IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF VICTOR TE TEK LAY TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. VICTOR TE TEK LAY, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPO…

A decision having been rendered on May 26, 1950, granting his petition for
naturalization as citizen of the Philippines, Victor Te Tek Lay filed a motion,
dated July 21,1953, praying that he be allowed to take the requisite oath.
Although the Office of the Solicitor General objected thereto, upon the ground
that petitioner had “left the Philippines” within two years from the
promulgation of said decision, the Court of First Instance of Manila, by an
order, dated December 4, 1953, granted said motion. The case is before us on
appeal, taken by the Government, from this order.

It is not disputed that, prior to and after the promulgation of said
decision, dated May 26, 1950, petitioner was a flight purser of the Philippine
Air Lines—hereinafter referred to, for the sake of brevity, as PAL—an enterprise
engaged in the operation of airway services in the Philippines and (then)
abroad; that, after the rendition of said decision and prior to the hearing of
the aforementioned motion, dated July 21, 1953, petitioner had left the
Philippines many times, as such flight purser of the PAL; and that, in April,
1951, he went to Hongkong and stayed there, on vacation, for eight (8) days,
during which time he did not discharge the duties of his aforementioned
employment as flight purser. The issue boils down to whether or not his absence
from the Philippines, in connection with said vacation in Hongkong, bars the
taking of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, and the
issuance in his favor of the corresponding certificate of naturalization, as
citizen thereof. Contrary to the opinion of His Honor the trial Judge, who
decided this question in the negative, we hold that an affirmative answer is
imposed by section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, the pertinent part of which
provides that:

“The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine
citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the
publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting
an application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and
after the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General
or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the intervening
time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, * * *.”

It is urged by petitioner-appellee that the injunction, in this provision,
against leaving the Philippines “must be related to departure, which is
intended to change domicile or the stay abroad of longer than one year
duration” (italics ours). This pretense finds no support, either in the spirit,
or in the letter, of the law. Indeed, referring to the conditions essential to
naturalization, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, invariably requires
“residence** in the Philippines (sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 15 and 18), whereas
Republic Act No. 530 forbids positively the execution of a decision in favor of
an applicant for naturalization who has “left the Philippines” within
two years from the promulgation of said decision. The word “left” used in
Republic Act No. 530, connoting material absence, when contrasted with
“residence,” which depends, to a substantial degree, upon intent, leaves no room
for doubt that physical presence in the Philippines, during said period, is a
condition without which said decision cannot become executory. If departure from
the Philippines, for purposes of vacation, were permissible under said Republic
Act No. 530, so would absence for business or educational purposes, which
generally are more meritorious and, often, imperative, apart from entailing, in
the case of education, a comparatively, longer sojourn abroad. Hence, the effect
of petitioner’s contention, if followed to its logical consequences, would be to
defeat completely the purpose of Republic Act No. 530, by depriving the
Government of the opportunity to observe the behaviour of an applicant for
naturalization for two years after the promulgation of the decision in his
favor.

In this connection, the case of Uy vs. Republic of the
Philippines^[*] (L-7054) decided on April
29, 1955, is squarely in point. Petitioner therein had, within two years from
the promulgation of the decision in favor of his application for naturalization,
“left the Philippines for the United States on a dual purpose, namely: (1) to
submit himself to a medical check-up; and (2) to strengthen the business ties of
the Associated Trading Corporation, of which he was then, and still is the
general manager, with various suppliers in the United States.” After quoting
section 1 of Republic Act No, 530, we said that;

“The purpose is that during that period of probation the Government and the
community wherein an applicant for Philippine citizenship lives, be given an
opportunity to observe his conduct and behaviour and see whether or not he has
complied with the other requirements contained in section 1 of Republic Act 530.
Moreover, if he is absent from this jurisdiction, how could he comply with
requirement No. 2 to the effect that he has dedicated himself continuously to a
lawful calling or profession? Besides, as well observed by the Solicitor General
on page 7 of his brief:

“* * * It is also the intention of Congress that the applicant be physically
present in the country during that period to see if he complies with the other
requirements of the statute, otherwise, if he were allowed to leave the country,
he may, while abroad commit acts inimical to the Philippines without the
Government, knowing anything about the matter.”

* * * * * * *

“* * * “We believe that by applicant’s failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 530, particularly by absenting himself from the
Philippines during the two years period, he had forfeited his right to
citizenship as granted by the decision of the trial court.” (Uy vs.
Republic of the Philippines, supra.)

Petitioner-appellee has not given any cogent reason, and we find none, to
warrant either a reconsideration or a reversal of this view. Accordingly, the
order appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against the petitioner. It is
so ordered.

Bengzon, Acting C. J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

Order reversed.

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^[*] 96 Phil., 866.