed for by the Company, the court of
first instance issued ex parte a writ
of preliminary injunction.  The Union
moved to dismiss said case No. 2772, alleging, inter alia,
lack of jurisdiction over its subject-matter, upon the theory that the case had
arisen out of a labor dispute already pending in the Court of Indus­trial
Relations.  Judge Perfecto Quicho, who presided over the court of first instance,
denied the motion and ordered the issuance of an injunction pursuant to section
9(d) of Rep. Act 875.  Hence, this ori­ginal
petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Quicho,
the Company and its plant superintendent, Eldred Fewkes.

As above indicated, the common issue in these cases is whether
the same are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations or
that of the court of first instance.  In
this connection, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, We had occasion to
postulate, in Bay-view Hotel, Inc. v. Manila Hotel Workers’ Union^[1]:

“1.
Petitioner’s case is planted upon the averment that respondent’s causes of
action are not covered by any one of those enumerated in the 1956 case of PAFLU
vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854, 862.  There, this
Court confined the CIR’s jurisdiction to the following
cases:

“‘x x x (1) when the labor dispute
affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so
cer­tified by the President to the industrial court (Section 10, Republic Act
No. 875); (2) when the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum
Wage Law (Republic Act No. 602); (3) when it involves hours of employment under
the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444); and (4) when it involves
an unfair labor practice [Section 5, (a), Republic Act No. 875].’

“But the court below asserted jurisdiction on the author­ity
of PRISCO vs. CIR, et al., L-13806, May
23, 1960.  In that case, this
Court reviewed the cases decided since PAFLU and then stated:

‘Analyzing these cases, the underlying princi­ple, it will be noted
in all of them, though not stated in express terms, is that where the
employer-em­ployee relationship is still existing or is sought to be
reestablished because of its wrongful severance (as where the employee
seeks reinstatement), the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction
over all claims arising out of or in connection with employment, such as
those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law.  After the termination of the
relationship and no reinstatement is sought, such claims become mere
money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

‘We are aware that in 2 cases [Mindanao Bus Employees Labor Union
(PLUM) vs. Mindanao Bus Co., et al., L-9795, December 28, 1957; Gomez vs. North
Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958] some
statements implying a different view have been made, but we now hold and
declare the princi­ples set forth in the next preceding paragraph as the one
governing all cases of this nature.’

“Then, amongst the many cases thereafter, restatements were
made in Sy Huan vs.
Bautista, et al., L-16115, August 29, 1961, and Campos, et al. vs. Manila
Railroad Co., et al., L-17905, May 25, 1962. 
In Sy Huan,
we said:

‘The jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Rela­tions, under the
law and the jurisprudence, extends only to cases involving (a) labor disputes
affecting an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and so
certified by the President to the Court, Section 10, Republic Act No. 875; b)
controversy about the minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law, Repub­lic Act
No. 602; (c) hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, Commonwealth Act No. 444; and (d) unfair labor
practice, Section 5 (a), Republic Act No. 875. 
PAFLU vs. Tan, 52 O.G. 5836.  x x x.  And such disputes and controversies, in order
that they may fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations,
must arise while the employer-employee relationship between the parties
exists, or the employee seeks reinstatement.  When such relationship is over and the
employee does not seek rein­statement, all claims become money claims
that fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.  Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., x x x.’

And in Campos,
the language we employed was:

‘We may, therefore, restate, for the benefit of the bench and the
bar, that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire
jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic Act No. 875, the
following circumstances must be present: 
(a) there must exist between the parties an employer-employee
relationship, or the claimant must seek his reinstate­ment; and (b) the
controversy must relate to a case certified by the President to the CIR as one
involving national interest, or must have a bearing on an unfair labor practice
charge, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under the
Minimum Wage Law.  In default of
any of these circumstances the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.’

“Later pronouncements reiterate the Campos
case.  As matters now stand, the doctrine
enunciated in Campos still
prevails.”2

This view was reiterated in Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Abiera,3 from which We quote:

“Under the next section of the Industrial Peace Act,4
the jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice case, whether on the part of
management or of a labor union, is vested with the Court of Industrial
Relations.  Thus:  ‘The Court shall have jurisdiction over the
prevention of unfair labor practices and is empowered to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice. 
This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by an
agreement, code, law or otherwise.’ This Court then ever since the effectivity of such Act has no choice but to adhere to the
view that the Court of Industrial Relations and not a court of first instance,
is vested with jurisdiction over every kind of an unfair labor practice
case.  x x x.”

To the long list of cases cited in support of the foregoing
statement,5 We
must add the recent decision in Rustan Supervisory
Union v. Dalisay6
stressing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Indus­trial Relations over
unfair labor practice cases.

Referring now to cases L-23058, L-24232, L-24718 and L-24956, it
will be noted that the acts therein complained of by the employer were directly
interwoven with a labor dispute arising out of certain acts there­of claimed by
the employees and/or the union to which they are affiliated to constitute
unfair labor practices.  The issue
between the parties is, accordingly, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations and beyond that of courts of first instance, even
if no unfair labor practice case had as yet been filed with the first court, it
being “enough that unfair labor practice is involved.”7

Appellant in L-23058 and private respondent in L-24718 maintain
that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations of their respective
complaints, and that, tested by such allegations, the subject-mat­ter of said
complaints in the court of first instance are within the juris­diction
thereof.  The rule to this effect,
established, in connection with demurrers under our old Code of Civil Procedure8 is
no longer ad­hered to – except, perhaps, where the ground invoked is the
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action – inasmuch as the Rules of
Court9
now permit a motion to dismiss based upon facts not alleged in the complaint,
such as, inter alia, pendency of another action between the same parties for the
same cause, res adjudicata,
the statute of limitations.

This is specially true in cases involving a conflict of
jurisdiction between the Court of Industrial Relations and a court of first
instance.  To be sure, counsel have, at
times, drafted their pleadings so adroitly as to refrain from even suggesting
that the issue between the parties is due to a labor dispute between them.  This notwithstanding, whenever the existence
of such dispute and of other facts placing the issue within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations has been duly established,
this Court has not hesitated to declare that the court of first instance has no
authority to hear and decide the case.10 Thus, in Rustan
Supervisory Union v. Dalisay,11 it was held:

“x x x For
while in regular civil actions, the question of jurisdiction is determined by
the allegations of the complaint, the rule differs in labor disputes in that
the Court has set the criterion that ‘whether the acts complained of in the
petition for injunction arose out of, or are connected or interwoven with, the
unfair labor practice case [presents] a question of fact that should be brought
to the attention of the court a quo to enable it to pass upon the
issue whether it has jurisdiction or not over the case,’ and ‘the court is duty
bound to find out if there really is a labor dispute by reception of evidence.’
x x x.”

As this Court had earlier said, in Leoquinco
v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc. Employees Association12:

“x x x, We
see no abuse of discretion by the court a quo in taking into
account the related facts disclosed in respondent labor organization’s opposition
to the issuance of the injunction, and in the annexes thereto, specially since
they were merely clarificatory of the averments of
the appellants’ complaint that was so artfully drafted as to conceal the fact
that the acts sought to be enjoined originated or were the consequence of a
strike against the common employer.”

It having been satisfactorily shown that the facts alleged in the
complaints in L-23058, L-24232, L-24718 and L-24956 are directly interwoven
with unfair labor practices, courts of first instance are bereft of authority
to restrain said acts, the power to determine whether the same should be
enjoined being vested exclusively in the Court of Industrial Relations.

“It has likewise long been settled that where the acts
complained of by the company are directly interwoven with the unfair labor
practice charged against it by the union, ‘the main case does not come under
the jurisdiction of the [regu­lar] trial court, even if it involves violence,
intimidation and coercion as averred in the complaint,’ as in the case below,
for the industrial court’s jurisdiction is exclusive.  If the pur­pose of the action is to obtain
some injunctive relief against certain acts of the union members, the same can
be obtained from the industrial court which is given ample powers to act
thereon.”13

What is more, the issuance of labor injunctions demand strict
adherence to the provisions of section 9 of the Industrial Peace Act.  As postulated in the Rustan
case14:

“x x x.  The issuance of injunctions in connection
with labor disputes is governed by the statutory restrictions there­in provided
and not by the Rules of Court.  And
injunctions in labor disputes are not favored and may issue only after a strict
and rigorous compliance with the statutory requisites.  It will be readily seen that the injunction
order and writ of respondent court must be overturned for the same failure to
comply with the statutory restrictions as in the Philippine Communications
Workers case, viz:  ‘For one, there is the absence of a showing
that the court heard the testimony of witnesses required in Section 9 (d) to
support the allegations of the complaint and testimony in opposition
thereto.  Then, the court did not make
any ‘finding of fact’ as to the exist­ence or non-existence of the facts
required to be shown under the afore-quoted Section 9 (d) and also under
Section 9 (f) of the Industrial Peace Act. 
Nor was notice given ‘to the chief of those public officials of the * *
* city * * * charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property,’ also a
pre-requi­site in said Section 9 (d) heretofore mentioned.  And finally, the record is barren as to
whether or not complainant exerted ‘every reasonable effort to settle such
dispute by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery
of mediation or by voluntary arbitration,’ another condition exacted by law –
this time Section 9 (c) of the Industrial Peace Act – before a restraining
order or injunction may be granted.  Failure
to comply with even one of these requirements will suffice to deny the issuance
of the writ.’“15

The jurisdictional issue heretofore dealt with has in L-23473 and
L-23871 certain peculiar aspects. 
Although the plaintiff in L-23473 seeks reinstatement with back wages,
upon the theory that he had been dismissed without just cause, no other fact
has been alleged to make out a case within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations.  An analogous
situation obtained in Administrator of Hda. Luisita Estate vs. Alberto,16 involving employees who had
allegedly been removed sum­marily or without just cause.  Inasmuch as no additional fact had been
alleged that might bring the dispute within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations, and there being not even a hint of unfair labor practice
or violation of either the Minimum Wage Law or the Eight-Hour Labor Law, We
held that said Court had no jurisdiction over the case, for:

“At any rate, and as a practical consideration, these
ex-employees never invoked in the Industrial Court
any of the pos­sible circumstances that might bring the dispute within the
category of suits included in its jurisdiction. 
Therein they submitted several pleadings; and in maintaining the Court’s
authority, they never hinted at any unfair labor practice, or Wage Law
or Eight-Hour Labor Law violation.  Even
here, fully apprised of the Industrial Court’s
position, they failed to take their cue, and advanced no proposition to confirm
the respondent court’s conjectures or foreseen contingencies.  In other words, even after the Industrial
Court had indicated three lines of approach, three
roads leading to its jurisdic­tional
territory, Alberto et al. refused to walk any one of them or to express their
intention to follow the lead.  Ob­viously,
because their counsel knows they can’t.

“Wherefore, there is no use compelling the Hacienda to spend
time and money resisting their claims before the Indus­trial
Court.”

The Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, accordingly, had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
plaintiff’s complaint in L-23473, so that the issue before Us boils down to
whether his dis­missal by the plaintiff-appellee was
capricious or justified.  It appears that
plaintiff had inflicted physical injuries, within the company com­pound, upon
Gerardo Gareza, who was in charge of the company
motor-pool.  Considering that an employer
is entitled to fire employees for just cause17 and that challenging a superior
officer to a fight has been held to be a sufficient ground for dismissal, as a
measure of self-protection of the employer whose interest is jeopardized
thereby,18
We find that defendant company was justified in dismissing plaintiff Rudy
Dominguez.

Opining that his dismissal was too harsh a measure inasmuch as
plaintiff’s misdeed was his “first offense,” and that his suspension
since October 30, 1962, is
more than sufficient penalty for the wrong done by him, the lower court ordered
his reinstatement without back wages.  We
do not share this view.  In Manila
Trading and Supply Co. vs. Zulueta,19 this Court adverted to the fact
that even economic orthodoxy cannot be expanded to compel an employer to
continue em­ploying a person guilty of misfeasance against the former and whose
interest is endangered by the continued service of said employee.  In the words of Mr. Justice Laurel,

“The whole controversy is centered around the right of the
Court of Industrial Relations to order the readmission of a laborer who, it is
admitted, had been found derelict in the performance of his duties towards his
employer.  We concede that the right of
an employer to freely select or discharge his employees, is subject to
regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police
power.  (Commonwealth Acts. Nos. 103 and
213.) But much as we should expand beyond economic orthodoxy, we hold that an
employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a
person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his em­ployer,
and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his
interests.  The law, in protect­ing the
rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppres­sion nor self-destruction of
the employer.  There may, of course, be
cases where the suspension or dismissal of an employee is whimsical or
unjustified or otherwise ille­gal in which case he will be protected.  Each case will be scrutinized carefully and
the proper authorities will go to the core of the controversy and not close
their eyes to the real situation.  This
is not however the case here.”

Plaintiff’s dismissal by the defendant being justified, the form­er’s reinstatement as directed by the lower court
cannot be sustained.

In L-23871, plaintiff Juan Glipo seeks
to recover a sum of money allegedly due to him by way of underpayment of
wages.  However, he has neither prayed
for reinstatement nor alleged the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between him and the Company. 
Thus, the case is limited to one simply for the recovery of a sum of
money, which is within the competence of the court of first instance.  In Mag­dalena Estate, Inc. vs. Bangilan,20
We held:

“Is an action (1) for recovery of underpayment under the
Minimum Wage Law, and (2) for the recovery of separa­tion pay under Republic Act
1052, as amended by Republic Act 1787, within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations?  With respect to
the first item, we are of the opinion that the proper court before which the
claim should be presented is the Court of First Instance and not the Indus­trial
Court, particularly where, as in this case, there is no labor dispute involved
and the claim pertains exclusively to the past and has nothing to do with
current wages.  In Teo­dora
Donato vs. Philippine Marine Officers Association
& Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-12506, May 18, 1959, it is stated:

‘Underpayment of the minimum wage or violation of the Minimum Wage
Law is not one of the acts of unfair labor practice enumerated in Repub­lic Act
No. 875, particularly Section 4 thereof, and the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Court under Section 5 thereof exclusively refers to the prevention of un­fair
labor practice, not of having allegedly underpaid Morales by giving him a
salary below the minimum wage fixed by Republic Act 602; so that in our opin­ion,
it is clear that the Industrial Court decided and resolved a point absolutely
outside the question and case presented before it and over which it had no
jurisdiction.

‘Moreover, only the Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over
cases arising from the Minimum Wage Law. 
Section 16 of said law, Republic Act 602, provides that the Court of
First Instance shall have jurisdiction to restrain violations of said act.  In the case of Isidoro
Cebrero vs. Jose Tala­man,
G.R. No. L-11924, decided on May 16,
1958, involving among other things underpayment by an employer to
an employee, we said, through Mr. Jus­tice Alex Reyes that under Republic Act
602, known as the Minimum Wage Law, an employee is author­ized to bring an
action in the regular courts for the recovery of unpaid wages.  The Industrial Court
with its limited jurisdiction does not come under the category of regular courts.’

“Section 16 (a) of Republic Act No. 602, referred to in the
decision just cited, provided:

‘SEC. 16.  JURISDICTION OF
THE COURTS.  – (a) The Court of First
Instance shall have jurisdic­tion to restrain violations of this Act; action by
the Secretary or by the employees affected to recover UNDERPAYMENT may be
brought in any COMPETENT Court, which shall render its decision on such cases
within fifteen days from the time the case has been submitted for decision; in
appropriate instances, appeal from the decisions of those courts on any action
under this Act shall be in accordance with applicable law.'”21

Since the lower court has jurisdiction over the case, the
appealed order dismissing the complaint should be set aside and the case re­manded
to said court for further proceedings.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment should be, as it is
hereby, rendered:

(a)  
In L-24232, L-24718 and L-24956,
granting the writ of certiorari therein prayed for and making permanent the
writs of prelim­inary injunction therein issued.  Respondent courts and/or judges should,
moreover, be, as they are hereby, ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 8725 in
L-24232, Civil Case No. 8617 in L-24718, and Civil Case No. 2772 in L-24956,
with costs against the private res­pondents therein;

(b)  
In L-23058, affirming the order
appealed from, with costs against plaintiff-appellant Mindanao Rapid Co., Inc.;

(c)   In L-23871, reversing the order appealed from and remand­ing the case
to the trial court for further proceedings, with the costs of this instance
against defendant A.L. Ammen Transportation Co.; and

(d)  
In L-23473, modifying the decision
appealed from in the manner above indicated and dismissing the case, without
special pro­nouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes,J.B.L.,  Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1] L-21803, December 17, 1966.

2 See:  Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation vs. Celorio, L-22542, July
31, 1968; Naguiat vs. Arcilla,
et al., L-16602, Feb. 28, 1963; Araullo vs. Monte de Piedad Savings Bank, et al., L-17840, April 23, 1963; Barranta vs. International Harvester Company of the Phil­ippines,
L-18198, April 22, 1963; National Mines & Allied Workers’ Union vs.
Philippine Iron Mines, Inc., et al., L-19372, Oct. 31, 1964; Mercado vs. Elizalde & Co., Inc., L-18962, Dec. 23, 1964; Oriental
Tin Cans Workers’ Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-17695,
Feb. 26, 1965; Edward J. Nell Corporation vs. Cubacub,
et al., L-20842, June 23, 1965. 
Underscoring supplied.

3 L-29474, December
19, 1970.

4 Section 5(a).

5 Cf. National Labor Union v. Dinglasan,
98 Phil. 649 (1956); PAFLU v. Tan, 99 Phil. 854 (1956); Reyes v. Tan, 99 Phil.
880 (1956); Dee Cho Lumber Workers’ Union v. Dee Cho Lumber Co., 101 Phil. 417 (1957), Phil. Sugar Institute
v. CIR, 106 Phil. 401 (1959); Velez v. PAV Watchmen’s Union, 107 Phil. 689
(1960); Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. OSCO Workers
Fraternity Labor Union, L-15826, Jan. 23, 1961; National Labor Union v.
Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corp., L-15363, July 31, 1961;
Phil. Am. Cigar & Cigarette Factory Workers Independent Union v. Phil. Am.
Cigar & Cigarette Mfg. Co., Inc., L-18364, Feb. 28, 1963 United States
Lines Co. v. Assoc. Watchmen & Security Union, L-15508, June 29, 1963,
Phil. Land-Air-Sea Labor Union v. Sy Indong Trading Co. Rice & Corn Mill, L-18476, May 30,
1964; Manila Railroad Co. v. Kapisanan ng Mga Mang­gagawa
sa Manila Railroad Co., L-19728, July 30, 1964; Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Baldo,
L-17739, Dec. 24, 1964; Visayan Bicycle Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. National Labor Union, L-19997, May 19, 1965; Magalit
v. CIR, L-20448, May 25, 1965; Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. CIR, L-17411, Dec.
31, 1965; Industrial-Commercial-Agricultural Workers’ Org. v. CIR, L-21465,
March 31, 1966; Pan Am World Airways, Inc. v. CIR, L-20434, July 30, 1966; Rizal Labor Union v. Rizal Cement
Co., Inc., L-19779, July 30, 1966; Bay View Hotel Inc. v. Manila Hotel Workers’
Union, L-21803, Dec. 17, 1966; Allied Free Workers’ Union v. Compania Mari­tima, L-22951-52,
Jan. 31, 1967; Salunga v. CIR, L-22456, Sept. 27,
1967; Security Bank Employees Union-NATU v. Security Bank and Trust Co.,
L-28536, April 30, 1968; Federacion Obrera v. Mojica, L-25059, Aug.
30, 1968; Veterans Security Free Workers’ Union v. Cloribel,
L-26439, Jan. 30, 1970.

6
L-32891, April 29, 1971.

7
Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Work­ers’ Federation
(PCWF) v. Nolasco, L-24984, July 29, 1968; Rustan Supervisory Union v. Dalisay,
L-32891, April 29, 1971; Erlanger & Galinger,
Inc. v. Erlanger & Galinger Employees
Association, 104 Phil. 17, 21; Consolidated Labor Association of the
Philippines v. Caluag, 103 Phil. 1032, 1040,
citing Reyes v. Tan, 99 Phil. 880.

8
Act No. 190, section 91.

9
Rule 16, section 1.

10 Espanilla v. La
Carlota Sugar Central, L-23722, March 31, 1971; Leoquinco
v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., L-28621, Feb. 22, 1971; Lakas
Ng Manggagawang Makabayan
(LMM) v. Abiera, L-29474, Dec. 19, 1970;
Veterans Security Free Workers Union (FFW) v. Cloribel,
L-26439, Jan. 30, 1970; Philippine Communications, Electronics &
Electricity Workers’ Federation (PCWF) v. Nolasco,
L-24984, July 29, 1968; Regal Manufacturing Employees Association v.
Reyes, L?24388, July 29, 1968; Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera v. Mojica,
L-25059, Aug. 30, 1968, Security Bank Employees’ Union-­NATU v. Security
Bank and Trust Co., L-28536, April 30, 1968.

11 Supra.

12 Supra.

13 Rustan
Supervisory Union v. Dalisay, supra.

14 Supra.

15 Underscoring
supplied.

16 L-12133, Oct.
31, 1958.

17 PLDT vs.
PLDT Workers Union, 91 Phil. 550.

18 Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. CIR, L-17411,
L-18681, and L-18683, Dec. 31, 1965.

19 69 Phil.
485, 486-487.

20 L-16357, April
22, 1963.

21 See, also, Valleson, Inc.
vs. Tiburcio, L-18185, Sept. 28, 1962.