C.F. SHARP MANAGEMENT, INC. AND/OR ARTURO V. ROCHA AND GLOBAL MARINE SYSTEMS, INC. PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND MAURO C. BRUAL, JR., RESPONDENTS.
REYES, JR., J., J.:
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner C.F. Sharp Management, Inc. (“CF Sharp” for brevity) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manning of vessels, while petitioner Arturo V. Rocha is the president thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Global Marine Systems, Inc. (“Global” for brevity) is a foreign corporation not registered in the Philippines and is the foreign principal of CF Sharp.
Private respondent Mauro C. Brual, Jr. was a seaman by profession and was hired by petitioner Global, through its local manning agent, petitioner CF Sharp for employment on board vessel C/S Cable Installer. The term of his employment was that he shall assume the position of Able Seaman (AB) for a contractual period of nine (9) months with a monthly salary of US$562.00 plus additional non-salary benefits of US$313.00 overtime pay for the first 85 hours, US$3.68 per hour of overtime in excess of the first 85 hours, and vacation leave with pay of eight (8) days per month. As stated above, private respondent was hired through the services of petitioner CF Sharp acting in its capacity as the duly accredited agent for the said vessel and for petitioner Global (Rollo, p. 54).
After having been found fit to work under a pre-employment medical examination (Rollo, p. 55), private respondent left the Philippines on January 30, 2002 and joined his vessel of assignment in due course. Private respondent served his contract satisfactorily, continuously, and without incident until September 6, 2002 when private respondent, with still two (2) more months in his contract, was repatriated to the Philippines.
Private respondent’s version was that he was repatriated because of his hearing ailment which he complained of to his master, and that there being only two (2) months left in his contract, his master allowed him to go on leave and return to Manila. Upon the other hand, petitioners’ version was that the master of the vessel decided, with private respondent’s concurrence, that the latter would be repatriated even if he still had about two (2) more months in his contract, since the vessel was laid up at a convenient port.
After arriving in Manila, private respondent came to the office of petitioner CF Sharp to claim his unpaid remunerations.
Private respondent alleges that at the same time, he also complained of his hearing ailment but that he was made to believe by the company physician that his pain and deafness was just an aftermath of his voyage and will soon subside after consuming his two (2)-month vacation. Petitioners claim otherwise. According to petitioners, when private respondent claimed his unpaid remunerations which were duly paid to him, he did not complain of any illness or symptoms thereof, and that since that visit in September 2002, petitioner CF Sharp did not hear from private respondent again until in March 2003 when the latter came to the former’s office for a new deployment.
Private respondent was thereafter accepted for a new deployment since his prior performance was satisfactory. He was then sent for pre-employment medical examination for this new deployment. However, the company physicians detected a sharp hearing acuity drop beyond 2000Hz. in both of private respondent’s ears which rendered him “unfit” for any position which involves watch-keeping duties (Rollo, p. 56). Since the position of Able Seaman (AB) requires watch-keeping functions, private respondent was not deployed to his former position.
On November 4, 2003, private respondent filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Quezon City for payment of disability and/or medical benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees (Rollo, pp. 40-41), which case was docketed as OFW-03-11-2802-00. Due to the failure of the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement during the preliminary conference, they were consequently directed to file their respective position papers (Rollo, pp. 42-53; 57-60; 64-71; 72-77; 93-101; 112-114).
On April 26, 2004, a Decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter ordering petitioners to jointly and severally pay private respondent permanent total disability benefits in the maximum amount of US$60,000.00 plus accrued sickness benefits, all in the aggregate amount of US$62,594.40 or its Peso equivalent at the time of payment, and 10% attorney’s fees (Rollo, pp. 115-120). Pertinent portions of the said Decision are as follows:
“From the asseverations of the parties above, the issue that comes into fore for resolution is whether or not complainant is entitled to medical and disability benefits as well as for moral and exemplary damages.
This Office had examined thoroughly and judiciously the allegations and arguments in the pleadings of the parties, as well as the annexes appended thereto and finds the submission of the complaint impressed with merit. In whatever angle we look at the issue, what emerges is that complainant’s ailment resulting to his loss of his hearing senses or deafness was contracted during his last employment as Second Engineer on board the vessel ‘C/S Cable Installer.’ Surely, it is a work connected injury or ailment. It is not even remote to conclude that the same commenced during the preceding employment with the respondents on board the same vessel, and manifested only on September 6, 2002 which is fifty four (54) days short of the POEA approved nine (9) months contract. He stayed and worked at the site above the vessel’s huge engine that emitted the terrible sounds that defected his hearings, separated only by the floor between. Finally, it convincingly appears that his work on board the vessel is the only occupation he knows, and that he had not worked in any gainful activity after disembarkation but remains idle and waiting for available vessel of respondents, and when this came, he applied for re-employment and was subjected to the usual pre-medical examination and it was here that he was found disqualified to work as seaman because of loss of his hearing senses, a condition which the Supreme Court defined and clarified as permanent total disability, thus:
‘x x x Disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of hearing capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or similar nature that (he) was trained or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of (his) mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness.’ (PTC vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123691, February 28, 2001).
Truly, we can surmise that the possible obstacle that precludes complainant’s entitlement to disability benefit is his failure to report formally to the local respondent within three (3) days from disembarkation his health condition. This, he tried to do but he was enveigled and swayed by respondents to believe that his ailment disability was nothing more than a hangover and would subside after a vacation which he did promptly, coupled with his overwhelming desire to be with his love(d) ones.
In our opinion, denial of disability benefits to the complainant would not only be harsh and unchristian but contrary to the basic policy of the law that in case of doubt in the interpretation of the law and rules and the evidence of complainant and employer, the same should be tilted in favor of labor and to a greater number of employees (Article 4 Labor Code of the Philippines; Nicario vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 125340, September 17, 1998). It may not be remiss to state furthermore, as pointed out by the complainant that instead of imposing upon the poor disembarked employee the duty to report to a post-employment medical examination, it should be the employer who should as a statutory duty cause the examination without which the failure should be at the employer’s risk.
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Unsatisfied, petitioners appealed the above-quoted Decision by filing a Memorandum on Appeal (Rollo, pp. 122-140) and posting the requisite bond (Rollo, pp. 141-155), which appeal was docketed as NLRC CA No. 040369-04. On February 28, 2005, public respondent NLRC rendered the assailed Resolution (Rollo, pp. 30-36) affirming therein the Decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto. In this assailed Resolution, public respondent NLRC ruled:
“In our review of the records, we find the errors being assigned to be unsubstantiated by any evidence. Instead, the records clearly reveal that: (a) On September 6, 2002, while on board respondent’s vessel “C/S CABLE INSTALLER” and during the voyage, complainant felt an unusual pain his left ear and by reason of which, he was allowed by the master to disembark and spend the two (2) remaining months of his contract on leave; (b) that in most of the time that he was hired by respondents his situs or place of work was at the spot above the vessel’s huge engine producing terrible noise separated only by the floor; (c) that promptly after disembarkation, he went to the local respondents to claim his unpaid remunerations and at the same time to submit to a post medical examination for his worsening condition but was made to believe by the company physician that his pain and deafness was just an aftermath of his voyage which will soon subside after consuming his 2-month vacation which he did, relying on such opinion; and (d) that because of this assurance, he did not mind anymore his deafness, joined his loved ones and waited for the next opportunity to board a vessel; and (e) that when he came to respondent’s yard to apply, he discovered at the pre-employment medical examination that he was suffering from deafness and making him unfit to work any activity of a seafarer.
It likewise appears on record as uncontroverted that during the 2-month period and months before he applied for new deployment, he was idle and did not have any work to do; and that his last employment was covered by three (3) contracts with respondents and the totality of his contract hires with respondents ranged to about 130 months from 1988 in about fifteen (15) separate and distinct contracts.
All the above surely point to the fact that complainant’s state of deafness constitutes a work-connected permanent total disability that merits the maximum payment under the pertinent provision of the POEA Standard Contract.
The other defense of respondents is that complainant failed to submit to a post-medical examination after disembarkation as required by Section 20 (B)(3) of the standard contract, and therefore, whatever benefits that accrued to him is deemed forfeited. This we think should not be the consequence. Complainant, as a layman and given the circumstances in which he was in after disembarkation, certainly could not be faulted more than the respondents because when he was examined by the company physician he was made to believe that the deafness was just an after effect of his voyage.
Moreover, we have to point out, that the appealed decision is supported by substantial evidence, particularly ‘that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind accepts as adequate to justify a conclusion’ (Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court, Enrique Bairos vs. NLRC, et al. G.R. No. 123901, September 22,1999).
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Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Resolution (Rollo, pp. 161-176) which was denied by public respondent in its other assailed Resolution of June 30, 2005 (Rollo, pp. 37-38). Thus, the instant petition for certiorari raising herein the following assignment of errors:
“(That) the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when:
- It affirmed that private respondent is entitled to disability benefits notwithstanding that his illness is not work-related;
- It affirmed that private respondent’s disability is permanent and total notwithstanding that what he suffers from is a mere drop in hearing activity;
- It did not give due consideration to the fact that the failure of private respondent to undergo post-employment medical examination forfeits his right to any benefit under his POEA contract;
- It affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the private respondent when he is clearly not entitled thereto.” (Rollo, p. 9)
The foregoing issues being interrelated, We shall dispose of them jointly.
Stipulations in a contract, including employment agreements, that are not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties (Article 1306, New Civil Code). And absent a covering specific agreement and unless otherwise provided by law, the terms and conditions of employment of all employees shall be governed by the Labor Code and such pertinent rules and regulations as may be issued by the agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of the Labor Code (De los Santos v. Jebsen Maritime Inc., 475 SCRA 656 [2005]).
In this case, private respondent entered into a contract of employment with petitioner Global through its local manning agent, petitioner CF Sharp on January 23, 2002 (Rollo, p. 54). It was specifically mentioned therein that the terms and conditions of the contract shall be strictly and faithfully observed in accordance with Department Order No. 4 and Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 2000. The said rules and regulations refer to the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels (“POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seaman” for brevity) issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Thus, the terms of the POEA Standard Contract for Seaman are deemed included and shall be read into the contract between private respondent and petitioner Global.
The POEA Standard Contract for Seaman provides that in connection with death and illness compensation cases, an employer shall be liable when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract (Section 20[B][6]). Corollarily, for an occupational disease and the resulting disability to be compensable, (1) the seafarer’s work must involve the risk described therein; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks; (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer (Section 32-A).
In interpreting the increased-risk theory covered by the above rule, the Supreme Court ruled that death and/or illness compensation benefits cannot be awarded unless there is substantial evidence showing that the cause of such death or illness was reasonably connected with the employee’s work or that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he died or became ill (Bonilla v. Court of Appeals, 340 SCRA 760 [2000]). And in this connection, substantial evidence has been defined as such degree of proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment (Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin, 437 SCRA 608 [2004]).
In the case before Us, private respondent complained of hearing loss which he allegedly acquired in connection with his work as Able Seaman on board C/S Installer. However, We do not find the work-connection of his hearing loss to be substantiated by evidence. The records before Us are bereft of any showing that would lead Us to believe that private respondent contracted hearing loss in the course of his employment or that his working conditions contributed thereto.
For one, other than his bare allegations, private respondent failed to adduce any evidence that would show that he was indeed exposed to noisy machines or engines in the vessel. No proof of his functions and duties in the vessel was presented except for the employment contract (Rollo, p. 54) which states that he was hired as Able Seaman. Private respondent should have at least presented documentary evidence showing the functions and duties relative to his position as certified to by his employer from which We could infer his exposure to high frequency noises in his work. Absent any link between his functions and working conditions, We cannot make a sweeping finding that private respondent’s work contributed to and aggravated his hearing loss. Absent such link, We cannot go beyond with what is settled by the records before Us, i.e., that private respondent was tasked to perform watch-keeping duties, he was part of the deck crew, and his place of assignment was not at the very location where the noisy machines and engines were.
For another, We also could not take private respondent’s position that he suffered hearing loss and pain during the course of his employment for it were true, he should have at least immediately brought the same to the attention of his employer. What the records show Us is that from January 2002 when he was deployed to C/S Cable Installer, he was found to be fit for work (Rollo, p. 55) and that for the duration of his contract, he never complained of any hearing difficulty or pain. The records also tell Us that when private respondent was repatriated to the Philippines on September 2002, he claimed, and was in fact paid, his salaries and remunerations. From that time on until he was denied deployment for another contract in March 2003, private respondent did not complain of any hearing loss to petitioners. Thus, private respondent’s failure to bring to the attention of petitioners that he suffered hearing loss while in the performance of his employment contract leads Us to believe otherwise.
Moreover, private respondent cannot claim disability compensation for failure to comply with Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seaman which reads:
“B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness:
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.” (Underscoring ours)
In Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin (437 SCRA 608 [2004]), the Supreme Court ruled that the claimant therein was not entitled to disability benefits for her failure to undergo a post-medical examination. The Supreme Court did not sustain claimant’s excuse that she could not have undergone the examination because she cannot be reasonably expected to travel from Lingayen, Pangasinan to Manila.
Similarly, in Rivera v. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. (474 SCRA 714 [2005]), where the claimant failed to submit himself to the mandatory post-employment medical examination, the Supreme Court ruled:
“In this case, it is not disputed that Rodolfo failed to submit himself to the mandatory post-employment medical examination. The respondent manning agency found out about his confinement only through the petitioner, who asked for assistance in claiming her husband’s retirement benefits. Indeed, while compliance with the reporting requirement under the Standard Employment Contract can be dispensed with, there must likewise be basis for the award of death compensation. Without a post-medical examination or its equivalent to show that the disease for which the seaman died was contracted during his employment or that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment, the respondents cannot be made liable for death compensation. Thus, in the absence of substantial evidence, working conditions cannot be presumed to have increased the risk of contracting the disease, in this case, chronic renal failure.” (Underscoring ours)
Also, in the recent case of Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent. Inc. (G.R. No. 167813, June 27, 2006), the Supreme Court said:
“Under Section 20-B, paragraph 3 of the said contract, petitioner is obliged to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure to comply with this mandatory reporting requirement shall result in forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. It is likewise provided that if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer whose decision shall be final and binding on both parties.”
In the instant case, private respondent was repatriated to the Philippines on September 6, 2002. Following the above-quoted Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seaman, he should have submitted himself to a mandatory post-employment medical examination. However, he did not do so.
Private respondent claimed that his failure to undergo the required post-employment medical examination was because petitioners’ physician misled him to believe that his hearing loss was nothing to worry about and would subside after a vacation. We are not persuaded.
The said Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seaman explicitly provides for the conduct of a mandatory post-employment medical examination and the failure of any claimant to undergo the same will not make his employer liable for disability benefits. True, the same provision allows of an exception but this applies only where the claimant is physically incapacitated to do so. In this case, private respondent despite his hearing loss was not physically indisposed as to excuse him from subjecting himself to the post-employment medical examination. In fact, he was not physically incapacitated at all as he was able to report to petitioner CF Sharp’s office to claim his salaries and remunerations.
Had private respondent undergone this mandatory post-employment medical examination with petitioners’ designated physician and was then and there found to be suffering from hearing loss, the work-connection of his hearing ailment would have been sufficiently established in light of the fact that he was found fit for work at the start of his subject deployment by the company-designated physician, and found by the same examining persons to be suffering from hearing loss at the time of his disembarkation. However, due to private respondent’s failure to do so, We are inclined to deny his claim for disability benefits especially because his illness was not sufficiently proven to be connected with his work and/or was aggravated by his working conditions.
We are mindful that migrant workers are the modern-day heroes of our time and that quite often, they find themselves laboring in the scorching heat and the freezing cold in foreign lands (More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, 307 SCRA 189 [1999]). However, while we commiserate with the hearing loss of private respondent, Our sympathy cannot justify an award which is not authorized by law.
All told, prescinding from the above discussion, We are convinced that the Labor Arbiter and public respondent NLRC erred in awarding disability compensation and benefits to private respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission dated February 28, 2005 and June 30, 2005, respectively, in NLRC OFW (M) 03-11-2802-00/CA No. 040369-04 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, (Chairman) and Lanzanas, JJ., concur.