G.R. No. L-30058. March 28, 1969

LUIS G. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. JULIAN G. GINETE AND UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SOR­SOGON, 10TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH I, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions March 28, 1969 ZALDIVAR, J.:
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ZALDIVAR, J.:


Petitioner Luis G. De Castro and respondent Julio G. Ginete were opposing candidates for the office of municipal
mayor of the municipality of Bulan, province
of Sorsogon,
in the general elections held on Novem­ber
14, 1967.  On January 1, 1968 the board of canvas­sers,
as constituted by the Commission on Elections, proclaimed petitioner as the
winning candidate with a margin of 12 votes over respondent.

On January 8, 1968
Ginete filed a motion of protest against the election
of De Castro before the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon,
alleging the commission of frauds and irregularities to favor the candidacy of
De Castro.  In due time De Castro, as protestee in the elect­ion case, filed a counter-protest,
also alleging the commission of frauds and irregularities to favor the can­didacy
of Ginete.

On April 15, 1968,
after the ballots in 20 out of the 25 precincts that were protested by Ginete were re­vised, De Castro filed a so-called
“Manifestation and Motion”, which is practically a motion to dismiss
the protest upon the ground of estoppel.  It is alleged in the “Manifestation and
Motion” that Ginete filed his pro­test after he
had made a written concession of the elect­ion of De Castro, and after he had
publicly declared during the inauguration and induction of De Castro as Mayor
that De Castro had won by a margin of 12 votes and on that occasion he urged
the people of Bulan to cooperate with the
administration of De Castro.  On April
22, 1968, before the hearing on the “Manifestation and Motion”, De
Castro filed an “Amended Manifestation and Motion” where­in he
alleged another ground for the dismissal of the protest, namely:  the failure on the part of protestant Ginete to allege in his motion of protest that if the
irregularities mentioned in the protest are corrected the result would be the
election of the protestant, “hence there is no claim upon which the relief
sought in the pray­er of the protestant may be granted.”[1]
After hearing, wherein the parties were afforded opportunity to present
evidence, and after they had filed their respective memo­randa, on September 6, 1968, respondent Judge Ubaldo Y. Arcangel of the Court
of First Instance of Sorsogon issued an order denying
De Castro’s amended manifestation and motion. 
On October 4, 1968
De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the amended
manifestation and motion, upon the ground that the order was not in conformity
with law.  Ginete
filed his opposition to the motion for reconsideration.  The motion for reconsidera­tion was set for
hearing on November 12, 1968.  On December
16, 1968, respondent Judge, the Hon. Ubaldo
Y. Arcangel, issued an order denying De Castro’s
motion for reconsider­ation.  Thereafter,
De Castro filed before this Court a pe­tition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction, alleging that respondent Judge acted without or in excess of juris­diction,
or with grave abuse of discretion, in denying his manifestation and motion as
well as his motion for recon­sideration. 
The petition prayed that the orders of respond­ent Judge denying his
amended manifestation and motion and his motion for reconsideration be annulled
and a new one entered finally dismissing the protest; and that pending the
resolution of the petition by this Court a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued against respondent Judge enjoining him from proceeding further with the
election protest of Ginete.

It is now urged by petitioner De Castro before this Court that
the lower court should have dismissed the pro­test because respondent Ginete, by his own acts and ut­terances, is estopped from contesting the election of here­in
petitioner.

The evidence shows that on January
1, 1968, after petitioner De Castro was proclaimed elected by the
board of canvassers respondent Ginete wrote a note to
petitioner, which reads as follows:

“January 1, 1968

“To Mayor Cesing
De Castro:

“Our congratulations to the winner and here’s hoping you good
luck and suc­cess in your administration. 
Wishing you Happy New Year and may God bless us all.  (Inclosed are the
keys)

F”J. Ginete“

Petitioner De Castro invited respondent Ginete to attend the ceremony on his inauguration as
municipal mayor, scheduled for January
6, 1968, and said respondent ac­cepted the invitation.  During the inauguration respondent Ginete accompanied the petitioner to the municipal building
and to the plaza where the inaugural program was held.  Respondent Ginete
went up the inaugural stage along with other officials.  Before turning over the symbolic key of
responsibility to petitioner De Castro, respondent Ginete
delivered a speech saying that the mayor elect had been proclaimed with a
majority vote and that the people of Bulan should
cooperate with his administration.  The
out­going mayor Ginete pleaded with the people that
if he had any shortcomings during the four years of his incumbency that he be
forgiven by the people.

We do not consider that the acts or conduct, or utterances, of
respondent Ginete, as mentioned in the fore­going
paragraph, had placed him in estoppel to protest the
election of petitioner De Castro.  We
view the con­duct and utterances of respondent as simply a laudable gesture of sportmanship and a manifestation of his res­pect for the
proclamation made by the board of canvas­sers. 
There is no showing that Ginete had admitted
that De Castro had won in an election that was clean and honest, or free from
irregularities.  Ginete,
as a law-abiding citizen, had to abide by the proclamation of the board of
canvassers.  But, certainly, his having
recognized De Castro as the winner in virtue of the proclamation by the board
of canvassers did not preclude him from questioning the validity of De Castro’s
election in the manner pres­cribed by law, if he had grounds to show that the
election of De Castro was brought about through the commission of frauds and
other election irregularities.

We cannot sustain the contention of De Castro that Ginete is in estoppel to contest
his election.  Estoppel
rests on this rule:  “Whenever a
party has, by his own dec­laration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be
permitted to falsify it.”[2]
The elements of estoppel by conduct are:  (1) that there must have been a
representation or concealment of material facts; (2) that the representation
must have been made with knowledge of the facts; (3) that the party to whom it
was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and (4) that it
must have been made with intention that the other party would act upon it.[3]

In the case now before Us, it cannot be said that Ginete had by his acts and declarations made representa­tions
of fact regarding De Castro’s election which were not known to the latter.  Ginete simply made
a formal re­cognition of the fact that De Castro had been proclaimed winner by
the municipal board of canvassers of Bulan, and
congratulated him – and this Ginete did only after
the board of canvassers had proclaimed De Castro winner.  It can not be said that De Castro came to know
about his having won the election because Ginete told
him so.  Ginete
did not mislead De Castro to the belief that he had won the election.  It can not be said that De Cas­tro was led to
act – in assuming the office as mayor – because Ginete
had made representation to him that he (De Castro) had won the election.  De Castro assumed office as mayor by
operation of law, because he was proc­laimed elected by the municipal board of
canvassers in accordance with law.  Ginete, by his acts and/or utter­ances, had not induced De
Castro to believe that his election was unquestionable.  Ginete is not the
one called upon to declare the election of De Castro valid, and so De Castro
can not claim that he was induced to believe that he was elected and he assumed
office as mayor simply on the basis of Ginete’s acts
and utterances.  Ginete
never made any statement that he would not question the elect­ion of De
Castro.  The election case, or the
election pro­test, that Ginete brought against De
Castro did not arise out of any act or declaration of Ginete.  The election case that Ginete
brought against De Castro has for its basis circumstances that had taken place
during the election held on November
14, 1967, or long before Ginete had recog­nized
the proclamation of De Castro as winner. 
If De Cas­tro was not the real winner in the elections it would not help
his case in the election protest to assert that Ginete
had congratulated him after he was proclaimed winner by the board of
canvassers.  We do not see in the facts
and/or circumstances shown by the evidence in this case the ele­ments of estoppel that would bar Ginete
from questioning the election of De Castro.

The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful
choice of the electorate.  What is sought
in an election protest is the correction of the canvass of the votes, which is
the basis of the proclamation of the winning candidate.[4]
An election contest involves a public office in which the public has an
interest.  Certainly, the act of a losing
candidate of recognizing the one who is proclaimed the winner should not bar
the losing candidate from questioning the validity of the elect­ion of the
winner in the manner provided by law.

The only case where this Court has held that a party is estopped to contest the election of the winning can­didate
is in the case of a tie where the candidates who were declared to have obtained
equal number of votes had voluntarily submitted themselves to the drawing of
lots to determine the winner, as provided by law.  It was ruled by this Court that the candidate
who lost in the drawing of lots is estopped from
contesting the election of the one who won in the draw, because by submitting
himself to the draw the defeated candidate is considered to have admitted that
the announcement made by the board of canvassers regarding the tie was the
result of a valid and lawful canvass. 
The candidate who submitted himself to the draw is considered as having
deliberately induced his opponent to believe that that canvass which resulted
in a tie was legal and he had thereby led his opponent to act upon such belief
in the validity of the canvass and the tie, so that he can not be permitted to
repudiate his own acts.[5]

This Court has even adopted a more liberal view on this matter
when in a latter case[6]
it held that a can­didate who has tied with another and who submits himself to
the drawing of lots, stating that if the result of said drawing of lots should
be adverse to him, he would file a protest before a competent court, is not estopped from doing so. 
The view adopted by the Court in this lat­ter case is in keeping with
the doctrine that an election protest involves public interest, so that the
court should allow all opportunity possible for the ascertainment of the true
result of the elections.

We, therefore, find no merit in the contention of petitioner De
Castro that respondent Ginete is estopped
from contesting his election.

Likewise, We find no merit in the contention of petitioner that
there is no claim upon which the relief sought in the prayer of the protest may
be granted because there is no allegation in the protest that the
irregularities mentioned therein, if corrected, would result in the elect­ion
of the protestant.  By this contention,
petitioner seeks the dismissal of the protest upon the ground that the motion
of protest does not state a cause of action.[7]

It is a settled rule that when a complaint – the motion of
protest in the present case – is sought to be dismissed upon the ground that it
does not state a cause of action the party seeking the dismissal admits hypo­thetically
the facts alleged in the complaint.  A
curso­ry reading of the motion of protest readily apprises one of the existence
of a cause of action.  The motion of
protest alleges that protestee De Castro was
proclaimed winner by the municipal board of canvassers of Bulan
with a margin of only 12 votes over the protestant.  The motion of protest impugns the votes of
the protestee in 26 elect­ion precincts in the municipality
of Bulan.  Among the irregularities alleged are:  (1) that protestee
had resort­ed to vote-buying, such that over 450 ballots were marked by the
voters in order to identify the same, following instructions from the protestee; (2) that in precincts 40, 46 and 63 of Bulan, absent registered voters, were misrep­resented by
men of protestee who were allowed to cast the votes
of the absent voters, resulting in the illegal ad­judication of over 100 votes
in protestee’s favor; (3) that at least 100 ballots
where the protestee was not properly voted in the
space for mayor were adjudicated to protestee; (4)
that 200 ballots where the protestant was properly voted for mayor were
wrongfully counted by the boards of inspectors in favor of protestee;
(5) that in precinct 45 of Bulan over 50 ballots
where protestee was voted were written by only one
band, and about 50 ballots where pro­testee was voted
were prepared by two distinct persons; and in same precinct 45 about 50 ballots
in a bunch were cre­dited in favor of protestee
without the chairman of the board of inspectors having read their contents,
thereby dep­riving protestant’s watchers the opportunity of seeing whether the
ballots cast were for the protestant or for the protestee.  It thus follows that if those allegations of
frauds and irregularities in the motion of protest are proved, the majority of
12 votes whereby the protestee was declared winner by
the board of canvassers would easily be overcome, and the result of the
election would change in favor of the protestant.  It would be an undue recourse to technicality
to dismiss the motion of protest simply because there is no allegation that if
the irregularities are cor­rected the result of the election would be changed,
when its very apparent that if the allegations in the motion of protest are
proved a change in the result of the election would necessarily follow.  It is a settled rule that statutes providing
for election contests are to be liberally construed, and that immaterial
defects in pleadings should be disregarded, to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by merely formal or
technical objections.[8]
When an election protest alleges frauds and irregulari­ties such that the
legality of the election of the pro­testee is placed
in serious doubt, the courts should proceed to ascertain the truth of the
allegations of frauds and irregularities, not necessarily to declare the
protestant elected but to determine whether the protestee
was legally elected, because once it is shown that frauds and irregularities
had characterized the election the court may annul the election and declare
that no candi­date had been elected.[9]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court resolves to DISMISS
the instant petition for certiorari with preli­minary injunction.  No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.


[1]
Quoted from par. 4 of Manifestation and Motion, p. 39-40, Record.

[2]
Section 3, paragraph (a), Rule 131, Rules of Court.

[3]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. VI, p. 14, 1963 Edition; citing Bigelo on Estoppel, 437; and Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810.

[4] Aquino vs. Calabia and Sahagun, 55 Phil. 984.

[5] Radaza vs. Enage, 53 Phil.
149; Montiague vs. Buyson-Lampa,
61 Phil. 58.

[6] Yap
vs. Court of First Instance of Zambales and Evalle, 66 Phil. 112.

[7]
World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., vs. Manuel, 51 O.G. 6214; 98
Phil. 46.

[8] Galang vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269.

[9] Badilles vs. Cabili, G.R.
No. L-29333, February 27, 1969;
Legaspi, et al., vs. Actub,
et al., G.R. No. L-29334, February 27,
1969.