G.R. No. L-34785. July 30, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. RENATO BARRIOS Y ALMOGUERA AND RICO NAZARIO Y IBAÑEZ, ACCUSED.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions July 30, 1979 EN BANC FERNANDEZ, J.:
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FERNANDEZ, J.:


This is an automatic review of the amended decision dated January
13, 1972 of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila in CCC-VI-733 (71) entitled
“The People of the Philippines versus Renato
Barrios and Rico Nazario” finding the two
accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing each one of
them to death and to jointly and severally pay the heirs of the victim Teodoro Castillo y Molina the sum of P12,000.00 for the
death of said victim and the sums of P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P7.00 representing the amount taken from the deceased and
to pay the costs.[1]

The two accused, Renato Barrios y Almoguera and Rico Nazario y Ibañez were charged in September 1971 with the crime of
robbery with homicide in the following:

“INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses Renato Barrios y Almoguera and Rico Nazario y Ibañez of the crime of robbery with homicide, committed as
follows:

That on or about August 28, 1971, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one other
whose identity and whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
by means of force and violence, and with intent to gain, take away from Teodoro Castillo y Molina, a taxi driver, the latter’s
earnings of undetermined amount, to the damage and prejudice of the said Teodoro Castillo y Molina in the said undetermined amount;
that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them
to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid earning of Teodoro
Castillo y Molina, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the said Teodoro Castillo y Molina, by then and there stabbing him
with a bladed instrument, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which
were the direct cause of his death thereafter.

Contrary to law.

(SGD.)
RODOLFO C. CASAS

Assistant Fiscal

I hereby certify that an ex-parte
investigation in this case has been conducted by me in accordance with law;
that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been
committed; and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Manila, Sept. 13, 1971.”[2]

The facts, as found by the trial court, are:

“A careful study of the evidence presented, shows the fact
that victim Teodoro Castillo y Molina, a taxi driver,
was killed and robbed of his earnings has never been disputed.  The only issue in this case, therefore, is
the criminal participation of the accused.

The corroborating statements of both accused (Exhibit ‘F’, statement
of Nazario and Exhibit ‘G’, statement of Barrios)
indubitably show that said accused, together with one Arthur, who is still at
large, conspired, confederated with and helped one another in killing and
robbing the victim.  Nazario
admitted in his statement (Exhibit ‘F’) that he invited Barrios to stage a
hold-up in Perlita Street.  Thereupon, a taxi passed by and he stopped
it.  They boarded the same and he sat in
the front seat while Barrios and Arthur sat at the back with Arthur immediately
behind the driver of the taxi. 
Thereafter, Barrios poked the balisong on the
taxi driver.  Then they pulled said taxi
driver to the rear seat in order to frisk him but the driver shouted for help.  Fearing that they might be heard and the driver
would create a scandal, Barrios immediately stabbed the driver 3 times.  Thereafter, he and his companions fled.  Nazario further declared
that Barrios also stabbed the taxi driver because he fought back.

Barrios likewise admitted in his statement (Exhibit ‘G’) that they
actually stopped the taxi at the corner of Perlita
and Estrada Streets and got the money of the driver but the driver fought back
and for which reason he stabbed him with a kitchen knife.  After that, he and his two companions
fled.  He cannot remember the number of
times he stabbed the taxi driver because he was then drunk.

The fact that both accused confessed to the truth is strongly shown
by the corroborating testimony of Generoso Quimpo, Jr., who testified in a spontaneous, categorical,
logical and straightforward manner with marked fluency and ease that between
2:00 and 2:30 a.m. of August 28, 1971, while he was still half-awake, he heard
a commotion consisting of a sound of a car, a radio and the struggle of some
men.  He even heard a shout ‘iwanan mo na yan‘
and the slamming of the door of the taxi. 
He looked out of the window and saw a taxi at standstill, around 9 to 10
meters away, but with the engine on. 
Inside the taxi, he saw two men at the rear seat struggling.  Then the driver (he said he is the driver
because he was the one who shouted ‘magnanakaw‘) came
out and started running towards Perlita
Street shouting ‘magnanakaw,
magnanakaw‘. 
The man who was inside, at the rear of the taxi, also went out and ran
on the opposite direction towards Estrada. 
In other words, the testimony of Quimpo, Jr.
that he saw two men struggling in the rear seat of the taxi, one of whom he
believes to be the taxi driver because he was the one shouting ‘magnanakaw‘, corroborates the admission of Nazario that they pulled the taxi driver from the front to
the rear seat in order to frisk him of his money (Exhibit ‘F’, answer to
question No. 6); the testimony of Quimpo, Jr. that
the taxi driver went out of his taxi and shouted corroborates also a portion of
the answer of Nazario to question No. 6 (Exhibit ‘F’)
that the taxi driver got out of his taxi and shouted; and the testimony of Quimpo, Jr. that he saw two men struggling at the back of
the taxi also corroborates the statements of Nazario
and Barrios that Barrios stabbed the taxi driver because the latter fought
back.  The credibility of Quimpo, Jr. cannot be doubted for in the absence of
evidence showing improper motive actuating the principal prosecution witnesses
tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive existed and their
testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit (People versus Amiscua, L-31238, February 27, 1971).”[3]

The two accused maintained that they were maltreated into giving
their statements admitting their participation in the commission of the crime
charged in the information.  This
contention has no merit.

The statements in question were subscribed and sworn to before
Assistant Fiscal Avelino Concepcion
of Manila.  There is no showing that the two accused
refused or even hesitated to sign and swear to said statements.  They did not complain to the fiscal that they
were maltreated by the police officers. 
Under these circumstances, the statements are considered to have been
voluntarily given.[4]

The assertion of the accused Rico Nazario
that he did not complain to the fiscal before whom he subscribed and swore to
the statement because he was afraid of the police officers is not
credible.  Considering the gravity of the
offense, it is logical to assume that the fiscal examined thoroughly the two
accused on the voluntariness of their
statements.  If the two accused were
really maltreated they should have complained because the probable penalty of
death for the crime charged is more awesome than the feared reprisal of the
police.  Moreover, there is no evidence
of the alleged maltreatment other than the bare assertion of the accused.

The statements of the two accused contain details most of which
could only have been furnished by them. 
The allegation of Nazario that they drank
first beer or liquor on the railroad track in Perlita
Street; that he was the one who sat in front of the taxicab while the other
accused sat on the rear seat; that Barrios was the one who poked a knife at the
taxi driver; that the driver was pulled to the rear seat of the taxicab so that
he could be frisked of his money; that the driver shouted “saklolo, tulungan ninyo ako“; and that the
driver was stabbed because he fought back are details that could not have been
concocted by the police investigators.

The accused, Renato Barrios, narrated
in his statement that the driver fought back when the former took his money;
that said accused stabbed the driver with a kitchen knife; that before the
robbery, he and the other accused first drank liquor by the bridge going to the
railroad track that he knows Col. Quimpo who lives at
the corner of Estrada and Perlita Streets; that it is
true that he went to Col. Quimpo three (3) days after
the incident and asked what said accused should do as he is one of those being
suspected in the killing and robbing of the driver as reported in a newspaper;
and that he read in the Daily Star that he is a suspect and Col. Quimpo is a witness. 
These details could not have been known to the police investigators.

It is a settled rule that where the statement of the accused
mentions details which only the declarant could have
furnished and could not have been concocted by the investigator, the confession
is considered to have been voluntarily given.[5]

Moreover, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption is that the police officers who investigated the accused performed
their official duties regularly.[6]

The defense interposed by the accused that on August 28, 1971 they were narrating
stories in the house at 2473 Perlita
Street, the residence of Renato
Barrios, is not credible.  Alibi is a
defense that can very easily be concocted. 
For this reason, alibi to be sustained as a defense must be supported by
strong evidence.  The evidence of the
accused in support of their alibi is weak. 
It is strange that the accused and their companions should be conversing
up to 2:30 o’clock in the
morning.  This is contrary to the
ordinary course of things.  Besides,
Virginia Siscon, a witness of the accused, declared
that she conversed with the accused and other persons only up to 10:00 o’clock in the evening of that date.  The place where the accused and other persons
allegedly told stories was at 2473 Perlita
Street which was near the scene of the crime.  The crime was committed on the same
street.  There was every possibility for
the two accused to have been present at the scene of the crime although earlier
that evening they were conversing with other people in the house at 2473
Perlita Street.

It has been held that for alibi to prosper, the evidence must
show that the accused was so far away that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.[7]

The evidence of the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that the two accused committed the crime charged in the information.

The trial court imposed the death penalty on both accused because
of the finding that the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of craft and abuse of superior strength without any mitigating
circumstance.  The evidence of the
prosecution has not established the aggravating circumstances of craft and
abuse of superior strength.

Craft is a circumstance characterized by trickery or cunning
resorted to by the accused to carry out his design.

The trial court found that craft was present because the two
accused stopped the taxicab by pretending to be passengers.  There is no evidence that the two accused pretended
to be passengers.  In fact, it is not
clear how the taxicab was stopped.  The
only eyewitness for the prosecu­tion, Generoso M. Quimpo, Jr., declared that between 2:00 and 2:30 o’clock in
the morning of August 28, 1971, he was half-awake when there occurred a
commotion outside his house consisting of a sound of a car, radio and the
struggling of some men; that upon looking out of the window, he saw a taxicab
at a standstill about 9 or 10 feet away from the window; that he was in the
second floor of the house; that the engine of the car was running; that before
looking outside, the witness heard a man shouting “Iwanan
mo na yan.”; that when
he heard the slamming of the door of the taxicab and he peeped out immediately,
he saw the taxicab already parked outside; that he saw two men struggling
inside the taxicab at the rear seat; that the taxi driver came out and ran
towards Perlita Street shouting “magnanakaw, magnanakaw.”;
that a few seconds after the taxi driver had run out, the man inside the
taxicab at the rear also ran towards the opposite direction going to Estrada
Street; and that the two persons struggling at the rear of the taxicab were the
taxi driver and a man.

It is clear from the foregoing testimony that when Generoso M. Quimpo, Jr. looked
out of the window from his house, the taxicab was already at a standstill and
that only two men were struggling at the rear seat of the taxicab, the driver
of the taxicab and one man.  This
testimony of the prosecution witness also rules out the existence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.  Only one man was struggling with the taxi
driver at the rear seat of the taxicab and the witness saw only one man coming out
of the rear of the taxicab and running towards the opposite direction going to Estrada
Street.

It is settled that an aggravating circumstance should be proven
as fully as the crime itself in order to aggravate the penalty.[8]

In view of the foregoing, the trial court erred in imposing the
penalty of death.  The crime was
committed without the presence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the decision under automatic review is hereby
affirmed, with the sole modification that the penalty imposed on the two
accused is reclusion perpetua, with
costs against said accused.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs
in the result.

Santos and Abad Santos,
JJ., on official trips abroad.


[1] Rollo, pp. 8-42.

[2] Rollo, pp. 3-4.

[3] Rollo, pp. 31-34.

[4]
People vs. Dorado, L-23464, October
31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53, 58.

[5]
People vs. Dorado, L-23464, October
31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53, 58.

[6]
Section 5 [m],  Rule 131, Revised Rules of
Court.

[7]
People vs. Condemena, L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910, 918.

[8]
People vs. Marcina, 77 SCRA 238, 246.