PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MODESTO MALABANAN Y ARANDIA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Appellant Modesto Malabanan was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna (in Crim. Case No. B-108) with the crime of “double
serious physical injuries with damage to property thru reckless
imprudence”, under the following information:

“That on or about January 20, 1957, in the
Municipality of Biñan, Province of Laguna, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
above-named, being then the driver and person incharge of a BTCO Bus
No. 302 bearing Plate No. TPU-12502 (Batangas ’56), did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, recklessly and imprudently manage, operate and
drive said vehicle while passing along the National Highway within the
said municipality in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner,
without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and in violation of
the Motor Vehicle Law, and without taking the necessary precautions to
avoid accident to persons and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence, said truck being driven and
operated by the herein accused, to bump, strike and collide with a
jeepney bearing Plate No. TPU-4975 (Manila ’56) thereby causing serious
physical injuries to its driver, Prodito Rufon y Goyo and his lone
passenger Honorato Villarico which will require medical attendance for
a period of at least ten (10) months and will incapacitate them to
perform their customary labor for the same period of time, and causing
damages to the last named jeepney in the amount of P3,000, to the
damage and prejudice of Januaria Tanchingco, owner of said jeepney in
the aforementioned sum of P3,000.

“Contrary to Law.”

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. The case was then
tried and, while the prosecution was presenting its first witness, the
injured parties (Honorato Villarico and Prodito Rufon) reserved their
right to file separate civil actions for damages arising from the
criminal act. After trial, appellant was found guilty as charged and
sentenced as follows:

“Wherefore, the Court hereby finds that the guilt of
Modesto Malabanan of the complex crime of double serious physical
injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt and there being present no modifying
circumstance in the commission thereof, the accused in accordance with
the provisions of Article 365 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P8,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency but not to exceed six (6) months,
and to pay the costs. No pronouncement is herein made regarding the
civil liability of the accused for the reason that the offended parties
reserved their right to file separate civil action.”

Dissatisfied with said judgment of the trial court, appellant
appealed to the Court of Appeals, presenting factual and legal
questions, but said court, on October 31, 1959, elevated the case to
us, on the ground that the appeal raises this legal issue: “The trial
court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
offense charged in the information.”

Appellant contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense at bar, citing as authority the case of Lapuz vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., (94 Phil., 710). It is urged that inasmuch as
the crime with which appellant was charged is the complex crime of
multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property thru
reckless imprudence, punishable pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 365 of the same code, with the
penalty for the more serious offense to be imposed in its maximum
period, he could only be properly tried by the Justice of the Peace
Court of Biñan, Laguna, instead of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, for the reason that of the two resulting offenses in said
complex crime, namely, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to
property, the former is graver or more serious than the latter; and,
since said offense of multiple serious physical injuries is punishable
with a prison term of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods, (a prison term the maximum of which does not exceed 6 months),
it is the justice of the peace court (pursuant to Sec. 87 [b] of the
Judiciary Act)^[1] which has jurisdiction over the offense.

It is true that, following the ruling of this Court in the case of Lapuz vs. Court of Appeals, supra,
in imposing the corresponding penalty, to the quasi-offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries and damage to property,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. However, there
may be cases, as the one at bar, where the imposable penalty for the
physical injuries charged would come within the jurisdiction of the
municipal or justice of the peace court, while the fine, for the damage
to property, would fall on the Court of First Instance. As the
information can not be split into two, one for damages and another for
the physical injuries, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance
of the case must be determined not by the corresponding penalty for the
physical injuries charged but by the fine imposable for the damage to
property resulting from the reckless imprudence. (Angeles, etc., vs. Jose, et al., 96 Phil., 151; 50 Off. Gaz., [12] 5764). The reason for this rule was given in the recent case of People vs. Villanueva, (111 Phil., 869), when this Court said:

“Considering that it is the court of first instance
that would undoubtedly have jurisdiction if the only offense that
resulted from appellant’s imprudence were the damage to property in the
amount of P2,636, it would be absurd to hold that for the graver
offense of serious and less serious physical injuries combined with
damage to property through reckless imprudence, jurisdiction would lie
in the justice of the peace court. The presumption is against
absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to interpret the law in
such a way as to avoid absurd results. * * *.

“Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility that the prosecution may not be able to prove
all the supposed offenses constituting the complex crime charged. Were
we to hold that it is the justice of the peace court that has
jurisdiction in this case, if later the prosecution should fail to
prove the physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the
damage to property in the amount of P2,636, the inferior court would
find itself without jurisdiction to impose the fine for the damage to
property committed, since such fine can not be less than the amount of
the damage. Again, it is to avoid this further absurdity that we must
hold that the jurisdiction lies in the court of first instance in this
case.” (Italics supplied.)

We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly took cognizance of this case.

Considering that the jurisdictional issue raised by appellant is
already a settled matter since the promulgation in 1954 of our decision
in the case of Angeles vs. Jose, (supra), and, consequently, unsubstantial as to bring his appeal within our appellate jurisdiction (See People vs.
Cuello, 111 Phil., 395) and that the review of the decision of the
trial court in question would require a determination or revision of
the factual findings of the trial court, as disclosed in Errors Nos. II
to VI (See Appellant’s Brief)^[2]
assigned by appellant, we are constrained to remand the case to the
Court of Appeals for determination and disposition, in accordance with
law. So ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., took no part.

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^[1] Prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 2613, effective August 1, 1959.

^[2] II. The trial court
erred in finding that the jeepney and bus No. 302 of the Batangas
Transportation Company collided on the jeepney’s lane and while the bus
was in the act overtaking a calesa.

III. The trial court erred in not finding that the jeepney suddenly swerved to the left.

IV. The trial court erred in finding that at the time of the
collision, the front wheels of Bus No. 302 of the Batangas
Transportation Company were not running along a straight line but
obliquely towards the right.

V. The trial court erred in finding that Bus No. 302 of the Batangas
Transportation Company was running fast at the time of the collision.

VI. The trial court erred in not acquitting the appellant.