ATTY. FRIOLO R. ICAO, JR., CHIEF, N.B.I., PAGADIAN DISTRICT OFFICE, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. REINERIO B. RAMAS, RESPONDENT.

Icao versus Ramas

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Friolo R. Icao, Jr., the Chief of the National Bureau of Investigation's Pagadian District Office, against Judge Reinerio B. Ramas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City. The complainant charges the respondent judge with collusion with the public prosecutor to frustrate the ends of justice in the dismissal of two criminal cases. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on two points every bar candidate must command: the quantum of evidence needed to hold a judge administratively liable, which is only a preponderance of evidence, and the operation of the disputable presumptions of innocence and of the proper discharge of official duty against bare and uncorroborated accusations.

Procedural History

The complainant filed the administrative complaint directly before the Supreme Court. On 9 February 2004, the Court referred the complaint to Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. Justice Lagman conducted the investigation and submitted her report on 18 May 2004, finding the complaint devoid of merit. The case then returned to the Supreme Court, which resolved it in its own administrative jurisdiction, adopting the investigating Justice's findings and dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

Facts

The complainant's office conducted an investigation and applied for the issuance of a search warrant against Rogelio Pangasian, Eliong Sumalpong, and Daisy Catipay, referred to in the decision as the accused. Criminal cases followed. The complainant then accused Judge Ramas of three acts: first, deferring the arraignment of the accused on his own motion, what the decision calls motu proprio, to give the defense counsel time to file motions to quash; second, drafting the prosecutor's comment to the motions to quash; and third, making the prosecutor sign that comment.

To support the charge, the complainant alleged that the typewritten comment of Prosecutor Briones dated 2 August 2002 and the order of Judge Ramas dated 8 October 2002 were drafted using the same typewriter. The respondent judge answered that the complaint was baseless.

The investigating Justice found that, except for bare allegations, the complainant adduced no shred of evidence of collusion. The defense counsels themselves refuted the claim that no initiative was taken to defer the arraignment, through their joint affidavit stating that they had moved to defer it and manifested their desire to file a motion to quash. The complainant himself admitted he was not present at the scheduled arraignment, so he could have no personal knowledge of what transpired. He also failed to specify any particular act or participation of the respondent in preparing the prosecutor's comment, and never saw the respondent preparing or typing it.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for collusion with the prosecutor in the dismissal of the criminal cases.
• Whether or not the complainant discharged the burden of proving his charges by a preponderance of evidence.
• Whether or not the disputable presumptions of innocence and of the proper discharge of official duty operate in favor of the respondent judge against the complainant's bare assertions.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 131, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Court, on the disputable presumption of innocence, provides:

Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong.

This presumption shields the respondent judge unless the complainant's evidence outweighs it, and here the complainant offered none.

Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Rules of Court, on the presumption of regularity, provides:

Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (m) That official duty has been regularly performed.

This presumption supplies the presumption that the respondent acted properly in deferring the arraignment and in issuing his order, which the complainant failed to overcome.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the charge of collusion must fail. Even assuming that the order and the comment were prepared on the same typewriter, the Court reasoned that this circumstance does not establish any agreement between the respondent and the prosecutor. Collusion requires an agreement, and speculation cannot supply it.

On the second issue, the Court fixed the standard: the quantum of evidence required to hold a judge administratively liable is only a preponderance of evidence. The Court defined that standard in these words:

Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.

Measured against that standard, the complainant miserably failed to satisfy his burden. He presented no evidence to corroborate his bare assertions, was absent from the arraignment he complained of, and never identified any specific act of the respondent in the preparation of the prosecutor's comment.

On the third issue, the Court applied the disputable presumptions of innocence and of the proper discharge of duty by public officers. These presumptions stand unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence, and the complainant offered nothing to overcome them.

Doctrine

First, the quantum of evidence required to hold a judge administratively liable is only a preponderance of evidence, meaning evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. Second, a charge of collusion cannot rest on speculation; even proof that two documents came from the same typewriter does not, by itself, establish any agreement between their authors. Third, the disputable presumptions under Rule 131, Section 3(a) and Section 3(m) of the Rules of Court, that a person is innocent of wrong and that official duty has been regularly performed, operate in favor of a respondent judge and must be overcome by competent evidence, not by bare allegations.

Disposition

The administrative complaint against Judge Reinerio B. Ramas was dismissed for lack of merit, and the respondent was exonerated.

Remember This

Memorize the line that administrative liability of a judge needs only a preponderance of evidence, yet bare allegations never meet it against the presumptions of innocence and regular performance of duty. Examiners use this case to test the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings and the rule that speculation, such as the same-typewriter theory, cannot establish collusion.