DOMINGO NICOLAS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ULYSES PRE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On October 8, 1952, Domingo Nicolas filed in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac a complaint praying that the judgment rendered in Registration Case No.
15 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 199) declaring Ulyses Pre, et al., oppositors
therein, owners of a parcel of land containing an area of 5 hectares and
ordering its registration in their name, be declared null and void for having
been rendered in excess of its jurisdiction and in violation of the
Constitution.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds (1) that the action
is barred by a prior judgment, and (2) that the complaint states no cause of
action. This motion was sustained and the court dismissed the case without
pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiff brought this case on appeal directly before
this Court on the plea that the questions involved are purely legal.

On November 30, 1946, Domingo Nicolas, appellant, filed an application for
the registration of a parcel of land containing an area of 31 hectares, 21 ares
and 18 centares located in Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac. Ulyses Pre, et al., appellees,
opposed the application with regard to a portion of the land containing an area
of 5 hectares, 17 ares and 70 centares claiming to be the owners thereof. The
case was set for hearing on August 6, 1948. On this date, appellant submitted
his evidence. In the course of the presentation of appellees’ evidence, the
parties agreed to have the hearing suspended to give them an opportunity to come
to an amicable settlement, to which the court acceded giving them 5 days within
which to submit the settlement. Six days thereafter, far from submitting the
proposed settlement, appellant, through counsel, moved to dismiss the
registration proceeding, which was favorably acted upon. Taken by surprise by
the order of dismissal which was acted upon ex-parte, appellees moved
to reconsider the order in order that they may be given an opportunity to
present their evidence to prove their claim of ownership with regard to the 5
hectares covered by their opposition. The motion was granted and the case was
set for the reception of appellees’ evidence with due notice to appellant’s
attorney, but on the date set neither appellant nor his counsel appeared. In
view of such non-appearance, the court designated its clerk of court to receive
the evidence. This was done, and after the clerk of court had received the
evidence, the court, on January 27, 1950, rendered judgment declaring appellees
owners in fee simple of the portion of land claimed by them in their opposition.
No appeal has been taken from this decision within the reglamentary period. The
same became final on April 7, 1950.

On April 21, 1950, appellant, through counsel, filed a petition to set aside
the decision under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court alleging, among others, that
said decision was null and void because it was rendered without jurisdiction and
in violation of sections 31, 36 and 37 of Act No. 496. Appellees vigorously
objected to this petition and the court sustained the objection in an order
entered on May 25, 1950. From this order appellant took the case on appeal to
the Court of Appeals and on May 12, 1952, the latter court affirmed the order of
the trial court. The present case is but an outgrowth of this adverse decision
of the Court of Appeals.

The issues raised by appellant in this appeal are:

“1. Did the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in the exercise of its
jurisdiction as Court of Land Registration have the power or jurisdiction to
enter the order of December 28, 1949 upon ex-parte application of the appellant,
to dismiss Registration Case No. 15, G. L. R. O. Rec. No. 199, and that once the
case had been dismissed, to amend, upon motion for reconsideration of the
appellees, the order of dismissal by allowing appellees to continue with the
presentation of their evidence as oppositors without at the same time
reinstating the application of the appellant or without first ordering the
appellees to publish the subject matter of the opposition as provided in section
31 of the Land Registration Law?

“2. As such Court of Land Registration, did the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac have jurisdiction to render the decision in said Registration Case No.
15, G. L. R. 0. Rec. No. 199 on the basis of the evidence of the
appellant and part of the evidence of the appellees which was
presented to the Court previous to the order of dismissal of December 28, 1949,
together with such evidence which was taken before the Clerk of Court on January
11, 1950, as delegate of the Court without said Clerk of Court giving previous
notice to the appellant of the hearing and without making his report on the
evidence taken before him as required by section 36 of the Land Registration
Law?”

1. It should be recalled that in the course of the presentation of the
evidence of appellees in the registration case and after the parties had failed
to settle the case amicably as they had proposed, appellant moved for the
dismissal of his application and the same was granted, but, on a motion for
reconsideration, the court decided to continue the hearing to give appellees an
opportunity to present evidence to substantiate their claim of ownership with
regard to the 5 hectares they claimed in their opposition and, taking advantage
of this opportunity, they presented their evidence and on the basis thereof, the
court decreed the registration of said 5 hectares in the name of appellees. It
is now the contention of appellant that this action of the trial court was in
violation of section 37 of Act No. 496 because, after having dismissed the
registration proceeding upon motion of appellant, the court could no longer
continue the hearing without reinstating the case or at least without requiring
the appellees to file a new application for registration so that they may comply
with the law as regards publication as if it were an original application. And
the court having failed to follow this procedure, its ulterior proceeding is
null and void, upon the theory that the court acted without jurisdiction or in
violation of the law.

We do not find merit in this contention as it ignores the amendment wrought
in the registration law by Act No. 3621. Before such amendment the purpose of an
answer to a registration case was simply to disclose the oppositor’s objections
to the application, or his reasons showing why the applicant should be denied
the relief applied for. The oppositor could not ask for any affirmative relief
or that the land bs registered in his name in the same proceeding it being the
sole purpose of the answer to prevent the registration of the land in the name
of the applicant. The power of the court was limited to determining whether the
applicant had a title proper for registration (City of Manila vs. Lack, 19
Phil., 324). However, when the law was amended in 1929, with the enactment of
Act No. 3621, the procedure was changed in the sense of allowing the oppositor
not only to allege in his answer his objections to the application but to ask
for any affirmative relief he may desire. Under the amendment, an oppositor who
claims ownership over the property covered by the application, or a part
thereof, may now claim in his answer that the land be registered in his name
in the same proceeding. This is clearly reflected in section 37 of Act
No. 496, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 3621, wherein it is provided that
“in case where there is an adverse claim, the court shall determine the
conflicting interests of the applicant and the adverse claimant, and after
taking evidence shall dismiss the application if neither of them succeeds in
showing that he has proper title for registration, or shall enter a decree
awarding the land applied for, or any part thereof, to the person entitled
thereto.” The only condition prescribed for this variation is that the
court “shall order the adverse claimant to whom a portion of the land applied
for has been awarded to pay to the applicant such part of said expenses as may
be in proportion to the area awarded to said adverse claimant.” This is what the
trial court has done. It ordered the oppositors to pay to the applicant his
proportionate share in the expenses. It is, therefore, evident that the claim of
appellant that the trial court acted contrary to law in acting on the adverse
claim of the oppositors has no legal basis.

2. With regard to the second issue, we find that the same has already been
passed upon by the Court of Appeals in the appeal taken by appellant from the
order of the trial court denying his petition for relief (CA—G. R. No. 7329-R).
Appellant is therefore prevented from asserting now the same question under the
principle of estoppel by judgment. Thus, on this point, the Court of Appeals
said:

“And when the applicant failed to appear at the hearing on January 11, 1950,
despite their notice thereof, had the lower court that authorized its Clerk to
receive the evidence of the oppositors, violated section 36 of the Land
Registration Law, as supplemented by sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court? We believe not, because said section refers to a case where the
contesting parties or some of them appeared and an order of default is entered
against those who did not appear and answer. The situation obtaining in the
present case is markedly different from the situation contemplated in section 36
of Act No. 496, inasmuch as the applicant having asked for the dismissal of his
application, the oppositors ipso facto acquired the role of applicants
on the portion they claim without any opposition whatsoever. In the legal
contemplation and strictly, speaking, the applicant, as far as his application
for registration was concerned, had already lost his standing in court when the
oppositors presented their evidence before the Clerk of Court, and for his
reason, his assault against the legality of the action of the court in
authorizing its Clerk to receive the evidence of the oppositors cannot now be
sustained, especially if we take into consideration that in spite of the fact
that said applicant was notified thru his counsel of the hearing, both abstained
themselves from appearing thereat.”

The foregoing considerations show that the lower court did not err in
sustaining the motion to dismiss filed by appellees and, hence, the error
assigned by appellant in this respect is without merit.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.