G.R. No. L-48448. February 20, 1984
CRESENCIO, MAGIN, JUANITO, SOCRATES, AND IMELDA, ALL SURNAMED VELEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CELSO AVELINO, PRESIDING JUDGE, CFI CEBU BRANCH XIII, ALDING ACEDERA, FABIANA ALLISON,…
GUERRERO, J.:
Juanito, Socrates and Imelda, all surnamed Velez, seeking the reversal,
for grave abuse of discretion, the decision dated May 22, 1978 of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII dismissing their complaint
for recovery of possession of five parcels of land pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 20.
The evidence shows that the five parcels of land all located at
Katipunan Street, Cebu City, then assessed at P17,000.00 and known as
Lots 5311-A-2-A, 5311-A-2-B, 5311-A-2-C, 5311-A-2-D and 5311-A-2-F, were
formerly owned by Rodrigo Velez, the father of petitioners. In an
extrajudicial partition, the said lots were adjudicated to petitioners
herein on June 16, 1970. As early as 1970, petitioners made a demand to
vacate upon respondents who asked an extension of one year but
thereafter, respondents changed their minds and refused to vacate.
Around the end of 1973, petitioners again advised respondents that they
needed the premises for their own use and ordered them to vacate the
premises by removing their dwelling units from the lots. Upon their
refusal, petitioners filed an ejectment case before the City Court of
Cebu, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-17011. On motion of
respondents, the City Court dismissed the case without prejudice
in an Order dated August 3, 1974 on the ground that there exists no
cause of action, following the suspension of judicial ejectment by
Presidential Decree No. 20. On July 3, 1976, petitioners made again an
extrajudicial demand in a letter which required respondents to vacate
the premises within 15 days at the same time threatening them with
prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 772 for the crime of
squatting. On August 5, 1976, petitioners filed the complaint for
recovery of possession of the aforesaid five parcels of land alleging
that except for Magin Velez, they have no other lot of their own and are
living on other persons’ premises; that respondents are not only
occupying the premises but also accepting boarders and/or using the same
for commercial purposes and that several demands have been made to give
way to the needs of petitioners and their respective families but
respondents maliciously, abusively and defiantly refused to accede to
petitioners’ lawful demands.
In their answer, respondents admitted the ownership of the land by
petitioners. But in their special and affirmative defenses, they
alleged that they have been occupying portions of the lots by virtue of
oral agreements of lease for an indefinite period, paying monthly
rentals for their respective portions ranging from P4.00 to P12.00; that
the present action is barred by res judicata and/or prior
judgment and that the present action, if at all there is any cause of
action, is essentially one for unlawful detainer since the last demand
to vacate was made less than a year ago.
Eight of the twenty respondents testified that they are the original
occupants of the lots while two of them, Segundo Macatol and Hilario
Gaviola, claimed to have bought their houses from third persons with the
understanding that they should pay rentals to the landowner, Rodrigo
Velez. They also testified that they have been paying rentals for their
respective portions ranging from P4.00 to P12.00. In support of their
claim of payment of rentals, at least six of them presented one or two
receipts dated 1973 or earlier (Exhibits 2, 2-A to 2-I) and claimed that
other receipts were lost. But all respondents admitted not having paid
rentals since 1973, some reasoning out that nobody collected and others
claiming that Fabiola Velez Garganera, Rodrigo Velez’ daughter, refused
to accept their rentals. At least one of them, Hilario Gaviola,
produced what he claimed as a building permit but the same turned out to
be a mere application.
After the case was submitted for decision, the trial court ruled:
“It appearing that the defendants are lessees of the portions of
the land in question wherein their respective dwelling units are
erected, personal use by the plaintiffs and/or their families of the
said land, cannot be a valid ground for judicial ejectment of the
former, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 20, issued by the President
on March 15, 1977.” (sic, should be October 12, 1972). (Decision of the
CFI, p. 5; Rollo, p. 30)
On the ground that respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu acted with grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of his
judicial functions by holding that private respondents are lessees and,
therefore, privileged to continue staying on the lots in question
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 20, the plaintiffs below brought
this instant petition for certiorari.
Petitioners contend that the preponderance of evidence shows that the
occupancy of private respondents on the lots in question is due to the
tolerance of the owners thereof and against the latter’s will.
Conceding that respondents are lessees, petitioners claim that
Presidential Decree No. 20 does not mean that (1) they are freed from
paying rentals for the lots in question; (2) they can use the lots for
commercial purposes; and (3) they can refuse to adduce evidence –
specifically referring to the twelve respondents who did not testify on
their behalf.
In answer to the argument of respondents that they are willing to pay
rentals if petitioners send collectors, petitioners cite Article 1256 of
the Civil Code where mere willingness to pay is not payment, thus:
“Art. 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been
made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be
released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sun
due.”
Petitioners also claim that they had presented evidence that some
respondents, particularly Natividad Bajarias, Maura Belarma and Placida
Tejano, are using the premises not only as residences but also stores
while Alding Acedera is using her residence as a boarding house, thereby
removing said respondents from the protective mantle of Presidential
Decree No. 20.
Finally, petitioners invoke the equal protection rights guaranteed by
the Constitution contending that respondent Judge’s undue application of
Presidential Decree No. 20 in spite of the undisputed fact that
petitioners have no other lot of their own and are renting other
people’s properties, except Magin Velez (who nevertheless wants to
recover his property for the use of one of his children who is married),
constitutes a denial of said constitutional provision.
Whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
must be resolved in the affirmative. It should be recalled that this is
a case of accion publiciana, the purpose of which is being to
establish who have a better right to possess. (Bernabe, et al. vs.
Judge Dayrit, et al., G.R. No. 58399, Oct. 27, 1983). There is no
allegation of forcible entry in the complaint. Neither is it a case of
unlawful detainer because the preponderance of evidence shows that the
occupancy of private respondents on the lot in question is due to the
tolerance of the owners thereof and against the latter’s will. Private
respondents admit that they have no written contract of lease with the
petitioners not with petitioners’ predecessor in interest. Only Marcial
Burgos alleged that he had an oral agreement with Rodrigo Velez, all
others surprisingly failed to testify that they had such an oral
agreement of lease. They likewise admit that their houses were
constructed without building permits. In the true sense of the word,
respondents are squatters. As such, their possession is by tolerance.
(Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136). Although respondents had been
paying nominal rentals, ranging from P4.00 to P12.00 per month for some
time, they did not thereby acquire the legal status of tenants.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence converts it into a
lawful act. Illegal constructions constitute public nuisance per se.
They pose problems of health and sanitation. (Cf. City of Manila vs.
Garcia, et al., 19 SCRA 413).
Even if the case were to be decided as an ejectment case, the insistence
of respondents that they are lessees and, therefore, under the
protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 20 loses ground when We
consider the finding of fact that respondents had not been paying any
consideration for the occupancy of their respective premises. Said
Presidential Decree No. 20 suspended ejectment when the lease is for an
indefinite period. It did not suspend ejectment on other grounds like
lack of payment of the rental stipulated.
The failure of the owners to collect, or their refusal to accept the
rentals are not valid defenses. Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides
that “if the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses
without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from
responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due.”
Independently of the foregoing, the petitioners’ need of the premises
for their own use or for the use of any member of his family as a
residential unit entitles them to the possession of the lots in
question. Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, which took effect on April 10, 1979,
provides as additional ground for judicial ejectment the need of the
owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own use or for the use of
any member of his family as a residential unit, such owner or immediate
member not being the owner of any other available residential unit.
Even before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Presidential
Decree No. 20 had been held to be not without exception. In Ongchengco vs. City Court of Zamboanga,
95 SCRA 313, this Court ruled that “extreme necessity for personal use
of the property entitles the owner to exemption from the operation of PD
20 which suspends the provision of Article 1673 of the Civil Code on
judicial ejectment.” The case of Betts vs. Matias, 97 SCRA 439,
reaffirmed that “Presidential Decree No. 20 does not sanction the
deprivation of a lessor of residential property in extreme need of the
leased premises for his own use of his right to terminate the lease and
recover possession of his property.” Then, in Sinclair vs. Court of Appeals,
115 SCRA 318, this Court held that “a strict and rigid compliance with
Presidential Decree No. 20 is not in order, for an exemption from its
provisions is warranted for humanitarian reasons.” Again, in Tan Tok Lee vs. CFI of Kalookan City,
121 SCRA 438, this Court said that “petitioners’ reliance on the
provision of Presidential Decree No. 20 is not well taken. It could not
have been the intention of the said decree to deprive the owner of the
rightful use of her home, more so, when petitioners reneged on their
promise to look for another house in the mistaken belief that PD 20 gave
them a preferential right over that of the owner. To deny the owner of
the use and possession of her property would be tantamount to depriving
her of her constitutional right to abode.” In Rantael vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
97 SCRA 453, this Court upheld the right of the Iessor to judicially
eject the lessee on the ground not only that “expiration of period of
written lease contract is manifestly present” but also because Batas
Pambansa Blg. 25 which superseded P.D. 20 “buttresses the right of
respondent Llave to judicially eject petitioner Rantael from the leased
premises.” In Santos vs. Court of Appeals and Paraguas, G.R.
No. L-45071, May 30, 1983, this Court held that “the retroactive
application of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 to pending ejectment cases is
already a settled matter and may no longer be questioned. (Alejandro
Melchor, Jr., etc. vs. Hon. Jose L. Moya, etc., et al., G.R. No.
L-35256, March 17, 1983; Gutierrez vs. Cantada, 90 SCRA 1; Ongchengco
vs. City Court of Zamboanga, 95 SCRA 313; Betts vs. Matias, 97 SCRA
439). It was also held therein that “the right of the private
respondents over the property which they own in order to use the same as
their residence, not being owners of any other dwelling place, may not
be denied. Such right is expressly recognized by Batas Pambansa Blg.
25. Elemental sense of justice and fairness dictates that it must be
so.”
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The
decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII,
dismissing the complaint of petitioners, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered in favor of petitioners,
ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to remove
their respective constructions and/or improvements therefrom within
sixty (60) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.