RAFAEL R. RECTO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASAY CITY BRANCH VII, AND AURORA R. DE BARRERA, AND C…

Motion dated April 8,
1976 filed by private respondent for the reconsideration of Our decision in this case dated March 23, 1976 and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the same party dated July
28, 1976, together with related incidents as of December 22, 1976.

Not content with lecturing on law and morals to petitioner,
learned counsel for private respondent practically chides the Court for having
predicated its decision on what counsel claims has never been disputed by him,
namely, the jurisdictional rule that a probate court may
not without the consent of all the parties concerned pass on any controversy
regarding the ownership of property purportedly forming part of the estate of a
deceased person.  While the right of
counsel to present his case in any manner within bounds of propriety must be
recognized, it is not for any party to tell the Court how it should rationalize
its decision.  We can see why, what with
the bitter personal feelings that undisguisedly
animate their arguments, neither party herein would concede even the most
insignificant contention of the other, but for any of them to insist that the
Court deal with the case only in the manner that suits their personal purposes
borders on pretentiousness not to be relished by any court.

To be sure, while counsel for private respondent asserts rather
pointedly that he knows perfectly well that issues of ownership are beyond the
competence of a probate court, the Court notes that there is a stubborn refusal
on the part of private respondent to accept the logical consequence and
corollary of such indisputable point of procedure.  It is vehemently maintained that in bringing
up what she considers to be an illegal transfer to his name by petitioner of the
Batangas property, into which a charging lien of the
late Don Claro was converted, as a ground for asking
for the removal of her son, the petitioner, as administrator of the intestate
estate of his father, claiming that such act constitutes breach of trust, she
is not making respondent court resolve a question of ownership, but is merely
raising an incident in the proper administration of her husband’s estate.  But such a posture could be correct, if it
were uncontroverted that the administrator had made
the assailed transfer without the knowledge and consent of all the other
heirs.  It happens, however, that in this
case, the petitioner-administrator has shown respondent court that his right
over the property in issue is based on appropriate documents purportedly
executed by all his co-heirs including private respondent.  Of course, it is true that private respondent
disputes the due execution and validity of the instrument imputedly
executed by her, and, as a matter of fact, in relation to her son’s adverse
claim, she has precisely asked respondent court to appoint Justice Calixto Zaldivar as special
administrator to seek in the court of proper jurisdiction the nullification of
said petitioner’s claim of title.  In
these premises, the Court finds it inappropriate for the probate court, if it
is not without jurisdiction, to determine such conflicting claims of mother and
son even for the sole desired objective of removing him as administrator.  And the reason is obvious, for to allow such
an inquiry might eventually lead to disparate results, as the respondent court
might hold a view different from that of the court in which the nullity
proceedings is intended to be brought, in which event an intolerable absurdity
will arise.  Considering that
substantially the same facts will have to be involved and presumably the same
evidence would be presented by the parties, should the matter be permitted to
be inquired into simultaneously by two courts, from the very nature of things,
it cannot be doubted that preference or priority should be given to the court
that can resolve the fundamental issue of ownership.

Our decision does not in any respect foreclose the earlier
removal of petitioner from the administration of the subject estate on any
other ground.  We have said so clearly
and unequivocably. 
What the Court cannot sanction is for respondent probate court to
resolve whether or not petitioner had committed a breach of trust in
transferring the property in question to himself, considering that from aught that
appears in the record before Us, the said transfer was made by him on the basis
of agreements purportedly entered into among all the parties interested in the
subject estate subsequent to the approval of the project of partition and the
implementation thereof to the seeming satisfaction of all of them.  Indeed, under these circumstances, it might
even be doubtful that an act of possible maladministration is involved, at
least until it has been proven that the documents relied upon by petitioner
were really fraudulently secured.

In her supplemental
motion for reconsideration, private respondent insists that what she is asking
respondent court to act upon are “actuations of the administrator which
she believes to be irregular and anomalous by reason of which she prays for his
removal.” And these alleged irregularities and anomalies; she enumerates
on pages 9 to 10 as well as pages 11 to 13 of said supplemental motion.  We have carefully gone over said allegations,
and We are of the considered opinion that they all revolve somehow around the
ultimate issue of whether or not the ownership of the Batangas
property has been legally and validly assumed for himself by petitioner
pursuant to mutual deeds and instruments among him and his co-heirs posterior
to the actual partition of the subject estate on the basis of the project duly
approved by respondent court.  In other
words, most of them appear to us to constitute elements of the alleged fraud
attending the transfer in dispute. 
Accordingly, We hold that it is at least
preferable, for the reasons already stated above, if not more in consonance
with applicable jurisdictional doctrines, to leave all such issues for
determination by the court in which Justice Zaldivar
will properly seek the nullity of petitioner’s title.

In an apparent insistent
effort to find fault in the decision of this Court, counsel for private
respondent contends that it is certainly not outside of respondent court’s
authority to appoint a special administrator to recover the Batangas
property for the estate.  But Our decision does not hold otherwise.  Just in case counsel has overlooked the
pertinent portion of Our decision, We hereby reiterate that “(i)nsofar as the appointment of Justice
Zaldivar as special administrator is concerned,
petitioner expressed conformity at the hearing, to forego his objection
thereto, provided it does not imply any waiver of his right to defend in any
action that said administrator may institute what he claims to be his acquired interest in the said property”
and that “(t)he herein petition is denied in so far as the order of
December 3, 1975 appointing Justice Calixto Zaldivar as special administrator for the purpose therein
stated is concerned.” (See pages 7 and 8, Decision.)

We cannot close this
resolution without sternly admonishing both private parties that they should
seek another forum for the ventilation of their respective purely personal and
private animosities against each other and also their opinions of each other’s
character and learning.  Surely, they
know or ought to know that this Court, or any other court of this country, is
not the place for them to wash dirty linen and to exchange endless attacks and
counter-attacks against each other’s personal honor and integrity.  That their disagreement has had to cause them
seek judicial arbitration is lamentable, and for them to hurl at each other
almost unprintable personal vilifications and insults in their pleadings filed
in this case is manifestly uncalled for and unworthy of their respective
standing before the Court as officers thereof. 
We cannot but express Our extreme disappointment with such unexpected
conduct, and make manifest Our unqualified disapproval of the language and/or
content of some of their pleadings and portions of the rest of them, not really
so much because they have mutually tried to outdo one another in putting each
one to shame without due regard to the dignity of these proceedings, but
because in some respects such exchange of tirades tend to downgrade the high
and deserved esteem in which a distinguished and revered former member of this
Court has been held by all Filipinos. 
The Court unanimously decries such a spectacle and is determined to keep
the name of Don Claro untarnished.

In consequence, We hold that the following highly offensive pleadings filed
by the parties do not deserve consideration and resolution by the Court:

1.  The reply dated November 16, 1976 filed by counsel
for private respondent;

2.  The petition to withdraw
check filed by petitioner by way of comment on the foregoing reply;

3.  The comment of counsel
for private respondent on said motion to withdraw;

4.  The reply of petitioner
to said comment;

5.  The rejoinder to this
reply; and

6.  The sur-rejoinder
to the foregoing rejoinder.

All these pleadings are hereby ordered expunged from the record
and the respective authors thereof are ordered to forthwith withdraw all of
them.  Accordingly, the resolution of December 13, 1976 is hereby set aside, hence the motion for reconsideration thereof is now
moot and academic.  It is understood that
counsel Barrera’s check in the amount of P6,800 should
be returned to him.  And if the parties
still desire to bring up any matter in connection therewith, they may file the
appropriate pleadings devoid of any personalities and confined strictly and
exclusively to relative factual and legal points.

For the same reasons, the Court hereby orders:

(a) Petitioner to replace his comment on the motion for
reconsideration dated April 8, 1976
of private respondent so as to eliminate therefrom all
allusions to Justice Jesus Barrera’s alleged motives in handling the case of
private respondent.

(b) Counsel for private respondent to replace his manifestation
dated June 5, 1976 in order to eliminate therefrom
pages 2 to 3 above the topic REFUTATION OF PETITIONER’S COMMENT, and relatedly, to withdraw from the records the manifestation
attached thereto of private respondent Doña Aurora
Reyes de Barrera;

(c) Carmen Gonzalez, c/o Petitioner, to likewise withdraw her
manifestation dated June 24, 1976
together with its annexes;

(d) Petitioner to withdraw from the records his manifestation of June 28, 1976.

(e) Petitioner to withdraw also his counter-manifestation dated July 12, 1976;

(f)  Private respondent’s
counsel to replace the Manifestation and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 28, 1976
so as to eliminate therefrom the Prefatory Statement
on pages 1 to 5 thereof;

(g) Private respondent, c/o her counsel, to withdraw from the
records her Answer dated July 31, 1976
to Carmen Gonzalez’ Manifestation;

(h) Elvira Arrastia Recto of 407
Adalia Street, Palm
Village, Makati, Rizal,
to withdraw from the records her counter-manifestation dated August 10, 1976;

(i) 
Petitioner to likewise withdraw his reply to Elvira Arrastia
Recto dated August 31, 1976;
and

(j) Petitioner to replace his Comment dated October 6, 1976 with another pleading omitting therefrom any personal offensive allusion to Justice
Barrera.

The Court expresses displeasure with the parties’ unrestrained
hurling of personal insults against each other in complete disregard of the
respect they owe the Court.  The
consequent degrading of the dignity of the instant proceedings must be stopped.  None of the above-listed pleadings is indispensable to the proper
resolution of the issues now before the Court. 
In any event, the Court finds no merit in private respondent’s original
as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision.

WHEREFORE, the said motions for reconsideration are hereby
denied, and this denial is FINAL.  The
above orders to replace and withdraw must be complied with within five (5) days
from notice hereof.  The check for P6,800 of Justice Barrera is ordered returned to him and he may withdraw the same together
with his reply dated November 16,
1976.  The parties are
strongly admonished that any further misconduct on their part will be properly
dealt with by the Court.  The Court
refrains from calling any of the parties to account for contempt only because
of its desire to immediately put an end to these unpleasant proceedings that
might somehow jeopardize the good and honored name of Don Claro
M. Recto, for whom all the members of the Court have nothing but respect and
admiration.  Indeed, it is the Court’s
earnest hope that the parties will yet find ways and means to heal wounded
feelings and settle their differences amicably, if only to avoid the slightest
possibility of hurting the memory of that great Filipino whom the nation sadly
and badly misses in these troubled times. 
It goes without saying,
nonetheless, that the Court expects counsels to make proper and appropriate
amends without any loss of time after notice of this resolution.

Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., in the result.

Fernando, J., (Chairman), did not
take part.

Martin, J., was designated to
sit in the Second Division.