G.R. No. L-12268. November 28, 1959
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JUAN MARTINEZ GODINEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
BARRERA, J.:
Manila (in Criminal Case No. 35737) with the crime of murder, for
the killing of Spanish Gonsul Horencio Millaruelo. After trial,
he was found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of recluision perpetua, and to pay indemnity in the sum of P6,000.00 and costs. From this judgment of conviction, he has appealed to us.
The
records disclose that in the morning of May 4, 1956, at about 11:20
o’clock, while Carmen Fernandez and Carmen Suarez were at their room
in the Spanish Consulate at Ayala Building, Manila, they heard a
gunshot. Moments later, while trying to locate where the shot came
from, they saw appellant, with hands on his head, coming out of his
room. He told them that Consul Millaruelo was shot and badly hurt,
and asked them to call a doctor. Carmen Fernandez rushed out to fetch
a doctor. In the meantime, appellant kept going; in and out of his
room. Later, he told Carmen Suarez to call up the Spanish Embassy
to inform it of the occurrence. Shortly there after, Dr.
Esperidion Tiongson arrived. He tried to revive the victim but his
efforts proved futile, because hardly,a minute later the victim died.
Having;
been informed about the incident, Emillo Blanco and Capt. Joaquin
Valero of the Spanish, Embassy hastened to the scene; of the incident
and there found the victim already dead. Valero found on appellant’s
table a piece of paper (Exh. BB), containing certain computations, in
the handwriting of the deceased among which was the figure “P43,430.84”.
Minutes
later, at about 12:16 o’clock past noon, Sgt. Capistrano, Patrolman
Mallare, and Detective Aguirre of the Manila Police Department, also
arrived at the scene to conduct an investigation of the incident.
Appellant admitted to them that it was he who had accidentally shot the
deceased with his .45 caliber pistol (EXh. K). Sgt. Capistrano found
the pistol lying on top of appellant’s table, fully cocked and loaded
with 3 rounds of ammunition (Exhs. K, K-1, and K-2)’ inside its
magazine. Inside its chamber, was one live bullet. ”’They also found
an empty .45 caliber cartridge shell (Exh. N) near the victim’s body,
and a slug (Exh. C), on the northeast corner of the room. Said empty
cartridge shell, slug, and ammunitions were thereafter submitted for
examination and testing to Ballistics Chief, Simeon Molina, of the
MPD. In his report (Exh. Y), Molina stated that the pistol was
mechanically sound, and that when fired, it ejects a bullet in a
straightforward direction; and that when cocked, it does not go off,
even when dropped from 6 inches to 1 yard on hard material. On May
5, 1956, Sgt. Capistrano took down in writing appellant’s statement
(Exh.Q) regarding the incident.
According to Dr. Mariano de
Lara, Chief Medical Examiner of the MPD, the wound produced by the
bullet which hit the victim traversed his left chest, obliquely
coming downward out of his back; and that the gun shot pierced the
victim’s heart completely, from front to back, passing through the
spleen. (Exh. E).
Appellant claims that the shooting of the
deceased Millaruelo was purely accidental. He relates that: In the
morning of May 4, 1956, between 11:00 and 11:30 o’clock he was in his
room in the Spanish Consulate. The deceased entered the room, as
appellant-wanted to show him some papers, and took a chair, moving
it in front of appellant’s table. Appellant, who was seated on his
chair behind his table and facing the deceased, stood up, pushing back
his chair, so that he could open his center drawer. At that time the
pistol (Exh. K) was inside the drawer on top of the papers which
he wanted to show the deceased, which papers consisted of letters
with money attached to them and which were about 21/2 inches thick. In
order to get said papers, appellant lifted the pistol with his right
hand such that it was in an unnatural position, that is, he was holding
it laterally, while trying to. get the papers from the drawer with his
left hand. While in that position, the pistol exploded, hitting the
deceased on the chest.
We do not find convincing appellant’s
explanation of the victim’s death admittedly caused by him. Appellant
declared that the safety lock of the pistol was set in the day before
the incident and that nobody had touched it. But he failed to
satisfactorily explain why it was fully cocked at the time of the
incident. His claim that it was always cocked from the time he got
its license in 1947 as a precaution against an emergency is
incredible. As the trial court correctly observed, appellant had no
reason for so doing as he had admitted that he had no enemies who
might make an attempt on his life. Said claim is disproved by the
testimony of his own witness and friend Salvajuaregui who declared that
on 3 occasions when he visited appellant at the Consulate in April
and May, 1956 prior to the incident, he saw appellant’s pistol but
the same was never cocked. It is likewise disproved by the testimony
of defense witness Concepcion Torres who stated that on certain
occasions when appellant requested her to get some papers from the
drawer, appellant told her that the pistol was not loaded. He admitted
that had it not been fully cocked, it would not have discharged even
by a slight touch. Appellant knew that the pistol had 3 safety devices
for the purpose of preventing its accidental firing; and that one had
to press the safety grip an^J press the trigger beyond the slack point,
exerting a pressure of 4.8 pounds, in order to fire. In spite of said
safety devices, appellant relates that when he lifted the pistol, it
discharged, but could not explain why it did fire, notwithstanding the
fact that, according to him, he had handled several kinds of pistols
before. It is significant that the pistol was subjected to a test by
Ballistic Chief Molina and was found to be mechanically sound, and
that even if fully cocked and dropped on a hard material, from 6 inches
to 1 yard, it will not go off.
It was likewise shown that it
was appellant’s habit whenever he took some papers from his drawer, to
simply push aside the pistol without lifting the same. He admitted
that it was not necessary for him to lift the pistol to get the papers
he wanted to show to the deceased, that is, that he could have pulled
out said papers even if the pistol was on top of them. He, likewise
admitted that he could have lifted the pistol without placing his
forefinger on its trigger. Yet significantly on this occasion, he did
exactly the opposite of all these.
At this juncture, it is
interesting to note that appellant did relate several inconsistent
accounts of the incident, which further indicate the improbability of
his claim of accidental shooting. In his statement to Sgt. Capistrano
(Exh. Q), he said that when he lifted the pistol with his right hand to
get hold of the papers underneath it with his left hand, it exploded.
But when he was interviewed by Patrolman Valentin, Francisco Palisoc,
and Jose Mascañan, who went to the scene of the shooting right after
its occurrence, he declared that his pistol went off after he had
placed it on his table. He also stated that he was standing when the
pistol-fired, explaining in this connection that he had to stand, in
order to open his drawer. Yet, he had made a previous statement that
he was sitting on his chair when the pistol exploded.
Finally,
as observed by the trial court, if it is really true that the
shooting was accidental, appellant should have rushed to the aid of
the deceased and embraced and comforted him. He did not. Instead, he
strangely cocked his pistol again (it was found so cocked immediately
after the occurrence) as if intending to use it anew, and stood by
his table looking at the deceased fall backward.
All the
foregoing circumstances, to our mind, disprove appellant’s claim that
his shooting of the deceased was purely accidental, and convince
us that it was done intentionally.
Appellant did not lack
motives to eliminate the deceased. It was duly established by the
prosecution that as chancellor of the Spanish Consulate since 1947 up
to the time of his dismissal on May 5, 1956 (Exh. KK), he took charge
of the consulate as general manager, treasurer, and disbursing
officer. The different consuls under whom he served had full trust
and confidence in him that, whenever he prepared balance sheets, they
never bothered to take inventory of the cash in his safe. In
fact appellant admitted that he alone had the key to the consulate
safe since 1941.
This reliance reposed on him by his
superiors induced appellant to believe that he was indispensable in the
consulate, and that he had, therefore, more right to occupy the
position of acting consul, whenever the titular consul was on leave.
When Consul Jose Agullo went on leave on April 7, 1956, appellant
naturally expected that he would be designated as the acting consul.
But he failed to get the designation, and so expressed his resentment
and disgust. During a conversation with Consul Agullo and the
deceased, appellant told them of his pretended right to be appointed as
acting consul The deceased, however, answered in a friendly manner
that no such right existed. Upon learning that the deceased was to be
designated as acting consul, he wrote a letter dated February 17, 1956
(Exh. CC) to his former chief, Consul Nicolas Martin Alonzo, stating
inter alia, that the designation of the deceased was a “pisoton” (injustice) to, him. Said letter, in part, reads:
“Creame
Sr. Alonzo, que, lo que vengo pidiendo de hace anos, lo creo de
justicia y equidad, por lo que he de recordarle interceda en mi favor
ante la Seccion correspondiente para mejorar con ella mi situacion,
ya que en esta, de dia en dia el costo de yida va , elevandose
al extremo de tener que incurrir en privaciones para poder hacer frente
a todas las necesidades de familia.“Como Vd. bien saber
vengo prestando servicio sin fallar un solo dia y en mas de una
ocasi6n no se guarda a mi persona consideration alguna. Ahora mismo
me entero de los planes del Sr. Agullo, quien al parecer desea
ausentarse un par de meses de vacaciones y tengo entendido que el
Sr. Embajador, designara al Sr. Millaruelo, para hacerse cargo
durante su ausencia—No cree Vd. que esto es un pisoton que de nuevo me dan,
ya que anteriormente, lo fui por el Sr. Beltran y por el Sr. Santiago
de Concha, cuando Vd. realizo se dara debida justicia a mi persona. *
* *.” (Italics supplied.)
In fact, appellant
testified that there was no reason at all for bringing another man from
outside, when the work in the consulate was going on smoothly with him
m the office.
It appears that the deceased, being a military man
and a lawyer, was very strict, straightforward, and exacting in his
official duties. He usually wanted to run things by himself in his
own. way, intervening even in minute details in the office. Before
he took over officially as acting consul on May 2, 1956, he started
visiting the consulate since April 7 in order to familiarize himself
on how it was being run. Appellant was, as a result, disappointed
and disgusted, especially when the deceased undertook to change the
office procedure. For such change of procedure, more particularly in
the keeping of consulate funds, would mean the inevitable discovery
of appellant’s admitted misappropriation in the sum of P43,334.92
which he had applied to his personal use without the knowledge of his
superiors since 1949, a procedure which the previous consuls never
instituted at all. And it is evident that appellant’s
misappropriation had been discovered by the deceased. This is shown
by Exhibit HH, a page of appellant’s desk calendar on which are
written in appellant’s handwriting the following: “Millaruelo—P43,000
para depositar en Embajada”, as well as by Exhibit BB, a sheet of pad
paper found on top of appellant’s desk on the day of the occurrence,
containing computations in the handwriting of the deceased among
which is the figure “P43,430.84” the amount of appellant’s
shortage. As the trial court said:
“* * * En
primer lugar, el no haber (Millaruelo) firmado el balance general de
30 de Abril, habiendo firmado el balance de sellos, demuestra que el
balance era falso en cuanto hacia constar la actual existencia en caja
de los fondos desfalcados. En segundo Iugar, la anotacion que el
acusado raismo puso en su calendario de mesa, que dice “P43,000
para entregar embajada,” revela que habia una orden en tal sentido
que solo podia haber emanado, en las circunstancias del caso, de
Millaruelo. Carece de importancia el que esa anotacion aparece
puesta en la hoja del calendario correspondiente al 7 de Abril, pues
esta admitido que el acusado tenia la costumbre de poner esas
anotaciones en las hojas de su almanaque de mesa sin tener en cuenta
la fecha que llevaba la hoja donde ponia una anotacion particular.
En, tercer Iugar, el mismo testigo de la defensa, Profesor Montiel,
declara haber oido a Millaruelo dicirle al acusado hacia el mediodia
del 2 de Mayo, cuando estaban frente a las oficinas del National City
Bank, que “queria aquello arreglado pronto,” y el mismo acusado
admite , en su declaracion escrita, cuidadosamente preparada del 7
de Mayo y entregada al embajador espanol: ‘El dia 29 de Abril me dijo
(Millaruelo) que queria todo arreglado en fecha 30’ (Abril). Cuando
Millaruelo dijo que ‘queria tbdo arreglado’ tenia que referirse
principalmente a los fondos que faltaban en la caja del consulado y que
no eran moco de pavo. En verdad no consta que hubiese otra cosa
que ‘arreglar pronto’ excepto la reposicion de aquellos fondos, porque
los sellos consulares estaban en orden,”
It was
established that on May 2, 1956, when the deceased assumed his
official duties as acting consul, he and appellant had a violent
discussion in appellant’s room regarding the accounts of the
latter. Defense witness Carmen Fernandez declared that she
overheard the deceased say to appellant: “Eso no es mi cuenta”.
(That is not my lookout). Being a strict disciplinarian, the
deceased did exactly what appellant was trying to avoid, namely,
the physical inventory of the consulate funds, of which he was
responsible. All of these factors and events must have influenced the
thinking and behavior of appellant on the morning of the fatal day
and overwhelmed him completely. On this point, the trial court
stated:
“El acusado habia Uegado a nn punto de
desesperacion: los repetidos atropellos, ‘pisotones’, de que era
objeto por parte de sus superiores, con las repetidas frustraciones de
su deseo de interinar como jefe del consulado y de obtener atimento de
sueldo, apesar de los meritorios aiios de servicio y capacidad que
pretende haber rendido y demonstrado; la designacion de Millaruelo
como consul interino que hacia imposible que el acusado pudiera
continuar ocultando su desfalco; la negativa de Millaruelo de
actuar de encubridor del desfalco cuando se nego a firmar al balance
general de Abril hasta que el acusado tuviera ‘arreglado todo el dia
30′ (de Abril) reponiendo los fondos desfalcados, y el cambio radical
de los procedimentos del consulado que hirieran al acusado en su
mal entendido amor propio con la, consiguiente perdida de prestigio
ante los empleados del consulado que habian venido considerandole
como el factotum en aquella oficina, y la perspectiva de la
expulsion del servicio, la deshonra y la prision, ante la
imposibilidad de cubrir el desfalco descubierto por Millaruelo: Todo
ello constituia movil suficiente para llegar al crimen utilizando
como victima a la persona que mejor venia a naano porque era la que
vino a dar al traste con sus bien calculados planes y habia provocado
ademas su odio por sus maneras autoritarias, su negativa a encubrir
el desfalco y sus apremiantes ordenes de “tenerlo todo arreglado’ es
decir, haber restitucidn completo, ‘ei dia 30 Abril'”.
But
appellant contends that the existence of a motive alone would not be
proof that he actually committed the offense. In support of his
contention, appellant invokes the decision of this Court in the case
of People vs. Marcos, et.al. (70) Phil., 468) wherein it was
stated that “the existence of a motive alone though perhaps an
important consideration, is not proof of the commission of the crime,
much less of the guilt of the defendants-appellants.”
The
principle invoked is not applicable to the ease at bar. It relates to
cases where there is no other evidence as to the identity of the
offender. Motive alone cannot serve as the link between the
offense and the person suspected to have committed the offense.
Hence, in the Marcos case, the accused were acquitted because while
the possible motive of appellants to desire the death of the victim
Nalundasan was established, the identity of the person responsible
for his death was not satisfactorily proved. But here it is not
disputed that the deceased died as a consequence of a bullet wound
which was discharged by appellant from his .45 caliber pistol (Exh.
K). The existence of a motive on the part of appellant becomes
decisive in determining the probability and credibility of his version
that the shooting was purely accidental.
There was treachery
in the willful shooting of the deceased which qualifies the crime as
murder, inasmuch as it was executed suddenly and unexpectedly, without
any warning to the deceased, who was seated at the time, and in a
closed room where only the deceased and appellant were present, thereby
ensuring the accomplishment of the offense without risk to appellant.
(People vs. Pengzon, 44 Phil, 224; People vs. Bandojo, 70 Phil., 486; People vs. Dosal, 92 Phil., 877) [1].
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of respect due to rank (Art.
14, par. 3, Rev. Penal Code) attended its commission, as it was not
disputed that the deceased was the acting consul of the Spanish
Consulate at the time of the incident, while appellant was a mere
chansellor, a subordinate of the deceased. Said circumstance, although
not alleged in the information was proved at the trial and, therefore,
may be taken into consideration. (People vs. Collado, 60 Phil,, 610; People vs. Abella, et al., 45 Off. Gaz., 1802.)
We
agree with the Solicitor General that the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation was not duly proved. There was no mitigating
circumstance to offset the aforementioned aggravating circumstance of
disregard of respect due to rank. The case, therefore, calls for the
application of the maximum penalty provided by law— death. However,
for failure in this case to get the necessary votes to impose said
penalty, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs
against the appellant.
It is so ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
[1] See also People vs. Noble, 77 Phil., 93; People vs. Sabijon, et al., G. R. No. L-6509, April 29, 1954.