G.R. No. L-26534. November 28, 1969
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, CAPTS. JAMES BARBERS, ANTONIO PARALEJAS AND FELICISIMO LAZARO, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITY AS PRECINCT OR S…
FERNANDO, J.:
The power of respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to direct
the Mayor of the City of Manila, petitioner Antonio J. Villegas, to replace the
other petitioners, James Barbers, Antonio Paralejas
and Felicisimo Lazaro as
station commanders of the three Manila police precincts, is challenged in this
prohibition proceeding filed with the Manila Court of First Instance. There is no dispute that petitioner, as
Mayor, by virtue of the statutory grant of authority of “immediate control
over the executive functions of the different departments,”[1]
could pick the police officials to be entrusted with such responsibility. The choice fell on the three other
petitioners, then police captains.
Respondent Commissioner would dispute their designation as such on the
ground of lack for each of them of “an Inspector First Class (Police
Detective Major)” eligibility.
Petitioners prevailed, the lower court being unable to locate any legal
provision to warrant such an exercise of power on the part of respondent
Commissioner. The case is before us now
on appeal. For reasons to be more
explicitly and fully set forth, we affirm.
The petition for prohibition, with preliminary injunction being
sought, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 17, 1965. After the allegation as to parties, it was
set forth therein that in an endorsement of June 30, 1965, respondent
Commissioner directed that petitioners Barbers, Paralejas
and Lazaro be replaced as station commanders of the
three police precincts of Manila, as their continued employment as such was
illegal, the eligibility required being that of an inspector first class,
allegedly not possessed by them.[2]
The petitioner Mayor replied on July 2,
1965, asserting that he felt obliged “to disregard said
directive, it being in excess of the authority vested in [the Civil Service]
Commission.” As noted in such communication: “This Office is not aware of any
provision of law requiring that Precinct or Station Commanders should be at
least a Police or Detective Major or an Inspector First Class. Paragraph 4, Section 23 of Republic Act No.
2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, which that Commission
has invoked, contemplates positions in the competitive or classified service as
provided for in an appropriation or budget measure to which an appointment, as
the term appointment is used in Section 24 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, is
required. Obviously, this provision of
law can not cover mere designations or assignments to an area of command. Thus, Precinct or Station Commanders in the
Manila Police Department are so designated for organizational purposes in order
to delineate their specific area of command and effect greater efficiency in
the administration of police affairs.”[3]
Respondent Commissioner of Civil Service was however adamant,
reiterating on July 9, 1965
his directive for the replacement of the other petitioners as station
commanders.[4]
Then came the allegation why in this particular case respondent Commissioner
of Civil Service acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or, at the very
least, with grave abuse of discretion.
As pointed out in the petition, the assignment or detail in this case of
the other petitioners as precinct or station commanders did not constitute “appointment
to positions in the competitive or classified service;” that such
designation or detail was exclusively within the power and jurisdiction of
petitioner Mayor under his specific power of direction, supervision and control
vested in him by the Charter and in view of his responsibility as the chief
executive of the City to maintain peace and order therein; that there is no
law or civil service regulation which requires any specific civil service
eligibility for a precinct or station commander and that on the assumption that
respondent Commissioner could determine the appropriate eligibility, the
examination for police inspectors invoked by him were suspended by order of the
President of the Philippines of March 23, 1964 insofar as the City of Manila
was concerned.[5]
There were other allegations to show lack or excess of jurisdiction as well as
grave abuse of discretion, but enough has been said to render clear why for
petitioners the directive in question was beyond the power of respondent
Commissioner to issue.
In the answer by respondent Commissioner filed on July 29, 1965, the facts as set forth
were admitted, but there was an explicit denial of the grounds relied upon to
show lack or excess of jurisdiction or his acting with grave abuse of
discretion.[6]
The stress in the affirmative and special defenses set forth was that the
assignment of petitioners Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro was not allowable under the Civil Service Act in
view of the fact that there were as of that time eligibles
to the position of inspector first class who could be so designated. Reliance was also had, as on the original
directive of respondent Commissioner, of such designation of petitioners as not
being “in conformity with the recommendation of the U. S. Agency for International
Development to assign and shift [Manila Police Department] personnel to
positions to which they have qualified in appropriate examinations.”[7]
The decision now on appeal, promulgated on July 14, 1966, noted that respondent Commissioner
did not dispute the civil service eligibilities and training of petitioners
Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro. Reference was made to the opening paragraph
of the petition wherein the following appeared:
“Petitioner Capt. Barbers passed his First Grade Civil Service
(supervisor) Promotional Examination taken on March 31, 1962 with a high mark
of 80.1 per cent; he is also a law graduate (1964) and graduated as a full
scholar; he completed the Basic Course for Patrolman at the MPD training school
(1945), the Advanced Course (1946), the Detective Course (1946) as class topnotcher with an average of 96.5 per cent and the Senior
Police Refresher Course (1962) at the Philippine Army School Command, Ft. Bonifacio; and he also trained at the International Police
Academy in Washington, D. C., the New York City Police Academy, the Pinkerton
Detective Agency in New York, the Dade County Police Department in Miami,
Florida, the U. S. Military Police School at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and the
Michigan State University Communications Seminar. Petitioner Capt. Paralejas
passed the civil service examination for police lieutenant in 1945 with a
rating of 77.90 per cent; he is a commerce graduate (1939) 2nd year law,
F.E.U.; he completed the supervisors 2nd In-Service Training in the City of Manila
(medalist) and the Senior Police Refresher Course (1962) at the Philippine
School Command, Ft. Bonifacio. Petitioner Capt. Lazaro
passed the Criminal Investigation in Secret Service examination (pensionado) given by the Civil Service Commission in 1947,
with an average of 83.62%; he completed the supervisors 2nd In-Service Training
in the City of Manila and the Senior Police Refresher Course (1962) at the
Philippine Army School Command, Ft. Bonifacio,
graduating as third honor; first grade eligible under Rep. Act 1080, being a
member of the Philippine Bar.”[8]
The decision then noted that while respondent Commissioner had
ruled “that the appropriate eligibility for the position of precinct
commander is that of police inspector, first class (police major), no valid
reason has been advanced to show that such eligibility is appropriate and that
of police captain is not.”[9]
It was likewise made clear in the decision that there was no law prescribing
that precinct commanders be police majors.
Even on the assumption then that the “corrective measures”
could be supplied by respondent Commissioner if “unsatisfactory situations
are found” still the appropriate conclusion, according to the lower court,
considering “the civil service eligibilities and training of
petitioners-captains, the failure of respondent Commissioner to show
unsatisfactory situations in the assignment or designation of
petitioners-captains as precinct commanders, and the reasons stated in the
petition, [is that] respondent Commissioner has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing and trying to
enforce the directive in question.”[10]
What cannot be denied, as stressed in such decision, is the
absence of any law “which prescribes that precinct commanders be police
majors,” resulting necessarily in the directive of respondent Commissioner
of Civil Service being declared null and void, the writ of prohibition thus
being the appropriate remedy, with an injunction perpetually restraining him
from the commission of the acts complained of.
The question, to repeat, is one of power. What is clear is that it is petitioner
City Mayor that could so designate
the other petitioners to assume the position of station commanders. That power is his, and his alone. He is not required by law to share it with
respondent Commissioner, who must justify by the valid conferment of authority
the action taken by him in requiring that the City Mayor replace the other
petitioners. Power is not to be
presumed, it must be shown. Respondent
Commissioner failed to do so. It was not
surprising therefore that the lower court ruled against him. As set forth at the outset, we sustain the
lower court and affirm the judgment appealed from.
1. The power of petitioner
City Mayor as to who could be
designated as station commanders of the three Manila
police precincts is conceded. No dispute
as to his authority to do so exists. The
Charter is clear. The narrow question,
therefore, is whether such designation could be frustrated by the directive of
the respondent Commissioner. For this
official to be justified in interposing a negative, he must show that an
applicable law authorizes him to do so.
It is well-settled that respondent Commissioner at the most may
inquire only as to the eligibility of the person thus chosen to fill up a
vacant position. If he were, then
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service must so attest. That function being discharged, his
participation ceases. So we have held in
the leading case of Villanueva v. Balallo,[11]
the opinion being penned by the present Chief Justice. Thus:
“When the appointee is qualified, as petitioner herein admittedly
is, then the Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. It has been repeatedly held
that an appointment becomes complete upon the performance of the last act
required by law of the appointing power.
The attestation required of the Commissioner of Civil Service is merely
a check to assure compliance with the civil service laws.”
In this particular case, the eligibility of the other petitioners
as police captains is admitted. That was
duly set forth in the decision now on appeal.
More than that, their being exceptionally well-qualified, was likewise
duly noted therein, a finding of fact binding on us as this appeal raises
purely questions of law. The
justification for the directive of respondent Commissioner is thus premised on
his alleged power to insist on a specific eligibility for each of the other
petitioners designated, that of “Inspector First Class (Police or
Detective Major).”
In his brief, however, he can point to no express provision that
would confer on him such a power. His
failure is understandable because there is none. At the most, then, he would rely on a reading
of the Civil Service Act from which, mistakenly to our mind, he would infer
such authority. According to his
brief: “Said authority to fix
appropriate eligibilities being corollary to respondent’s ‘exclusive
jurisdiction over the approval under the Civil Service Law and rules of all appointments
including promotions to positions in the competitive service’ and/or being an
implied power, there is therefore no need for an express provision setting
forth in black and white what eligibilities are appropriate for what
positions.”[12]
There is thus an admission from respondent Commissioner himself
that his power is necessarily limited.
He would however, construe such a restricted authority expansively. He would rely on an ambiguity. It would be a stultification of well-settled
principles of public law if from the vagueness of a statute competence to act
could be predicated. If such a purpose
were within the contemplation of Congress, an appropriate form of words could
have been utilized. The absence of such
language negates its existence.
Respondent Commissioner would seek support for such untenable
view by asserting that under certain provisions of the Act,[13]
he is empowered to issue rules and regulations as well as to promulgate
standards, policies and guidelines. This
is to rely on a frail reed. To do so is
to offend against the primacy that should be accorded a statute as contrasted
with decrees coming from the Executive Department, necessarily of lower
category. What is worse, the rules in
question are not issued by the President, but by one of his subordinates; their
binding force then is not as great. Much
less could they supersede applicable statutes, not only in what they command
but also in what they omit. It does not
admit of doubt that in the hierarchy of legal norms, such rules and standards
definitely occupy an inferior status. If
the statute is silent as to the existence of power, there the matter rests.
Only Congress can remedy the situation. It is not for respondent Commissioner to do
so on the flimsy allegation that he possesses authority to promulgate rules and
standards dealing specifically with the supervision, the preparation and rating
of all civil service examinations,[14]
the making of investigation and special reports upon all matters relating to
the enforcement of the civil service law,[15]
the authority to pass upon all removal, separation and suspension of permanent
officers and employees in the competitive and classified service,[16]
and the determination of appeals instituted by any person believing himself to
be aggrieved –[17]
a power which does not have the remotest connection with an exercise by petitioner
City Mayor of a competence exclusively lodged in him to designate the other
petitioners as precinct commanders.
This conclusion has reinforcement from authoritative
pronouncements that of late have come from us.
Thus, from a 1968 decision:[18]
“It would seem fairly obvious then that the law does not impose a rigid or
mechanistic formula on the appointing power, compliance with which is
inexorable and a deviation therefrom fatal. Far from it.
If there be adherence to the concept that public office is a public
trust, as there ought to be, the criterion should be what public welfare
demands, what satisfies public interest.
For it is axiomatic that public needs could best be attended to by
officials, about whose competency and ability there is no question. To that overmastering requirement, personal
ambition must of necessity yield. Discretion
if not plenary, at least sufficient, should thus be granted to those entrusted
with the responsibility of administering the officers concerned, primarily the
department heads. They are in the most
favorable position to determine who can best fulfill the functions of the
office thus vacated. Unless, therefore,
the law speaks in the most mandatory and peremptory tone, considering all the
circumstances, there should be, as there has been, full recognition of the wide
scope of such discretionary authority.
Happily, there is nothing in the Civil Service Act, which is fittingly
concerned with protecting the rights of those in the career service, that,
rightly construed, calls for a different conclusion. It is well worth repeating that the broad
authority of a department head appears indisputable. Such is the policy of the law, a policy
reflected with fidelity in the decisions of this Court.”
Also, from Pineda v. Claudio,[19]
decided even more recently, the opinion coming from Justice Castro: “For it is not enough that an aspirant
is qualified and eligible or that he is next in rank or line for promotion,
albeit by passive prescription. It is
just as necessary, in order for public administration to be dynamic and
responsive to the needs of the times, that the local executive be allowed the
choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who
in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledge ability, energy and judgment.
After all, it is the local executive, more than anyone else, who is
primarily responsible for efficient governmental administration in the locality
and the effective maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly
answerable to the people who elected him.
Nowhere is this more true than in the sensitive area of police
administration.”
While the two above cases are not squarely in point, still the
principle therein announced as to the respect to be accorded to the exercise of
the authority to appoint by the official entrusted by law to do so and the
minimum interference allowed the Commissioner of Civil Service under his power
to inquire into the eligibility of the appointee lends further support to the
conclusion arrived at. It would appear
clear, therefore, that respondent Commissioner does not possess any statutory
authority to interfere with the power of petitioner
City Mayor to make the designation
of the other petitioners.
2. Respondent Commissioner,
in his answer to the petition assailing his directive, would lend plausibility
to his claim that he was legally empowered to do so by this argument:
“Furthermore, said assignments are not in conformity with the recommendation
of the U. S. Agency for International Development to assign and shift MPD
personnel to positions to which they have qualified in appropriate
examinations.”[20]
To state such a contention is to reject it.
As a foundation for the challenged directive it is, to put it mildly,
far from stable. As an asserted basis to
justify what respondent did, it is far from persuasive. To put it bluntly, as a source of power, its
value is nil. It would not be easy to
imagine a plea more offensive to our sovereignty and derogatory to our dignity
as an independent nation.
All governmental powers are lodged in officials of our government
both national and local. An alien agency
at the most may be permitted to serve in an advisory capacity. It can suggest, but it cannot command. Its wishes do not constitute law. Our officials, therefore, are not bound to
obey. If it were otherwise, then a
posture of subserviency and mendicancy would be
sanctioned. That this Court cannot
allow.[21]
3. In the answer of
respondent Commissioner, there was an implication that his directive finds
support in the constitutional provision on the Civil Service. More specifically, he did point to the requirement
that appointments in the civil service “shall be made only according to
merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination.”[22]
Apparently, he had a change of mind subsequently as to such constitutional
prop, for his brief was conspicuously silent in that respect. That sober second thought had much to
recommend it. No such support is yielded
by the above constitutional provision to his assertion of authority.
The Constitution on the civil service has only four brief
sections, two of which, prohibiting partisan political activities and
additional or double compensation, have clearly no relevance.[23]
The fourth section guarantees security of tenure, again without any bearing on
the present litigation.[24]
It is only the first section then, referred to above, that may conceivably
touch upon the issue involved, although in a rather remote way. For it is more the expression of an ideal
than a source of authority. Note that in
stressing merit and fitness, it recognized that it should “be determined
as far as practicable by competitive examination.”
There was no creation of a Civil Service Commission. No such official as a Civil Service
Commissioner was provided for.
Respondent’s position is a statutory creation, the extent of his powers
being thus limited and circumscribed. It
would thus be futile on his part to trace the existence of an alleged authority
to the Constitution.
As a matter of fact, if there are constitutional overtones to
this litigation, petitioners, not the respondents, are the beneficiaries. As they did correctly point out, not even the
President is vested with the power of control over local officials. He exercises only “general supervision *
* * as may be provided by law, * * *.”[25]
Respondent Civil Service Commissioner cannot be deemed then to be possessed of
a greater prerogative, being himself an official of a lower category in the
executive branch. Moreover, what the
Constitution enjoins on the President as well as all those entrusted with
executive functions is to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”[26]
Certainly, it is a manifestation of less than fealty to such a duty if an
executive official like respondent would enforce a statutory provision not as
written but as expanded and enlarged by him through a process of strained
construction.
4. One last word. Nothing is better settled in the law than
that a public official exercises power not rights. The government itself is merely an agency
through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents
entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are
empowered to act. There must be a
delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are
devoid of power. What they do suffers
from a fatal infirmity. That principle
cannot be sufficiently stressed. In the
appropriate language of Chief Justice Hughes: “It must be conceded that
departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by
statute.”[27]
Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then
is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise
the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an
eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of July 14, 1966 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., in the result.
Barredo, J., no part.
[1]
Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 409 (1949). Cf. Sec. 22 of the same Act.
[2]
Petition, par. 3.
[3] Ibid,
par. 4.
[4] Ibid,
par. 5.
[5] Ibid,
par. 6.
[6]
Answer with Opposition, pars. 1-5.
[7] Ibid,
Affirmative and Special Defenses.
[8] Petition,
par. 1.
[9]
Decision, pp. 7-8.
[10] Ibid,
p. 8.
[11]
9 SCRA 407 (1963).
[12]
Brief for Respondent-Appellant, p. 26.
[13]
Section 16 (e), (c), (f), (i) and (j), Republic Act
No. 2260.
[14]
Section 16 (c).
[15] Ibid,
(f).
[16] Ibid,
(i).
[17] Ibid,
(j).
[18]
Reyes v. Abeleda, 22 SCRA 825.
[19]
28 SCRA 34 (1969).
[20]
Answer, Affirmative and Special Defenses, p. 5. His brief as appellant
discussed the matter further at p. 13.
[21]
Cf. Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans
Affairs, 101 Phil. 762 (1957).
[22]
Art. XII, Sec. 1, Constitution.
[23]
Art. XII, Secs. 2 and 3, Constitution.
[24]
Art. XII, Sec. 4, Constitution.
[25]
Art. VII, Sec. 10, par. 1, Constitution.
[26] Ibid.
[27] United
States v. Macintosh, 283 US
605, 627 (1931).