PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT, VS. JOVENAL D. APOSTOL, ALIAS “JUVAL APOSTOL”, AND ONE (1) JOHN DOE, ACCUSED-PETITIONER.

Apostol versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is Apostol versus People of the Philippines, a criminal appeal in which the accused, Jovenal Apostol, also known as Juval Apostol, asks the Supreme Court to overturn his conviction for the crime of Other Mischiefs under the Revised Penal Code. The People of the Philippines, through the private complainant Tirso Dagayloan, stand as respondent. The case matters because it settles two things a reviewee must know cold: first, that criminal liability cannot be the subject of a compromise, and second, that a barangay amicable settlement, though it has the force and effect of a final judgment, cannot extinguish a criminal offense committed against the People. It also gives a clean restatement of the three elements of malicious mischief.

Procedural History

Apostol was charged before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Zamboanguita-Dauin, Negros Oriental. On arraignment he pleaded not guilty, and trial on the merits followed. The trial court, in its judgment dated February 15, 2012, convicted him of malicious mischief under Articles 327 and 329 of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to three months and eleven days of arresto mayor and ordering him to pay Tirso Dagayloan 1,500 pesos for the damage to the fence.

Apostol appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 44, Dumaguete City. The Regional Trial Court, in its decision dated June 27, 2012, affirmed the trial court's judgment in full. Apostol moved for reconsideration, which was denied. He then came to the Supreme Court on appeal, assigning as errors the failure of the lower courts to appreciate the barangay compromise agreement and the finding of guilt despite the absence of evil intent.

Facts

On the morning of September 21, 2008, in Barangay Maluay, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, Tirso Dagayloan had blocked a portion of the road leading to the highway with a bamboo pole, preventing vehicles from passing through his property. Apostol, who was on his way to church with his family, could not pass. He went to Dagayloan's house to negotiate, but Dagayloan demanded twenty pesos each time Apostol would use the road and could not produce proof of ownership.

Apostol returned to the site and cut the bamboo so that residents with vehicles could pass. Witnesses Isaias Ta-an and Marvin Tenido testified that Apostol, together with a companion, destroyed and cut into pieces the bamboo fence, and even returned twice to uproot the posts and totally destroy the fence. Ta-an testified that Apostol was very angry at the time.

It later appeared that Apostol had filed a harassment case against Dagayloan before the barangay, and the parties executed a Malinawon nga Kasabutan, a compromise agreement, providing that the disputed portion should remain open to passers-by pending resolution of Dagayloan's deed of sale. Apostol argued that this agreement barred the criminal case against him.

Issues

• Whether or not the barangay compromise agreement, the Malinawon nga Kasabutan, barred or extinguished the criminal liability of Apostol for malicious mischief.
• Whether or not Apostol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code, considering his claim that no evil intent could be attributed to him when he cut the bamboo poles.

Applicable Provisions

Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines the offense, provides:

Whoever shall deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief.

This is the offense charged, and its elements are the very test the Court applies to Apostol's act of destroying the bamboo fence.

Section 416 of Republic Act Number 7160, the Local Government Code, on the effect of amicable settlement, provides:

Section 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration Award. The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.

This is the provision Apostol invokes, and the Court explains why its force as a final judgment does not reach criminal liability.

Section 418 of the same law, on repudiation, provides:

Section 418. Repudiation. Any party to the dispute may, within ten days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same by filing with the lupon chairman a statement to that effect sworn to before him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for filing a complaint as hereinabove provided.

This provision is cited to show the limits of a barangay settlement, which governs only the civil dispute between the parties.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the compromise agreement did not bar the criminal case. It laid down the firm rule that criminal liability cannot be the subject of a compromise, because a criminal case is committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes. A compromise is not among the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal liability. The Court also observed that the agreement pertained to the harassment case Apostol filed against Dagayloan, not to the malicious mischief case, and that nowhere in it did Dagayloan condone the cutting of his bamboo poles.

On the second issue, the Court held that all three elements of malicious mischief were present: that the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; that the act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; and that the act of damaging another's property was committed merely for the sake of damaging it. Apostol admitted destroying the fence, and the trial court found that he acted out of anger and frustration after his negotiation failed, returning twice to completely destroy the fence. This showed the specific desire to inflict injury that the offense requires. The Court deferred to the trial court's factual findings on the credibility of witnesses, absent any clear showing of overlooked facts of weight and substance.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, criminal liability cannot be the subject of a compromise, for a crime is committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish it; a compromise is not a ground for the extinction of criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code. Second, a barangay amicable settlement under Section 416 of the Local Government Code has the force and effect of a final judgment, but only as to the civil dispute; it cannot exonerate an accused from a criminal charge. Third, the elements of malicious mischief under Article 327 are: deliberate damage to the property of another; the act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; and the damage is committed merely for the sake of damaging it, out of a specific desire to inflict injury. Fourth, factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of overlooked or misapplied facts.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed in full the decision of the Regional Trial Court, and Apostol's conviction for malicious mischief, with the penalty of three months and eleven days of arresto mayor and the award of 1,500 pesos in damages, stands.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: criminal liability cannot be the subject of a compromise, and a barangay settlement, though it has the force of a final judgment, cannot extinguish a crime against the People. Examiners like to use this case to test the elements of malicious mischief and the limits of a barangay amicable settlement under the Local Government Code.