LUCILA B. VDA. DE AZARIAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE MANOLO L. MADDELA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INS­TANCE OF QUEZON AND MAMERTO AZARIAS, JR., RESPONDE…

Azarias versus Maddela

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Lucila B. vda. de Azarias against Judge Manolo L. Maddela of the Court of First Instance of Quezon and against Mamerto Azarias, Jr. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals which dismissed her petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to approve her notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal in the settlement proceedings for the estate of her deceased husband. The case matters because it settles, with impressive unanimity, the fate of a motion for reconsideration filed without a notice of hearing: it is a worthless piece of paper, and it does not stop the decision from becoming final.

Procedural History

Mamerto Azarias, Jr. filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, assigned to the branch presided by Judge Maddela, praying for appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased Mamerto Azarias and for recognition as an acknowledged natural child. Lucila filed her opposition. After hearing, Judge Maddela rendered a decision appointing Lucila as administratrix but declaring Mamerto Azarias, Jr. the natural child and an heir of the deceased. Lucila moved for reconsideration and correction of that decision, but her motion carried no notice of hearing. The respondent Judge denied the motion on the ground that it lacked the formalities required by the Rules of Court, granted the private respondent's motion for execution, and denied Lucila's opposition to execution. When Lucila later filed her appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal, the respondent Judge disapproved them because the decision had already become final and executory. Lucila then lodged an original petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals to compel approval of her appeal papers; the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, and denied her motion for reconsideration. Hence this appeal by way of certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Facts

On the fourth of February, 1963, Mamerto Azarias, Jr. filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon for appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased Mamerto Azarias and for recognition as an acknowledged natural child. On the twenty-fifth of March, 1963, Lucila B. vda. de Azarias filed her opposition.

After due hearing, the respondent Judge rendered a decision on the twenty-second of January, 1965, appointing Lucila as administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased husband, and declaring Mamerto Azarias, Jr. the natural child and an heir of the deceased, entitled to all the rights and privileges of such status. The petitioner's counsel received a copy of this decision on the sixteenth of February, 1965. On the twenty-second of February, 1965, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and correction of the decision. She sent copies of the motion by registered mail to the respondent Judge and to the private respondent's counsel, who received them on the twenty-fifth and the twenty-third of February, respectively. But the motion contained no notice fixing the time and place of its hearing.

On the twentieth of April, 1965, the private respondent moved for execution of the decision, and the petitioner opposed it. On the twenty-eighth of July, 1965, the respondent Judge issued three orders at once: he denied the motion for reconsideration because it lacked the required notice, granted the motion for execution, and denied the opposition to execution. On the seventeenth of December, 1965, the petitioner filed a cash appeal bond, a notice of appeal, and a record on appeal, which the respondent Judge disapproved on the fourteenth of February, 1966, on the ground that the decision had become final and executory on the eighteenth of March, 1965.

Issues

• Whether or not the lower court acted legally and correctly in dismissing the petitioner's motion for reconsideration because it lacked a formal notice of hearing, although all parties were properly served with copies of the motion.
• Whether or not the service of copies of the motion on the adverse party amounted to substantial compliance with the Rules of Court, curing the absence of a notice of hearing.
• Whether or not the petitioner's pleading, even if treated as a motion for new trial, could be acted upon without a notice of hearing.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

The written notice referred to evidently is that prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provide that such notice shall state the time and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the parties concerned at least three days in advance.

This fixes the content of the notice: it must state the time and place of hearing, and it must reach all parties concerned at least three days in advance.

Section 6 of the same Rule provides:

And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice.

This is the provision that seals the fate of the petitioner's motion: without proof of notice, the court has no authority to act upon it.

Section 2 of Rule 37, construed in relation to Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15, provides:

The result is the same: a written notice of a motion for new trial must be served by the movant on the adverse party, stating the time and place of the hearing thereof; without proof of service of such notice the motion can not be acted upon by the court.

This shows that even if the petitioner's pleading were treated as a motion for new trial, the same requirement of notice would apply.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the lower court acted legally and correctly. The Court ruled that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court no authority to act upon. The reason is that unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court has no way to determine whether the other party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves fix no period within which he may file his reply or opposition. The Court rejected the petitioner's explanation that she omitted the notice to spare the respondent Judge from embarrassment, calling it an afterthought to conceal the forgetfulness, if not the negligence, of her counsel. The Court also distinguished the cases she cited: the Inesin case rested on special circumstances, where the court held sessions in Pagadian only once a year and the movant could not know the date of the next session, whereas here the respondent court was holding sessions at Polillo, Quezon; the Manansala case involved practice before the Public Service Commission; and the Sun Un Giok case involved a motion that actually carried a notice of hearing, although addressed to the clerk of court.

On the second issue, the Court held that furnishing the adverse party a copy of the motion was not substantial compliance. In the Almacen case, the Court gave no importance to the undenied fact that a copy of the motion for reconsideration was furnished the opposing party. The duty to give notice devolves upon the movant, not upon the court.

On the third issue, the Court held that even if the petitioner's pleading were considered a motion for new trial under Rule 37, the result would be the same, because the applicable rule requires a written notice stating the time and place of hearing, and without proof of service of such notice the motion cannot be acted upon by the court.

Doctrine

A motion for reconsideration that does not comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, because it carries no notice of the time and place of hearing, is a worthless piece of paper. The clerk of court has no right to receive it, and the court has no authority to act upon it. Under Section 6 of Rule 15, no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Service of a copy of the motion on the adverse party does not cure the defect, because the duty to give notice devolves upon the movant, not upon the court. A defective motion for reconsideration does not toll the running of the period for appeal, so the decision becomes final and executory. The same requirement applies to a motion for new trial under Rule 37, which must be served with a written notice stating the time and place of hearing.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition, at the petitioner's cost.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a motion for reconsideration without a notice of hearing is a worthless piece of paper that does not stop the decision from becoming final. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of a valid motion under Rule 15, the rule that the duty to give notice rests on the movant and not on the court, and the rule that a defective motion for reconsideration does not toll the period of appeal.