DIONISIO NAGRAMPA, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JULIA MARGATE NAGRAMPA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is a suit to revoke a donation. The court of first instance of Camarines
Sur dismissed it on the ground of prescription.

Way back in 1937, the plaintiffs executed a notarial instrument entitled
“Onerous donation inter vivos” the pertinent portions of which read as
follows:

“That we, Dionisio Nagrampa, Filipino, 69 years of age, and Tecla Collada,
Filipino, 68 years old, husband and wife, respectively, residents and with
postal address in Iriga, Camarines Sur, Philippines, hereafter called the
DONORS, and Julia Margate Nagrampa, Filipino, of legal age, and Pablo Sadang,
Filipino, of legal age, wife and husband respectively, all residents and with
postal address in Iriga, Camarines Sur, Philippines, hereinafter called the
DONEES, have agreed as they do hereby agree to the following;

“That the said DON0RS, Dionisio Nagrampa and Tecla Collada, for and in
consideration of their love and affection for the said DONEES, Julia Margate
Nagrampa and Pablo Sadang, and also for the services rendered and to be rendered
to the DONORS by the donees, do by these presents, voluntarily give, grant, and
donate to the DONEES, their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns
forever the following described real properties and the improvements thereon,
free from all liens, charges and incumbrances: * * *

“These parcels described above are not registered under Act 496 nor under the
Spanish Mortgage Law, hence, the parties herein have agreed to register this
instrument under the terms of Act 3344.

“That the said donees, Julia Margate Nagrampa and Pablo Sadang, hereby
receive and accept this donation and rift and further express their gratitude
for the generosity of the said donors who hereby acknowledge the notification of
such acceptance by the Donees. * * *.

Donors and donees signed and acknowledged the instrument.

On July 21, 1958, this complaint was filed, the plaintiffs alleging that
defendant, in violation of the conditions of the donation, had failed to render
them “financial, physical and all kinds of services”; and that ‘^fjse Years ago”
plaintiffs demanded such services, which defendant Julia Margate Nagrampa (her
husband had died) “refused and until now refuses” to render. Copy of the deed of
donation was attached to the complaint.

Defendant moved to dismiss, because Art. 764 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines has fixed a four-year period within which actions to revoke
donations may be filed, such period to be counted from the non-compliance with
the conditions allegedly violated. The court sustained the motion, and ordered
the dismissal of the case.

Plaintiffs have appealed. The period of prescription, they contend, is ten
years because this being an onerous donation, it is governed by the law on
contracts-Art. 733, Civil Code of the Philippines-and according to Art 1144 of
the same Code, actions upon written contracts must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues.

Appellee replies that Art. 764 is a special provision about revocation that
must control general provisions. At any rate, she says, even if the rules of
contracts be applied, plaintiffs’ action is in effect one for rescission, which
action “must be commenced within four years.” (Art. 1389.)

The deed of donation was undoubtedly inter vivos. It was captioned
“onerous donation inter vivos.” It contemplated immediate transfer of ownership.
There was no mention of death, the donees “hereby received” the donation, and it
provided for registration of the instrument (which donated real property) in the
land records. It was not in the form of a will, since there were no three
witnesses and no attestation clause.^[1]

Such donations (inter vivos) “shall be governed by the general
provisions concerning contracts and obligations in all matters not
determined by this title.” Art. 621, Civil Code (Art. 732, Civil Code of
the Philippines). And under Art. 647 of the same title (as amended by Art. 764
of the Civil Code of the Philippines), actions for the revocation of such
donation by reason of non-compliance with its conditions prescribe “after
four years counted from such non-compliance.” Now, therefore, as the
complaint described refusal of donees to render services-which refusal
constituted the alleged non-compliance-more than five years before the
presentation thereof, it is clear that the court a quo committed no
error in dismissing it on the ground of prescription.^[2]

In this connection, it may be explained that although no special period of
prescription was fixed in “this title” at the time of the donation in 1937, the
provisions of Art. 764 of the Civil Code of the Philippines operate, to preclude
this action, because the entire period of four years fixed by it has
elapsed since the time such Code took effect in 1950: suit in July, 1958,
violation in 1953.

“Art. 1116.-Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code
shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code
took effect the entire period herein required for prescription should elapse,
the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws a longer
period might be required. (1939)”

Consequently, the appealed order is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellants.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Order affirmed.

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^[1] See Cuevas vs. Cuevas 98
Phil., 68; 51 Off. Gaz., 6163; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91 Phil.,
823; Zapanta vs. Posadas, 52 Phil., 557; Tuason vs. Tuason, 54
Phil., 289; Tagala vs. Ybeas, 49 Off. Gaz., 200.

In fact, appellants do not claim, in this Court, that it was mortis
causa.

^[2] This view makes it unnecesary to
go into the other points raised by appellee: (a) no violation of the
indefinite condition of “future services to be rendered”; (b) the
violation, if any, was ground for rescission of a contract which must be filed
within four years.